Supreme Court hears arguments in Fifth Amendment takings and arbitration cases News
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Supreme Court hears arguments in Fifth Amendment takings and arbitration cases

The US Supreme Court [official website] heard oral arguments Wednesday in two cases: Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, and New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira [transcripts, PDF].

In Knick v. Scott Township [docket], petitioner challenges a doctrine [text] that requires state remedies to be exhausted in constitutional takings before being allowed to file a federal lawsuit. Knick, the owner of land in Pennsylvania, was subject to an ordinance requiring all owners of cemeteries to provide public access during daylight hours through a right of way from the nearest road. The town agreed not to enforce the law against Knick, but she continues to protest its application, arguing it is unconstitutional on its face. Circuit courts are split on this question.

Counsel for Knick argued Wednesday that in the county where Knick lives, there is no predictable forum for adjudicating a Fifth Amendment takings claim. “Property owners like Ms. Knick for 30 years have had no reasonable way to litigate that federal question. Is there a taking or or not a taking” he said.

In addition, New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira[docket] challenges the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) [materials] and presented two questions for the court to consider: whether a dispute over the applicability of the FAA’s Section 1 exemptions to the act should be adjudicated before a judge or done through arbitration; and whether the FAA’s Section 1 exemption regarding “contracts of employment” is applicable to independent contractors.

Here, the respondent, an independent contractor for an interstate trucking company, acknowledges that it signed an arbitration agreement in which it agreed to arbitrate all workplace disputes with petitioner on an individual basis; however, respondent filed a putative class action in court and opposes arbitration on the basis of a Section 1 exemption.

Counsel for the respondent argued that the “structure of the statute, the text of the statute, and the history, all of those factors mean that, in 1925, the ordinary person would have understood [the] exemption [in question] to apply to all agreements to perform work of transportation workers.”