For most lawful permanent residents, coming home from a trip abroad is supposed to be just that: coming home. But in Blanche v. Lau, the Supreme Court will consider when that presumption gives way and whether immigration officials may place a returning green-card holder on the inadmissibility track without already having clear and convincing evidence, at the time of reentry, that he committed a disqualifying offense. The Court will hear the case on April 22, 2026. Although the merits briefs were filed under Blanche v. Lau, the docket now lists the petitioner as Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General. The justices granted certiorari on January 9, 2026.
What is this case about?
This case concerns the legal status of a green-card holder returning from abroad, specifically when immigration officials must decide whether to treat the individual as a returning resident or as someone “seeking admission” under the Immigration and Nationality Act. This distinction is significant because the INA provides two removal tracks: admitted noncitizens are placed in deportation proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1227, while those treated as seeking admission may be charged as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182. For lawful permanent residents, this difference can determine the outcome.
Muk Choi Lau became a lawful permanent resident in 2007. In 2012, he was charged in New Jersey with trademark counterfeiting. While the case was pending, he traveled abroad and returned through JFK Airport. Instead of admitting him as a returning resident, immigration officials paroled him for deferred inspection. After he pleaded guilty, DHS sought to remove him under the inadmissibility provisions, alleging he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude. The Second Circuit found that, at the time of Lau’s reentry, the government only had criminal accusations, not clear and convincing evidence of a disqualifying offense. The court vacated the removal order and terminated the inadmissibility case, allowing for a future deportation case under § 1227.
Ultimately, the case asks whether DHS can parole a returning green-card holder and later justify that decision, or whether the statute requires sufficient evidence at the border before denying ordinary admission.
What the government says
The government argues that Lau was properly removable as inadmissible because he had committed the offense before returning to the United States, and parole does not constitute admission. Under this view, once paroled, Lau remained an arriving alien awaiting inspection, and later removal proceedings could use the conviction record to establish both the offense and inadmissibility. The government maintains that the INA does not require DHS to have clear and convincing evidence at the time of reentry; instead, proof can be presented later before the immigration judge.
The government also raises a jurisdictional argument, asserting that federal courts should not review DHS’s discretionary parole decisions. It claims the Second Circuit invalidated a decision that Congress intended to be discretionary and largely unreviewable. The government warns that affirming the ruling would disrupt the longstanding practice of paroling returning permanent residents with pending criminal cases, allowing prosecution without forfeiting inadmissibility grounds. It further argues that the Second Circuit’s rule is impractical because border officers must make quick decisions and often lack immediate access to the necessary evidence to prove criminal conduct at the port of entry.
What the respondent says
Lau’s main argument is that the statute establishes a specific sequence, which the government did not follow. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C), a lawful permanent resident returning from abroad “shall not be regarded as seeking an admission” unless an exception applies. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), DHS may parole only those already “applying for admission.” Lau contends these provisions require DHS to determine at the border whether an exception applies before invoking parole. He argues the government cannot parole a returning green-card holder simply to gain time to assess its authority.
Lau further argues that the government lacked the required level of proof under its own framework. He cites BIA precedent that demands clear and convincing evidence before DHS can treat a returning lawful permanent resident as seeking admission. When Lau returned through JFK, he had not been convicted or admitted the offense; the government only had an unresolved criminal charge. Lau contends this is insufficient under both statutory text and due process, as accusations are not proof. He maintains he was admitted upon inspection, and any removal effort should proceed, if at all, through deportation under § 1227 rather than inadmissibility under § 1182.
Lau also disputes the government’s claim that the parole issue is unreviewable. He relies on the INA’s provision for judicial review of “questions of law,” arguing that courts can determine whether DHS had statutory authority to parole him. He presents the issue as whether the agency satisfied the statutory prerequisites for exercising its discretion, rather than whether the discretionary decision was sound.
What the justices are likely to focus on at oral argument
The first likely focus is statutory timing. The justices will likely examine whether “shall not be regarded as seeking an admission” requires a decision at reentry, as Lau argues, or if the government can establish that status later in immigration court with new evidence.
The second likely focus is the meaning of parole. The government asserts that parole maintains arriving-alien status, keeping the person outside the admission framework until inspection is complete. Lau responds that DHS cannot rely on parole’s legal consequences if it lacked authority to grant parole. This issue may prompt questions about whether an unlawful parole is still considered parole under the INA, and whether a court reviewing a removal order can address that legal question.
A third likely issue is administrability. The government will emphasize that border officers must make quick decisions, often without full access to criminal case files, and have long used parole to defer admissibility decisions. Lau will argue that DHS already screens for criminal history at the border and that Congress intended to give returning permanent residents a presumption against being treated as applicants for admission. The justices may question both sides on what officers must know at the airport and what evidence is sufficient.
The justices may also address a background issue: whether “has committed” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) requires only the commission of an offense or, as suggested in Vartelas v. Holder, points toward conviction or admission of guilt. The government argues for actual commission, while Lau contends the Court can avoid this issue because DHS lacked clear and convincing evidence at reentry.
What could this ruling change?
For lawful permanent residents, this case could significantly affect what happens after international travel if there is a pending criminal case or unresolved allegation. If the government prevails, DHS will have greater flexibility to parole returning green-card holders and to use later-developed evidence in immigration court to pursue inadmissibility. This could make it easier for the government to seek removal in cases where the individual had not yet been convicted upon return.
If Lau prevails, DHS would face stricter evidentiary requirements at the border. Returning permanent residents would have greater protection against being treated as applicants for admission solely because of unresolved charges or suspicion. The government could still seek removal, but would more often need to proceed through deportation rather than inadmissibility, which involves different rules and burdens.
More broadly, this case highlights that immigration law often depends less on whether misconduct occurred and more on when the government must prove it, under which statute, and with what procedural consequences. This is not just a technical dispute about parole, but a case about the protections Congress provided to green-card holders at the border and the extent of DHS’s flexibility in treating returning residents as applicants for admission.
