In January, Romania passed controversial amendments to its anti-extremism legislation, sparking protests over free speech concerns that remain unresolved today. 

In January, protests took place in Bucharest and several other Romanian cities after lawmakers proposed amendments to the country’s anti-extremism legislation. Demonstrators gathered in central Bucharest raising concerns that the amendments could restrict freedom of expression. Supporters of the legislative changes argue that they are needed to strengthen Romania’s ability to address extremist propaganda in the current uprising of conservative and right wing parties, which have been accused by the opposition of dabbling with dangerous political messages.

Supporters of the amendments argue that extremist narratives increasingly circulate online and that existing legislation should be updated to reflect this reality. In their view, strengthening the legal framework is necessary to respond to propaganda that spreads through social media platforms and online communities. Several European states have adopted strict legislation targeting extremist ideologies, particularly those linked to fascism and Nazism, like Germany, Austria and Spain.

Romanian legislation already criminalizes the promotion of fascist, racist, and xenophobic ideologies under Government Emergency Ordinance No. 31/2002. The law prohibits the creation of fascist organizations, the use of fascist symbols, and the promotion of individuals responsible for crimes against humanity. However, the amendments seek to expand the scope of the legislation and address the dissemination of extremist propaganda, including in digital environments.

After passing a parliamentary vote the first time, Romanian President Nicușor Dan refused to promulgate the amendment and returned it to Parliament for reconsideration, arguing that several provisions lacked sufficient legal clarity. In his view, key terms used in the law, such as “fascist,” “legionary,” and references to organizations or materials with such a character, were not precisely defined. Because the law introduces criminal liability, he argued that the principle of legal certainty requires clear and predictable wording so citizens can understand what conduct is prohibited. Dan warned that the current formulation could lead to inconsistent or overly broad interpretations, potentially affecting legitimate historical discussion, academic research, or civic activity. For that reason, he asked Parliament to clarify the definitions before the law could be promulgated.

The Romanian Parliament, however, rejected the president’s objections and passed the law again in essentially the same form. Under the Romanian Constitution, once Parliament adopts a law again, even when it had been returned for revision by the President, the latter must promulgate it or refer it for review to the Romanian Constitutional Court.

President Nicușor Dan explained that he would not promulgate the amendment to the anti-extremism law because in its current form, the legislative act could also make liable to imprisonment those who, for example, read classical texts that contain antisemitic passages. The head of state gave as an example the play The Merchant of Venice, a classic work written by William Shakespeare. Dan said on national television: “As that law is written, if I were to give you the complete works of Shakespeare and read them word for word, I could be liable to prison, because there is a play called The Merchant of Venice and it contains certain antisemitic passages. We need to maintain a balance.”

The President also raised constitutional concerns about the wording of the law, but the Romanian Constitutional Court rejected the challenge, ruling that the legislation was constitutional. The court’s reasoning was that the law is “clear, precise and predictable,” pursues the legitimate aim of protecting democratic values and human dignity, and that concepts such as fascism or legionary ideology are historically established notions that do not require strict statutory definitions. The court’s ruling has not yet been published in the official monitor or on the court’s website.

Critics argue that Romania already has sufficient legal tools to address extremist speech. Ordinance No. 31/2002 provides criminal sanctions for promoting fascist or racist ideologies, while the Romanian Criminal Code includes provisions addressing incitement to hatred or discrimination. These provisions have been applied in cases involving extremist speech and Holocaust denial, indicating that the existing framework already addresses conduct that crosses the legal threshold. The concern raised by many legal commentators is the potential chilling effect of broadly worded criminal provisions. When legislation relies on vague concepts such as “promotion” or “support” for extremist ideas, individuals may hesitate to engage in legitimate discussion out of concern that their speech could fall within the scope of the law. Journalists, academics, or citizens participating in political debates may avoid addressing controversial topics if the boundaries of permissible speech are unclear.

Romania’s Constitution protects freedom of expression while allowing certain restrictions in order to protect public order and the rights of others. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights similarly protects freedom of expression while permitting restrictions that are necessary in a democratic society. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly stated that freedom of expression applies not only to ideas that are well received, but also to those that “offend, shock, or disturb.” This principle is relevant to the Romanian debate. Democratic legal systems allow restrictions on speech that incites violence, discrimination, or hatred, but such restrictions must be clearly defined. If the boundaries of criminal liability are uncertain, the law risks discouraging speech that should remain protected.

The amendment also attempts to address a problem that does not currently exist in Romania at a scale that would justify expanding criminal legislation. Romania already prohibits fascist organizations, Holocaust denial, and incitement to hatred under Ordinance 31/2002 and relevant provisions of the Criminal Code, and these tools remain available to authorities when extremist conduct crosses the legal threshold. Unlike several Western European countries that have faced recurring problems with violent extremist movements or organized radical groups, Romania has not experienced a comparable phenomenon in recent years. In this context, the amendment risks looking less like a response to a concrete domestic challenge and more like an effort to mirror regulatory approaches developed elsewhere in Europe. Such legislative moves can lead to overregulation, expanding criminal liability in areas where existing law is already sufficient and where the social conditions that prompted similar measures in other states are largely absent. Criminal law should address real and demonstrable harms, not hypothetical ones, and adopting increasingly restrictive provisions without a clear societal need risks undermining the balance between protecting democratic values and preserving freedom of expression, leading to the political weaponization of legislation.

Some critics have also drawn comparisons with other democratic systems. In France, political movements with controversial ideological positions, including the French Communist Party, have historically operated as legal political actors. The argument advanced by some commentators is that democratic societies must tolerate political viewpoints that many citizens strongly oppose, provided they do not incite violence or hatred. A similar argument has been made in the United States in the context of freedom of speech jurisprudence. American courts have protected the right of extremist groups, including the Ku Klux Klan, to hold public demonstrations. Civil liberties advocates have long argued that protecting even highly offensive speech is necessary in order to preserve freedom of expression more broadly. The reasoning is that once governments acquire the authority to prohibit certain viewpoints, the scope of that authority may gradually expand, centralising too much censorship power within the state.

With Parliament adopting the amendment a second time after the mobilization of centrist and left-leaning parties, the President was effectively placed in the position of promulgating the law, leaving little room for further institutional resistance. The political stage of the process therefore appears largely settled. What remains uncertain is how far the practical effects of the amendment will reach once it begins to operate in real cases. Much will depend on how national courts interpret its broadly framed provisions. The responsibility will ultimately fall on the judiciary to apply the law cautiously and objectively, ensuring that its enforcement respects Romania’s constitutional standards on freedom of expression and the principles developed under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In practice and at this stage, the courts have the ultimate power to determine whether the amendment remains a narrowly applied tool against genuine extremist propaganda or will evolve into a politicized weapon threatening the freedom of expression in the country.