Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama has removed Chief Justice Gertrude Araba Esaaba Torkornoo from her office and the Supreme Court following petitions accusing her of misusing public funds. The decision, announced on September 1, came after a constitutionally mandated committee investigated the petitions and recommended her removal for “misbehavior.”

According to the committee’s findings, Her Ladyship Torkornoo authorized unlawful expenditures, including covering travel expenses and per diems for her spouse and daughter through the judicial service. The committee concluded that such misuse of public funds fell within the grounds of “misbehavior” under article 146(1) of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution, which lists misbehavior, incompetence, or infirmity of mind or body as bases for removing superior court justices. Article 146 further obliges the president to act on the committee’s recommendation under clause nine.

In March 2025, a group of citizens submitted petitions to President Mahama’s office, initiating Her Ladyship Torkornoo’s removal proceedings. In April, President Mahama suspended the Chief Justice and appointed a Committee of Inquiry to investigate the merits of the petitions, sparking public uproar over the proceedings’ constitutionality even before the committee began its work. In Vincent Ekow Assafuah vs. The Attorney General, the Supreme Court upheld the suspension of Her Ladyship Torkornoo in a 3-2 majority decision, reasoning that the action had become moot. Later, Her Ladyship Torkornoo challenged the suspension and removal process at the Supreme Court of Ghana and filed a separate case before the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice—a West African regional court—alleging violations of her rights.

Reactions to the removal have been divided. In an interview on September 3, former Chief Justice Sophia Akuffo, now a member of the Council of State, said the removal process for Her Ladyship Torkornoo was unnecessary and had weakened the judiciary as an institution. She argued that the removal grounds in article 146 are vague, noting that “misbehavior” and “incompetence” are personal and circumstantial, lacking the gravity to justify the ousting of a chief justice.

In what appeared to be a rebuttal interview on September 4, Deputy Attorney General and Minister of Justice Dr. Justice Srem Sai defended the process as constitutional and legitimate. He said it is for the people of Ghana to decide the standards of conduct for public officials and that, given her position, Her Ladyship Torkornoo ought to have known better.

In an earlier interview, presidential spokesperson Felix Kwakye Ofosu had emphasized that the rule of law requires accountability from everyone, regardless of societal standing, and that any society that is unable to do that cannot call itself a society governed by the rule of law.

As a law student closely following the line of arguments in relation to Her Ladyship Torkornoo’s removal, I have reflected on whether the rule of law in Ghana has won or lost. As a matter of principle, the rule of law applies to all people. I believe that holding Her Ladyship Torkornoo accountable for her alleged actions—regardless of her societal position—is a win for the rule of law. At the same time, the lack of clarity in constitutional provisions makes the law unpredictable and undermines fairness.

The maxim nullum crimen sine praevia lege applies here, requiring laws to be predictable and clear. In Tsatsu Tsikata vs. The Republic, the Court of Ghana held that laws ought to tell with reasonable clarity what they forbid or require, and must provide an ascertainable standard of guilt. To my understanding, the Court concluded that men of common intelligence should not have to guess the meaning of a law and differ in its application. Ambiguity, as in this case, risks leaving citizens and officials guessing at their meaning.

Also, the question of fairness regarding the committee factors into the rule of law in this circumstance. This is because the constitutional grounds for removing a justice of the superior court leave room for discretion in interpreting each ground of removal. Thus, how do we balance the duty to be fair against the risk of bias based on personal dislike, as envisaged under article 296 of the constitution—a concern Her Ladyship Torkornoo had earlier raised regarding conflict of interest?

I still hold the opinion that judicial independence is as much a matter of fact as it is of law. It is high time Ghana, as a country, considered broad reforms to protect the judiciary and other governmental institutions while also making them accountable.