Edited by Alanah Vargas | JURIST Staff, US

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees everyone the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information through any media without interference. This global dispatch, contributed by correspondents around the world, examines key challenges and developments affecting media freedom in diverse political and social climates. As rapid technological change and shifting political landscapes reshape how information is disseminated, the right to free expression remains a critical yet increasingly contested principle.

Indonesia dispatch: the state of press freedom following the 2024 General Election

By Shofa Umrotul H. | Faculty of Law, Universitas Brawijaya, ID

Proposed efforts to revise Indonesia’s Broadcasting Law No. 32/2002 (Law No. 32/2002) in 2025 have raised serious concerns among press freedom advocates. The Legal Aid Institute for the Press (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Pers or “LBH Pers”) and the Alliance of Independent Journalists (Aliansi Jurnalis Independen or “AJI”) of Indonesia warn that several proposed articles threaten both press freedom and the public’s right to information. Among the most controversial is draft Article 50B(2), which prohibits the exclusive broadcasting of investigative journalism and any content portraying “lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender” behavior.

Another draft article, Article 8A(q), aims to settle “special journalistic disputes” in the field of broadcasting. Similarly, draft Article 42 requires broadcast content to comply with the Broadcasting Code of Conduct (Pedoman Perilaku Penyiaran or “P3”), Broadcast Program Standards (Standar program Siaran or “SIS”) and all other prevailing laws and regulations. These articles seek to shift the authority from the Press Council to the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia or “KPI”) to resolve journalistic disputes. The revision seeking to replace the Journalistic Code of Ethics with P3 and SIS introduces legal uncertainty when it comes to resolving disputes. Additionally, the combined provisions of Article 8A(q) together with Articles 42(1) and (2) undermine the independence of the Press Council and weaken the effectiveness of the Press Law.

Indonesia’s press freedom issues have also moved into to digital spaces. On May 6, 2025, the National Police of Indonesia (POLRI) arrested an Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB) student, known as “SSS,” based on a March 24, 2025 report. The case concerned an AI-generated meme depicting President Prabowo Subianto and former President Jokowi kissing. SSS was charged under Article 45(1) in conjunction with Article 27(1) and Article 51(1) of the Electronic Information and Transaction (ITE) Law, and faced up to 12 years in prison and a IDR 1 billion fine. The police argued the meme’s content violated public decency. However, peaceful expression—even if provocative, artful, satirical, or political commentary—is not a criminal offense. The use of the ITE Law in this case exemplifies how the State criminalizes freedom of expression.

In another alarming event on May 1, 2025, police arrested and used physical violence against Cho Yong Gi, a Universitas Indonesia (UI) philosophy student, for allegedly inciting a riot during a May Day demonstration against rising authoritarianism. Cho, who was present as a medic and donned full medical gear, was among 14 individuals designated as suspects by Metro Jaya Police (POLDA Metro Jaya). This incident is more than just state repression; it signifies the shrinking of civic space for dissent and peaceful protest in Indonesia.

In a further escalation, Tempo journalist and host of the ‘Bocor Alus Politik’ podcast Fransisca Christy Rosana (Cica) was subjected to sustained terror following coverage of protests the TNI Bill—a 2025 law expanding Indonesia’s military roles in civilian affairs, sparking concerns over revived political influence. On March 19, 2025, Cica received a severed pig’s head, and later, a box containing six mutilated rats. Tempo also reported receiving threats via Instagram and telephone. These acts, widely believed to be a response to Tempo’s critical reporting post-2024 election, reflect a disturbing attempt to silence the press. Dr. Wisnu Martha Adiputra, a communication scholar at Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), described the incident as an escalation of intimidation aimed at silencing the media. “Media suppression has occurred before, but this is on another level,” he said on March 25.

Since the 2012 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, buzzer politics—a growing industry in which individuals and groups are paid to create and share political propaganda content online—has increasingly dominated Indonesia’s digital space, peaking again in the 2017 Jakarta election, 2014, 2019, and 2024 general elections. Originally focused on platforms like X (formerly Twitter), buzzers have since expanded their reach to Instagram, Facebook, and WhatsApp. During political campaigns, buzzers often spread misleading content and fuel public polarization. They work to raise divisive issues such as identity, ethnicity, and religion—often resorting to hoaxes and hate speech—to manipulate and evoke strong emotions and create conflict among viewers. Instead of promoting informed decision-making, they cloud public understanding and deepen social divisions. Left unchecked, this practice could erode political values for future generations.

According to the AJI’s 2024 Indonesian Press Freedom Situation Report, journalists continue to face both physical and digital attacks while mass layoffs across the media sector weaken the press ecosystem at large. Several ethical violations have also been reported. AJI’s findings on Journalistic Professionalism and Media in Indonesia revealed that independent media remains scarce in regional areas, with most outlets reliant on either government funding, or local political and corporate interests. Reliance on these funding sources undermine editorial independence—especially when many regional media companies continue to underpay journalists. The study also noted an increase in self-censorship, particularly concerning environmental issues. While rates of violence against environmental journalists appeared lower than for political journalists, the report determined that it was mainly due to the suppression of environmental reporting. Journalists often face mounting pressure from media outlets to refrain from covering critical environmental stories. When journalists do end up covering these stories, they are frequently removed after publication. While public discourse surrounding violence against journalists often centers on external violence perpetuated by police, thugs, or digital trolls, less attention is given to internal editorial suppression. This form of censorship is equally deserving of public attention and advocacy as it also threatens the journalism sector.

As a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Indonesia is obligated under Article 19 to protect press freedoms—essential for safeguarding freedom of expression—through the enactment of Law No. 40/1999 on the Press (Law 40/1999). Article 2 of Law 40/1999 further affirms that “freedom of the press is a manifestation of popular sovereignty grounded in democratic principles, justice, and the rule of law.”

Equally, international and domestic human rights law, and the Constitution of Indonesia protect freedom of opinion. While restrictions protecting the reputations of others exist, international norms discourage criminal punishment. Equally, defamation laws under international human rights frameworks do not shield heads of state and public officials. Criminalizing such expressions creates fear, silences criticism, and often causes severe psychological distress to the accused and their families, especially when arrests and detention occur.

Recent events signal a media freedom crisis across Indonesia in the wake of the 2024 General Election. Instead of protecting this essential pillar of democracy, the State appears to be dismantling it. But the State is not just amputating a “diseased” limb—it is attacking the vital organs of democracy itself. The question remains: in this era of governance, is the Indonesian government amputating the wrong body part, risking systemic dysfunction in our democratic life?

Kenya dispatch: a Constitutional right under pressure

By Aynsley Genga Ogecha | Kenya School of Law, KE

In Kenya, freedom of the press exists, but only until it threatens the interests of those in power. From attacks and threats against journalists to state-sanctioned intimidation, the Kenyan press continues to navigate a minefield laid by political elites who fear accountability.

Most recently, during the 2025 anti-government protests, the Communications Authority of Kenya (CAK) issued a directive banning media stations from covering the demonstrations. However, the ban was swiftly challenged in the High Court and was lifted on the basis of unconstitutionality. The court also ordered CAK to restore signals to NTV, KTN and K24 since they had been switched off due to their defiance against the ban.

This came amid an escalating pattern of hostility toward the media under President William Ruto. Reports of journalists being attacked by police during protests have become disturbingly common under the current administration. The assassination of Pakistani journalist Arshad Sharif—who had sought refuge in Kenya after fleeing death threats in Pakistan—further intensified concerns. Although the High Court later declared his killing unlawful, no one has been held accountable.

Media houses have also faced relentless criticism from government officials. In 2023, then–Cabinet Secretary Moses Kuria publicly referred to major media stations as “prostitutes,” accusing them of bias against the government, and threatened to fire any government official who advertised on the media stations. Rather than condemn the remarks, President William Ruto defended Moses Kuria’s statements as free expression—a response that legitimized the attack and signaled a disregard for the role of a free and independent press in a democracy.

Kenya’s press freedom, protected by the Constitution, has been in steady decline since William Ruto took office in 2022. This trend was noted by Sadibou Marong, Director of RSF’s sub-Saharan Africa bureau, who said:

Kenya was an exception in East Africa, where the media are routinely attacked and journalists are arrested on spurious charges, but the situation has declined in Kenya in the year since William Ruto’s election. Journalists have become one of the prime targets of the police, especially during protests, and have been subjected to frequent attacks by politicians on all sides. As he approaches his second year in office, RSF calls on President Ruto and his government to establish a mechanism for protecting journalists and to shed light on the circumstances of Pakistani journalist Arshad Sharif’s death.

Kenya’s drop from position 102 to 117 in the World Press Freedom Index reflects this deterioration. The country’s media landscape is now marked by caution and rising self-censorship, as journalists weigh the risks of reporting on politically sensitive topics. Independent journalists and smaller media houses—without the institutional backing or visibility of major broadcasters—are especially vulnerable, particularly those with large and dedicated social media followings. Major stations, on the other hand, have courageously challenged government overreach, helping keep public discourse alive, but this has created an uneven playing field where the loudest voices may survive while the most vulnerable risk being silenced entirely.

The recent erosion of press freedom in Kenya is part of a long-running pattern of state control over the media, dating back decades. Under the late President Daniel arap Moi in the 1980s and 1990s, media independence was virtually non-existent. At that time, Kenya’s Independence Constitution did not explicitly provide for media freedom. Article 14(b) of the Constitution provided for freedom of expression but offered no strong legal safeguards for the press, leaving it subject to the penal code. This gave the government authority to limit media on the basis of public order and national security, resulting in banned publications and editors jailed, fined, or forced into exile.

After President Moi, President Mwai Kibaki (2002–2013) brought some reform toward the end of his tenure, including the 2010 Constitution, which protected media freedom under Article 34. Specifically, the article prohibited the state from controlling or interfering with broadcast, production, or published content. It also protected individuals and content from penalties for their opinions or viewpoints, and from circulating information through any medium. However, early in his presidency, Kibaki’s government still operated under restrictive laws inherited from past regimes. During the 2007 general elections, the administration imposed a media blackout while he was sworn in as president late into the night. It also introduced the controversial Kenya Communications (Amendment) Bill, 2008, opposed locally and internationally for its harsh penalties on media offenses.

President Uhuru Kenyatta’s tenure (2013–2022) began with seemingly cordial media relations but quickly soured following the 2013 Westgate terrorist attack. The tragedy left many dead and traumatized, prompting widespread calls for government accountability. After inviting media personnel to a briefing at the State House, officials removed journalists when their questions became too critical of the government’s handling of the crisis, marking the beginning of the government’s hostile relations with the press. In 2015, Kenyatta publicly insulted the media when it criticized his relationship with then–Deputy William Ruto. In 2017, his government withdrew advertising revenue from major media houses, raising concerns over indirect economic censorship. President Uhuru’s tenure came to an end in 2022 when he was succeeded by his former deputy, William Ruto.

Amid these challenges, hope remains, so long as the public does not yield to government pressure. This resilience is not only evident among journalists and media professionals who continue to pursue truth in difficult conditions, but also among everyday citizens who have repeatedly defended their constitutional rights. In a climate where power often seeks to silence dissent, the public’s unwavering commitment to press freedom offers a powerful reminder that democracy depends on the courage to speak and to listen.

Ghana dispatch: military assault on reporter highlights economic pressures on press freedom

By Lana Osei | JURIST Staff, GH

On July 30, 2025, local JoyNews reporter Carlos Calony was assaulted and briefly detained by men in military uniform while covering a demolition exercise in Accra. The military men reportedly punched Carlos Calony from behind and seized his phone while he was attempting to film the demolition. He was later released following intervention by senior officials. The Ghana Armed Forces say they are investigating the conduct of the personnel involved.

The incident comes as Ghana experiences a worrying decline in press freedom. The 2025 RSF World Press Freedom Index highlights a historic downturn, driven less by direct censorship and more by worsening economic instability. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, over 80% of countries have seen deteriorating financial conditions for the media, and Ghana is no exception. Most private media outlets face serious financial challenges resulting in low salaries, delayed payments, and poor working conditions, while state-sponsored media benefit from lucrative government advertising contracts and payments for publishing official information. This unequal economic playing field undermines editorial independence, fosters self-censorship, and makes it harder for journalists—particularly in the private sector—to report freely and hold power to account.

In Ghana, media freedom is protected under the 1992 Constitution, which explicitly prohibits censorship and guarantees every person the right to establish and operate media institutions. Articles 162(1) and (2) of the Constitution ban censorship and grant all individuals the right to establish and operate media institutions. Article 162(4) protects editorial independence, ensuring that editors and publishers can determine content without interference.

These protections have been consistently upheld by Ghana’s courts. In Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association v. Attorney-General [2017] GHASC 26, the Supreme Court invalidated portions of the National Media Commission’s Content Standards Regulations, ruling that regulatory overreach cannot supersede constitutional safeguards and that prior restraint violates Article 162’s core tenets.

In New Patriotic Party v. Ghana Broadcasting Corporation [1993-94] 2 GLR 354, the Court found that denying political opponents equal access to state media infringed on media pluralism and fairness—principles essential to Ghana’s democracy. Interpreting Articles 55 and 163, the Court held that political parties must have equal opportunity to communicate their programmes through state-owned media, as part of their constitutional right to shape the political will of the people. It further stated:

The State shall provide fair opportunity to all political parties to present their programmes to the public by ensuring equal access to the state-owned media. All presidential candidates shall be given the same amount of time and space on the state-owned media to present their programmes to the people.

Together, these cases affirm the constitutional imperative to protect media freedom from both direct censorship and indirect regulatory interference.

However, constitutional safeguards alone cannot preserve press freedom in the face of economic decline and systemic inequality between state and private media worldwide. In an age of rapid news cycles and pervasive social media, the principles of media expression face increasing erosion. To uphold its democratic reputation, Ghana must move beyond symbolic guarantees by strengthening independent funding mechanisms, enforcing anti-harassment laws, and investing in quality journalism. Without these steps, the constitutional promise of press freedom risks becoming an empty ideal, disconnected from the realities of Ghana’s evolving media landscape.

Pakistan dispatch: legal crackdowns and digital censorship

By Syeda Aamna Hasan | Brunel University, GB

Pakistan’s press freedom faces unprecedented erosion in 2025, with journalists and digital platforms increasingly under threat. Reporters Without Borders ranked Pakistan 158th out of 180 nations on the 2025 global Press Freedom Index, placing it among the world’s worst countries for press freedom in 2025. On 9 July 2025, the government issued a legal directive banning more than 27 YouTube channels critical of the government, citing the creators’ alleged ties to former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s political party, Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf, and accusing them of sharing “anti-state content.” Critics argue that authorities are operating without due process, deliberately targeting dissenting voices. Social media platforms such as X remain federally blocked since early 2024, leaving few safe spaces for independent commentary in Pakistan.

The risks to journalists’ safety have also escalated dramatically. Between May 2024 and April 2025, at least eight journalists were killed, and more than 80 suffered attacks or threats, with enforced disappearances of dissenting reporters reportedly on the rise. Traditional media outlets face mounting economic and political pressures: distribution and broadcasting access are being restricted, government advertising withheld, and bold reporting increasingly met with intimidation and lawsuits. According to Freedom House, these conditions have cultivated a climate of press self-censorship, shrinking the economic viability of legacy media and resulting in layoffs and closures.

A major turning point came in February 2025, when the government amended the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) 2016. The amendments criminalize the spread of “false information,” imposing harsh penalties of up to three years in prison and fines of up to two million rupees , and establish a powerful Social Media Protection and Regulatory Authority. The government has used the new law to silence dissent by arresting journalists and charging them for allegedly violating the Act. It has also worked to remove content using vague provisions such as Section 26-A of PECA. The Federal Union of Journalists and other media bodies have mobilized nationwide strikes and challenged these laws in court, but have run up against statutes like the Punjab Defamation Act, which permits lawsuits and fines without proof of actual harm. According to the Freedom Network, these measures have triggered a crisis that threatens the very foundations of democracy.

Digital platforms, once seen as havens for independent and opposition voices, now face aggressive state scrutiny. Legal directives, federal blocks, and arbitrary censorship signal a shrinking space for online dissent, reinforcing the broader clampdown on free expression.

Yet, despite Pakistan’s bleak outlook on media freedom, hopeful countercurrents are emerging. Satellite internet initiatives plan to expand nationwide access, civil society groups have formed alliances to support media freedom, and legal challenges to abusive regulations continue in the courts.

Pakistan’s media sector remains under severe pressure from legal tools like PECA, defamation statutes, economic retrenchment, state retaliation—including violence and enforced disappearances—and digital censorship on platforms such as YouTube and X. While civil society and judicial activism offer some relief, fundamental threats to independent journalism remain deeply entrenched, leaving press freedom at a critical crossroads.

Uganda dispatch: digital control ahead of 2026 elections

By Lawrence Alado | Makerere U. School of Law, UG

In Uganda, the climate for press freedom continues to deteriorate as the country gears up for the 2026 general elections. Social media is under siege: Facebook has remained inaccessible since the 2021 elections, forcing citizens to rely exclusively on VPNs to communicate or publish dissenting narratives. The government shut down social media platforms during the past two presidential elections, a pattern many fear will recur next year.

Journalists and media organisations operate in a state of guarded caution, facing the dual threat of state interference and online harassment. Although mainstream media continues to cover political developments, the online space has become increasingly volatile. Satirical content, especially by comedians and digital content creators who criticise the ruling party or highlight the overstay of certain MPs, is met with coordinated backlash, often amplified by pro-government influencers and anonymous accounts. These attacks range from cyberbullying to threats of arrest under Uganda’s ambiguous computer misuse laws. The spectre of state surveillance also looms large, particularly for journalists covering opposition rallies or publishing investigative stories about corruption or abuse of power.

Adding to the intimidation is the President’s son, Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, whose erratic posts on X (formerly Twitter) have become a source of national anxiety. His account has shared photos appearing to glorify the torture of opposition leaders, and posted openly misogynistic threats such as arresting “nyashless women.” His violent rhetoric—including explicit threats to kill prominent opposition figures—has faced no official reprimand. Instead, it reinforces a culture of impunity and signals to security agencies and party loyalists that such conduct is tolerated, if not encouraged.

Despite this increasingly repressive environment, many Ugandan journalists persist. Independent radio and print outlets still try to hold people in powerful positions to account, and some digital platforms have even adapted by creating encrypted newsletters or diaspora-run channels. Yet, the overall state of press freedom remains fragile, with legal protections easily undermined by political interference. To the surprise of many Ugandans, authorities have issued statements supporting press freedoms abroad, as seen in the UCC’s critique of Kenyan crackdowns this past July.

The domestic picture tells a sobering story of shrinking civic space, rising digital authoritarianism, and a media forced to work under shadow.

India dispatch: gains in ranking, losses on the ground

By JURIST Staff 

The correspondent filing this dispatch is a law student at Maharashtra National Law University in Mumbai who must remain anonymous.

India’s ranking in the World Press Freedom Index rose by eight spots from 159 in 2024 to 151 in 2025. However, despite this nominal gain, press freedom on the ground has continued to deteriorate in the first half of 2025. India’s free speech functions more like a sieve than a shield, slipping through the cracks of a growing list of judicial and statutory exceptions.

In one of its earliest landmark judgements, the Supreme Court of India (SCI) recognised press freedom as a fundamental right, closely intertwined with free speech and free expression rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of India’s Constitution. Near the end of 2024, the Apex Court objected to the erosion of national press freedoms, underscoring the media’s critical role in nurturing democratic participation. While this judicial recognition highlights the potential for safeguards, the reality on the ground remains challenging.

Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF) has also flagged concerns surrounding the concentration of media ownership and political collusion by a handful of elites, which severely heightens the risk of political collusion and opaque reporting. The State has also tightened its grip on social media platforms and digital intermediaries through the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. Rule 16, in particular, has been used extensively by the executive to issue blocking and takedown orders for content on social media platforms. These measures have not been without controversy, and the judiciary’s next litmus test for the protection of free speech comes in the form of a batch of petitions before the Delhi High Court challenging the constitutionality of the Intermediary Guidelines.

India’s independent media has been reportedly “crippled” in recent times due to the State’s dual approach: overt persecution to silence dissent and indirect, covert pressure to drive out media houses that do not align with ruling party narratives. Yet, a resilient core of independent journalists persists against all odds. The outlook is not entirely bleak, and there is potential for recovery, provided that the judiciary reins in executive excesses promptly, reclaiming the space for fearless reporting.

United States dispatch: private pressure and political influence

By Brendan Hickey | Vermont Law & Graduate School, US

A series of private lawsuits, public media funding cuts, TV show cancellations, and broad editorial changes are shaping the current state of media freedom in the United States. President Donald Trump filed multiple private lawsuits during his presidential candidacy, which were settled following his re-election. The defendants settled in in Trump v. American Broadcasting Companies Inc. and Trump v. Paramount Global CBS Broadcasting Inc. for $15 million and $16 million, respectively. Meta, the parent company of Facebook, also settled with Trump for $25 million over its removal of his account.

TV network CBS News published the settlement details on July 2. On July 16, Stephen Colbert, host of “The Late Show with Stephen Colbert,” announced that CBS had cancelled his show, effective May 2026. Colbert, an outspoken critic of the Trump administration, called the settlement “a nuisance settlement” that CBS knew it could easily win, and “a big fat bribe.” The network responded that the settlement was “a purely financial decision.” On his Truth Social platform, President Trump said of the cancelled show, “I absolutely love that Colbert got fired. His talent was even less than his ratings.”

Other late-night hosts also voiced their criticism of the cancellation.

The cancellation coincided with CBS parent company Paramount Global’s (Paramount) efforts to complete an $8.4 billion merger with Skydance Media. Eight days after Colbert’s cancellation, on July 24, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) approved the merger, which was finalized on August 7. As part of the deal, Paramount  agreed to hire an ombudsman to review and monitor “complaints of bias” at CBS, and the network remains under federal monitoring.

Congress has also taken action that affects media funding. This week, it voted in favor of US House Resolution 4 (HR4) to permanently cancel $9 billion in public media funding and foreign aid for the current year and the next two fiscal years. This includes approximately $1.1 billion for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), which funds National Public Radio (NPR) and Public Broadcasting System (PBS)—both accused by Trump and his supporters of liberal bias. The US House of Representatives previously initiated the House resolution at President Trump’s request. With approval from both the US House of Representatives and Congress, President Trump is now expected to sign the resolution into law. CPB has announced it will cease operations at the end of September, while PBS and NPR will continue operating until further notice.

In addition, editorial influence at private media outlets has also been evident. Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, owner of The Washington Post, previously blocked the paper’s endorsement of Kamala Harris for president. In February 2025, he posted a memo to staff on X stating that the “opinions” section would now feature viewpoints endorsing “free markets” and “personal liberties,” leaving oppositional viewpoints to be published elsewhere.

Katie Fallow, deputy litigation director at the Knight First Amendment Institute, questioned whether these settlements and editorial changes at The Washington Post and Los Angeles Times mark the end of the First Amendment. She wrote:

The First Amendment, as powerful as it is, can only be a shield to those who are willing to use it as one…The message sent by Paramount and other media companies that have settled with Trump is that journalists and news organizations should think twice before publishing reports that might anger the president…But these decisions set a precedent that harms the integrity of our political processes and threatens the basic functioning of our democracy.

Many legal experts viewed the Trump cases as weak and likely certain victories for the defendants, calling the settlements “protection money” and “(an) affront to the First Amendment.”

Tunisia dispatch: A shrinking space for press freedom amid democratic backsliding

By Fatma Taghouti

Tunisia, the birthplace of the 2011 Arab Spring and once hailed as a regional beacon for independent journalism, has seen press freedoms erode sharply since President Kais Saied’s July 2021 power grab. Over the past year, multiple reporters have been arrested under vague charges such as “spreading false news” or “undermining state security.” Independent radio stations and online platforms have faced increasing pressure, while critical voices—including cartoonists and commentators—have been targeted through legal and extralegal means.

The government’s rhetoric has grown increasingly hostile, frequently painting independent media as agents of foreign agendas. This has fueled a climate of fear that threatens public discourse and civic participation.

According to the 2025 Reporters Without Borders (RSF) index, Tunisia now ranks 129 out of 180 countries, a decline that places it closer to Algeria and Morocco—long criticized for heavy-handed media control—than to the democratic gains the country once promised. International human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and the UN Human Rights Council, have expressed concern over Tunisia’s drift toward authoritarianism, emphasizing the chilling effect on public discourse and civic participation.

The country’s backsliding follows President Kais Saied’s consolidation of executive power, dissolution of parliament, and continued rule by decree, all of which have weakened institutional safeguards for journalists. While Western democracies face media challenges of their own, Tunisia’s regression is more abrupt and institutional, rooted in a shrinking civic space and the absence of constitutional oversight.

Despite growing restrictions, segments of Tunisia’s media community remain defiant. Independent journalists continue reporting on corruption, migrant rights, and police abuses, often at significant personal risk. For these reporters, the struggle is no longer about expanding liberties but preserving the hard-won gains of the last decade in the face of mounting repression.

Ireland dispatch: risks of media concentration and algorithmic bias

By Conor Doran | U. College Cork School of Law, IE

Ireland currently enjoys a high degree of media freedom, but enduring systematic issues driven by globalization could undermine media freedom in the future. Since the 2008 financial crisis, conventional media sources such newspapers and TV media have struggled financially, and smaller regional media sources even more so. This has resulted in the concentration of ownership of conventional media in Ireland, as local media sources are bought up by a small number of often foreign-owned corporations.

Alongside this dynamic is the expansion of internet-based media sources oriented around social media. While these trends have not directly or significantly impacted media freedom in Ireland yet, the absorption of media ownership by a small few risks undermining media freedom in the future—especially when conflicts arise between media owners and ethical journalism. This tension could result in corporate influence over editorial policies that can impart bias into how media reports the news. Ireland’s public broadcaster, Raidió Teilifís Éireann (RTÉ), offers a counterbalance to the corporate ownership of the media, but RTÉ has been beset with funding issues in recent years. The current government has provided the public broadcaster with funding until 2027, but further funding will depend on future government budget allocations. Although public trust in RTÉ is relatively high, the organization’s reputation has been damaged by the mismanagement of public funds.

Although the rise of social media as a journalistic source has somewhat countered the concentration of ownership in traditional media by offering alternatives, these platforms themselves pose risks to media freedom. For example, research conducted by Global Witness in Germany suggests that X, Instagram, and TikTok’s algorithms exhibited a conservative bias for non-partisan users. This shows that social media companies have the ability exert significant control over what media users see through their algorithms, which can result in misinformation and bias in how users perceive societal issues. This was especially apparent in 2023 when misinformation circulating on social media led to anti-immigration riots in Dublin. Bias in social media algorithms threatens media freedom due to social media companies’ ability to promote journalism that they support, at the expense of journalistic opinions that they disagree with.

Afghanistan-United States dispatch: free press collapses under Taliban rule, while American media faces selective silencing

By Maneza Ali | Vermont Law & Graduate School, US

Since the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in August 2021, the country’s media landscape has been systematically dismantled. Over 300 media outlets—including newspapers, TV channels, and radio stations—have closed under Taliban pressure, threats, or financial ruin, according to the Afghanistan Journalists Center (AFJC). More than 80% of women journalists have lost their jobs, and self-censorship is now the norm. Journalists face constant surveillance, intimidation, arrests, torture, or death for covering sensitive topics such as human rights abuses, women’s rights, or the humanitarian crisis.

When the Taliban regained control, one of their first targets was the free press. Within weeks of the US withdrawal, the Taliban launched a systematic campaign to dismantle what had taken two decades to build. Women were banned from journalism. Television programming, music, and entertainment were censored or banned outright. Journalists and activists who could flee the country did so—those who stayed behind faced arrests, torture, and in some cases, death.

Vague and repressive censorship laws have been enforced without transparency. The Taliban’s so-called “Sharia-compliant” media guidelines criminalize any reporting that questions their rule. There is no independent political coverage, no reporting on corruption, no critique of Taliban policies. The Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice and the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) have become media enforcers. Journalists are regularly summoned for questioning, forced to reveal their sources, or pressured to delete or modify stories. Even Afghan journalists working from exile are not safe. Reporters for BBC, Radio Azadi, Amu TV, and Afghanistan International TV have received threats from Taliban officials, and in some cases, their family members back in Afghanistan have been harassed or punished.

This is not just about silencing journalists; it is about silencing the Afghan people. The public has been cut off from reliable information about their government, their rights, and the world. In many provinces, independent news has been replaced with Taliban-approved religious programming. This is not merely narrative control—it is population control. Some journalists continue to report in secret from basements; from hidden corners of the country; from exile. But how long can that last? No one knows. What we do know is that many have already been arrested, tortured, or killed for trying.

Before the Taliban’s return, Afghanistan had one of the most dynamic media sectors in the region. Hundreds of independent outlets operated across the country, and thousands of Afghan journalists—both men and women—reported on politics, human rights, and daily life. This fragile but growing freedom was built over two decades, with support from civil society, international donors, and courageous Afghan reporters.

I still remember when the Taliban were overthrown by the United States in 2001. It was a moment of cautious hope. Afghanistan’s media began to flourish like never before. Dozens of independent TV channels, radio stations, and newspapers emerged. Women journalists—many for the first time in Afghan history—became visible in newsrooms, on television screens, and in public life. There were programs for entertainment, investigative journalism, political debate, and education. The media was not perfect, but it was vibrant, alive, and pushing boundaries. Today, that media landscape is gone. Vanished as if it never existed. It is not just tragic; it is devastating.

In Afghanistan today, truth-telling is not just journalism; it is defiance. And for many, it has become a crime punishable by prison, torture, or death. In America, by contrast, there is freedom of the press…until you criticize the Israeli government.

It’s a strange and unsettling dynamic; one I have never encountered anywhere else. I’ve lived in many countries, including Pakistan and China. In China, the rules are clear: you cannot criticize the Chinese government. It’s openly authoritarian, and censorship is expected, and even institutionalized. But in the United States, the expectation is different. This is supposed to be a country where you can question power, challenge leaders, and scrutinize government policy without fear of retribution. You can criticize the US President, Congress, the Supreme Court, or any domestic institution. Yet when it comes to Israel, that same freedom suddenly becomes fragile, conditional, and, in many cases, punishable by social or professional consequences.

The American media landscape allows for sharp critiques of almost everything except Israel’s government. Journalists, academics, students, and even public officials who speak out against Israeli policies—especially regarding Palestine—often face blacklisting, smears, professional retaliation, or antisemitism accusations, regardless of the substance or intent of their criticism.

This is not just censorship. It’s a chilling phenomenon that undermines the very concept of free speech. It creates a protected category of foreign policy criticism that is off-limits, policed not by law, but by powerful political and institutional pressures. For someone who has lived under overt censorship, I find this kind of selective silencing in a so-called free society to be more confusing, and in some ways, more dangerous. It cloaks repression in the language of democracy, while quietly eroding the space for honest dialogue.

Western Balkans dispatch: press freedom declines across region, Kosovo sees sharpest drop

By Ernesa Shala | U. Pristina Faculty of Law, XK

Press freedom is in retreat across the Western Balkans, with Kosovo suffering the steepest fall in more than a decade, according to the latest Reporters Without Borders (RSF) rankings. Kosovo plunged 24 places to 99th in this year’s index, the lowest position it has recorded in over ten years.

RSF’s annual assessment reveals a deteriorating media environment across much of the Balkans, with Kosovo, Bulgaria, Croatia, North Macedonia, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Moldova all falling in the rankings. The report cites political interference, legal threats, disinformation, and intimidation as key factors undermining press freedom.

Kosovo’s dramatic decline has sparked widespread concern among journalists and media watchdogs. “While the Kosovo media market is diverse, its development is limited by its small size and ethnic divisions,” RSF noted. The report warned of politicised regulation, insufficient access to public information, and growing risks to journalist safety. The recent adoption of the Law on the Independent Media Commission was also criticised for opening the door to political influence.

In response, the Association of Journalists of Kosovo (AJK) expressed alarm at the steep decline, blaming what it described as a “continuous active hostile policy towards media” by the ruling Vetevendosje government over the past two years.

Elsewhere in the region, Croatia, an EU member state, dropped 12 positions to 60th place. Despite a dynamic media landscape, the Croatian government has come under fire for its failure to protect journalists from Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) and attacks by organised crime. The report accuses the authorities of exerting pressure on the media and not doing enough to safeguard journalists.

North Macedonia also saw a fall in press freedom, moving down six spots to 42nd. Although not considered a hostile environment for journalists, the index highlights the damage caused by widespread disinformation and a lack of professionalism, which has eroded public trust and exposed independent outlets to threats. RSF also pointed to dismissive attitudes from government officials toward the press.

Bosnia and Herzegovina slipped to 86th place, with RSF flagging major concerns in the Republika Srpska entity, where the recriminalisation of defamation and the spread of Russian propaganda have jeopardised public-interest journalism. The report notes sharp regional disparities in press freedom within the country.

While the overall trend is negative, a few countries in the region made slight progress. Albania recorded the most significant improvement, climbing from 99th to 80th place. Nevertheless, RSF warned of persistent challenges, including blurred lines between business and politics, partisan regulatory bodies, and the continued intimidation of journalists by both politicians and organised crime networks.

Montenegro moved up modestly to 37th place, but press freedom remains fragile due to ongoing political interference, unsolved attacks against journalists, and economic vulnerabilities affecting independent media.

Serbia also advanced slightly to 96th place. Despite the presence of investigative journalism, particularly on corruption and crime — the media in Serbia is caught between pervasive propaganda and political pressure. Crimes against journalists continue to go unpunished, and fake news remains a major concern.

As the region grapples with rising authoritarianism, politicised institutions, and an increasingly hostile environment for journalists, RSF’s findings serve as a stark reminder of the urgent need to defend press freedom as a cornerstone of democracy in the Western Balkans.