Earlier this month, Dutch Member of Parliament Kati Piri (GroenLinks–PvdA) introduced a parliamentary motion calling for a complete arms embargo on Israel, including a suspension of defense-related exports such as those contributing to the Iron Dome system. Although the motion was ultimately rejected by the Dutch House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer), its contents and rationale have reignited legal and normative debate within Dutch and European policy circles.
The Iron Dome is widely understood as a defensive weapons system, developed to intercept and neutralize incoming rockets. The motion argued that even defensive military exports should be restricted in response to alleged violations of international law by the Israeli government in the Gaza Strip. Critics, however, contend that denying access to purely defensive capabilities undermines the principle of civilian protection and risks applying international human rights law selectively.
Under Dutch and EU export law, the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP governs arms transfers and mandates a case-by-case evaluation of whether an export would “contribute to internal repression or prolong armed conflict.” While this provides EU member states with discretion, it also anchors decisions in international humanitarian law (IHL) and proportionality. What’s at issue in this case is whether a blanket embargo, particularly on systems like Iron Dome, aligns with or distorts that framework.
Critically, the legal and ethical implications go beyond technical export control. The motion and similar calls from civil society raise broader questions about the universality of human rights rhetoric. If a state’s right to protect its population is deemed negotiable based on its political posture or perceived culpability in conflict, then human rights risk becoming conditional tools, rather than universal guarantees.
This concern echoes debates within the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and UN Charter Article 51, both of which affirm the rights of states to defend their civilian populations while simultaneously being held accountable for the conduct of hostilities. The Geneva Conventions prohibit collective punishment under Article 33 of Convention IV, but only in specific circumstances, namely where civilians are intentionally penalized for acts they did not commit. The application of that standard to arms embargoes remains a contested and context-dependent question.
Importantly, criticism of Israeli policy especially as it relates to Gaza is not only legitimate but necessary in a democratic society. However, motions that treat entire populations, institutions, or defensive capabilities as undifferentiated targets risk conflating policy critique with collective sanction. In doing so, they may inadvertently violate the very legal norms they purport to uphold.
While Piri’s motion was not adopted, it reflects an increasing trend in Dutch and European politics to pursue symbolic foreign policy gestures with limited legal grounding and unintended humanitarian consequences. As students and observers of international law, we must scrutinize not only the actions of states in conflict but also the internal consistency of the legal and moral frameworks invoked in response.
There can be no meaningful peace without legal coherence, and no credible rights advocacy where protection is extended only selectively. If the international legal order is to remain legitimate, its principles must apply regardless of region, religion, or narrative framing