The supreme court heard oral arguments in two cases Monday concerning a Virginia uranium mining ban and authority over Alaskan national parks.

In Virginia Uranium v. John Warren, Virginia Uranium is arguing that Virginia’s state law banning uranium mining in the state is preempted by the Atomic Energy Act. In addition to hearing oral arguments representing both Virginia Uranium and John Warren, the court also heard oral arguments from US Solicitor General Noel Francisco, who argued in agreement with Virginia Uranium.

Charles Cooper, who argued on behalf of Virginia Uranium, argued that the court should look to the purpose of the law. Cooper states that if a “prohibited purpose was a motivating factor” in enacting a state law, then the state would have the burden to prove that the law would still have been enacted even without the prohibited purpose. Cooper argued that the Virginia law was enacted due to safety concerns of radiation hazards, which is preempted by the Atomic Energy Act.

General Francisco argued that the state would need to bring forward a plausible non-safety rationale that is “sufficient to sustain the law” in order to show no preemption.

Solicitor General of Virginia Toby Heytens, who argued on behalf of John Warren, argued that the Atomic Energy Act only gave the federal government jurisdiction over milling of uranium, not the mining of uranium. Heytons noted that although milling and mining of uranium occur simultaneously, the law only concerns the mining aspect of the process.

When questioning Cooper and Francisco, the justices’ questions frequently focused on how multiple purposes of laws would impact the preemption of the law. Specifically, could a law with a nonallowable purpose for its enactment still be to avoid preemption if an allowable purpose for the law also exists. Questioning of Heytons focused on the intertwining of mining and milling of uranium and comparisons between uranium mining and coal mining.

The court also hears arguments in Sturgeon v. Frost, a case concerning the authority of the National Park Service’s regulatory control in national parks in Alaska based on the Alaska National Interest Land Conservation Act (ANILCA). The court heard oral arguments from Matthew Findley, who represented John Sturgeon, Alaska Assistant Attorney General Ruth Botstein, who argued in support of Sturgeon, and Deputy Solicitor General Edwin Kneedler.

The case concerns Sturgeon, who was cited by the National Park Service for operating a hovercraft on a river on the Nation River in the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve.

Findley argued that ANILCA requires that the National Park Service does not have authority to enforce regulations on navigable waters within Alaska. Findley argued that the navigable waters are not owned by the federal government, and thus are not considered to be public lands. Botstein also argued that the navigable waters are not public lands and out of the reach of the National Park Service under ANILCA. Botstein stated that ANILCA intended the navigable waters to be out of the National Park Service jurisdiction because of the importance the waterways have for the transportation of people in Alaska.

Kneedler argued that navigable waters within national parks are included in the definition of public lands. Kneedler states that the water itself was not conveyed to the state of Alaska, and thus would still be considered public lands.

When questioning Findley and Botstein, the justices focused on limits on jurisdiction of other federal agencies if the river is not considered to be public land. The Justices also asked questions regarding how Alaskan state owned lands are not considered to be public lands. When questioning Kneedler, the justices focused on the limits on the National Park Service power if the the navigable waters were included in the jurisdiction of the National Park Service.