Taiwan’s three-day Review Meeting on its National Reports on the Two International Human Rights Covenants concluded, followed by a press conference on May 15. The review committee expressed concern over the operation of the Constitutional Court, which currently functions with only eight incumbent justices, out of the statutory total of 15.
The Constitutional Court had a year-long cease of function from December 2024 to December 2025, when Constitutional Court Judgment No. 1 of Year 114 (2025) was made. The court, composed of five justices out of the current total of eight, held that the 2024 amendments to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act were unconstitutional and therefore not binding on the court. While some observers see it as a victory against democratic backsliding, the judgment continues to face challenges from three other dissenting justices and the opposition parties.
With a similar structure to France’s semi-presidential system, the current political system in Taiwan is structured mainly around the separation of powers among the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan (the parliament), and the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court serves as an important checks-and-balances mechanism between the executive and legislative sectors. Under the Constitution, the 15 justices are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Legislative Yuan. Each serves a term of eight years.
In December 2024, an amendment to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act was passed by a majority vote in the Legislative Yuan, with the support of the two major opposition parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). The amendment made crucial changes to Article 30 of the Act, changing the original proportional threshold into a fixed quorum of 10 justices for deliberation proceedings.
Some believe this will ensure stronger legitimacy of constitutional judgments. However, some argue that this strict and rather inflexible quorum will lead to the court’s malfunction in practice. Most importantly, there are no complementary measures in Taiwan to prevent the court from becoming inoperative due to the deadlock between the executive and the legislative sectors. If the president and the Legislative Yuan fail to agree on the nominees, the number of justices can fall below the threshold due to the end of terms, causing a suspension of its operations.
Critics argue that ancillary measures are needed, such as the practice in Germany, where incumbent judges in the Federal Constitutional Court remain in office until new judges are appointed to prevent the court from ceasing operations. The process required to pass amendments is also up for debate, as a lack of discussion during the second and third readings raises doubts about its procedural legitimacy.
After the terms of seven justices ended in October 2024, the number of justices in the Constitutional Court fell to eight. President Lai of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) nominated new candidates in December 2024 and July 2025, only to be disapproved by the Legislative Yuan. The rejections were primarily driven by the two major opposition parties, KMT and TPP. Nevertheless, some nominees also received disapproval votes from the DPP ruling party. The opposition parties claimed that the president’s choice of nominees was politically biased, while the ruling party argued that the two parties were boycotting the process and intentionally paralysing the court.
Concerned by the situation, a protest against the amendment was initiated in November, joined by 300 lawyers and around 2,000 people. However, with only eight justices in place, the court eventually ceased operations after December 2024, leaving public rights cases suspended.
In Judgment No. 1 of Year 114 (2025), the five judges ruled that the 2024 amendment was unconstitutional and therefore not binding on the court. They reasoned that the amendment suffered from serious procedural flaws due to a lack of discussion and transparency in the legislative process. They further held that the absence of necessary ancillary measures for the new quorum requirement obstructed the Constitutional Court from performing its duties, violating the principle of separation of powers.
In contrast, three dissenting judges issued a statement arguing against the majority’s opinion. They contended that Judgment No. 1 of Year 114 (2025), made by the five judges, should be considered invalid. They reasoned that the Constitution authorised the legislators to regulate the formation of the court, and therefore the judges have a constitutional duty to abide by the law. The statement, however, raises doubts because it was not an official dissenting opinion issued by the court, but instead an unofficial statement released through the media.
The disparity surrounding the Constitutional Court cannot be understood as a mere disagreement within the judiciary. In fact, this conflict reflects deeper problems in Taiwanese society—the polarization of opinions in Taiwanese politics. Stemming from historical conflicts and different identity beliefs, the divide between the DPP and the KMT camp (which now aligns with the TPP) continues to widen. The toxic rivalry between political parties exacerbates social distrust, and the phenomenon of political echo chambers worsens this trend. This political antagonism undermines the rule of law. In the context of the Constitutional Court crisis, the gap between the two camps continues to deepen as no effective channels of communication seem to exist.
The challenge for democracy, however, goes beyond the Taiwanese context. Critics point to the connection to the global pattern of “democratic backsliding.” This refers to the recent phenomenon observed in countries such as Poland and Hungary, where democratically elected governments enact measures in the name of democracy, but which in fact undermine the rule of law and weaken institutional checks on power. Some critics view the controversy surrounding the Taiwanese Constitutional Procedure Act as a warning sign of populist democratic backsliding. While the opposition parties in the Legislative Yuan appear to implement laws that represent “the people’s will” and claim to strengthen the oversight of the ruling party, analysts argue that the practical effects of these laws in fact erode the fundamental operations of democracy.
While Judgment No. 1 of Year 114 marks the resumption of the Constitutional Court’s functioning, it continues to face challenges from the opposition. At the same time, the court risks a second wave of paralysis, with four of eight remaining justices scheduled to retire in September 2027. Amid the global crisis of democracy, the question remains: is civil society in Taiwan resilient enough to weather the storm?
