“America First Has Become America Alone”: An Interview with Theology Professor Wesley Ariarajah on the Crisis of U.S. Democracy Features
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“America First Has Become America Alone”: An Interview with Theology Professor Wesley Ariarajah on the Crisis of U.S. Democracy

In his recent book, What is the Future of U.S. Democracy: Renewal or Decay? Fixing the Constitution and Reforming the Political Processes to Save U.S. Democracy, Rev. Dr. S. Wesley Ariarajah ventures beyond his established theological scholarship to offer a sweeping constitutional diagnosis of American democracy. Professor Emeritus of Ecumenical Theology at Drew University and one of the world’s leading figures in interfaith dialogue, Dr. Ariarajah draws on over sixteen years of observing U.S. political life to argue that America’s constitution drafted in 1787 to address the fragile realities of a newly independent nation is ill-equipped to govern a deeply polarized twenty-first century superpower. He proposes concrete reforms across the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. In this interview, Pitasanna Shanmugathas, JURIST’s Senior Editor for Long-Form Content, engages Dr. Ariarajah in a wide-ranging conversation covering the two-party system, campaign finance, the Electoral College, the pardon power, judicial politicization, American exceptionalism, and the entanglement of religion with partisan politics.

Dr. Wesley Ariarajah’s book  is available for purchase on Amazon.

This interview has been edited for clarity and concision. 

Pitasanna Shanmugathas: Dr. Wesley Ariarajah, you are a professor of theology in the area of interfaith relations. However, this book you have written, What is the Future of U.S. Democracy: Renewal or Decay?,  does not really focus on theology. Aside from a few references to religion, it is not a theological work. What made you write a book that seems so different from the theological work for which you are known?

Dr. Wesley Ariarajah: Having taught at Drew University in New Jersey for 16 years, and observing the political processes in the United States—especially the current deadlock in Washington, D.C., and the growing anxiety about the future of democracy—I began to wonder whether I should look more closely at the Constitution. I wanted to examine what problems might be remedied.

In doing so, I found that the Constitution drafted in 1787 is very outdated for the United States of 2026. It needs serious updating in several areas. It was written at a time of very different political, social, economic, and cultural realities. It was time-bound and addressed the immediate issues of that era.

Unlike some other countries that do not constantly return to their constitutions, in the United States everything is referred back to the Constitution. People challenge presidential and congressional actions on constitutional grounds. So, I wanted to undertake a serious study of what this document is all about. I concluded that it is outdated and needs updating for today. That became the focus of this book.

Shanmugathas: In the book, you outline numerous developments within the U.S. political system that give you great concern about whether the republic can continue as a democratic nation. What are some of these developments, and why do they concern you?

Dr. Ariarajah: There are several problems. First, what we call the gridlock in Washington D.C. Congress is deeply divided between the two parties, and this division is increasingly reflected across the nation. It has become almost impossible to carry out a healthy democratic process. On most important issues, members of Congress vote according to party loyalty. While bipartisan cooperation may occur on minor matters, on issues that truly matter, party allegiance prevails over democratic deliberation.

Thus, the two-party system, which once functioned well on democratic principles, has become paralyzed. People are losing confidence in Congress’s ability to act in the nation’s interest.

Second, the role of money in politics deeply troubles me. Elections are increasingly influenced by corporations, billionaires, and millionaires who effectively determine who gets elected, both as president and to Congress. In return, they expect to be served. Democracy is eroded when elections depend so heavily on massive fundraising. Unless you can raise millions of dollars, you cannot realistically run for president—or increasingly, even for the Senate.

Third, the Supreme Court. When the Constitution was drafted in 1787, there were no organized political parties. But once parties developed, and presidents were elected along party lines, the president was given the power to appoint justices. Over time, partisan politics entered the judiciary. Today, many people question the legitimacy of the Court’s decisions, and confidence in the judiciary is declining.

Then there is the presidency. Article II describes the executive branch very minimally. It does not clearly define the relationship between the executive and Congress, nor does it establish a regular process for presidential accountability. While impeachment exists as a last resort, there is no consistent mechanism of oversight. As a result, some presidents have acted as though they possess unlimited authority—some even claiming to be above the law.

The president’s power to dismiss executive officials without reason also concerns me, as does the pardoning power, which in recent years has been used in ways many consider scandalous.

Perhaps most troubling today is the Department of Justice. It was intended to function independently of partisan politics. Yet increasingly, the DOJ and the Attorney General act at the behest of the executive branch. This undermines the integrity of the system.

These are not isolated issues. The cumulative effect poses a real danger to the future of democracy. My book does not simply diagnose problems; it also proposes corrections—amendments and additions that could make the Constitution more relevant to our time.

Shanmugathas: I would like to explore some of these points further. Let us begin with the two-party system. In your book, you suggest that the two-party system must be broken. You note that U.S. President George Washington was the only U.S. president who served two terms without belonging to a political party. But given the enormous financial and institutional machinery behind the Republicans and Democrats, how can the two-party system realistically be broken?

Dr. Ariarajah: The only way, as I suggest in the book, is to introduce a multi-party system—at minimum, a viable third party. If no single party holds a majority in Congress, cooperation becomes necessary. Democracy would be strengthened because parties would need to work together.

I argue that creating a strong third party is both possible and necessary. It would require a nationwide effort.

Shanmugathas: We already have third parties like the Green Party and the Libertarian Party. But they don’t win national office. Given the dominance of the two major parties, how would a third party realistically gain seats in Congress?

Dr. Ariarajah:  Many smaller parties focus primarily on presidential campaigns rather than looking at the wider question. What is needed is a coordinated nationwide effort to build a serious third party. Around 45 percent of Americans now identify as independent—former Democrats, former Republicans, or people unaffiliated with any party. They need political organization and a political home.

This would require capable leadership, significant resources, and the establishment of national, regional, and local offices. It is a long-term project. But if such a party could secure even 20 or 30 seats in Congress, it would fundamentally change how Congress functions. A multi-party system has become essential to preserving democracy.

Shanmugathas: Campaign finance laws—especially after the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Citizens United—and practices like gerrymandering reinforce the two-party system.

Dr. Ariarajah:  Yes, that is absolutely true. What you are describing is the reality.  The influence of money, weak campaign finance laws, and gerrymandering all reinforce the two-party system. That is at the heart of the matter. What is needed is a group of people who not only have resources but also have the ideological commitment to truly save democracy. They would have to organize themselves and use those resources to build and sustain a genuine third party. I admit that this is perhaps the most difficult proposal in the whole book. But how else can we save the situation without bringing a third party into Congress?

The two parties are so deeply divided, and that division has spread into the nation itself. People are increasingly worried that this polarization could lead to a kind of civil conflict. In the book, I draw a comparison with the Sunni-Shia divide. Originally, that was simply a leadership dispute. But over time, it settled into two major branches of Islam, becoming part of people’s identity. In the same way, the Democratic and Republican parties have become more than political organizations. Party affiliation is handed down almost like a family inheritance. It is no longer primarily about policy. It has become about identity. The parties have become almost tribal groups. There is very little genuine democratic deliberation taking place. I could not think of any other structural way to break this rigidity except by introducing a multi-party system, so that no single group can dominate and simply push through whatever it wants.

Shanmugathas: In the book, you discuss how five times in U.S. history, the presidential candidate who won the popular vote did not become president—most recently in 2016, when Hillary Clinton won the popular vote but lost the presidency. Why was the Electoral College created, and why do you argue that states should join the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact?

Dr. Ariarajah: I believe one of the most important contributions of the book is that it explains why the Electoral College was created, how it functions, and how it has become outdated and undemocratic.

At the time the Constitution was drafted, the states were not a fully unified nation. They were a loose coalition of former colonies emerging from British rule. There were deep differences among them—not only in population and geographic size, but also because of the issue of slavery. The states did not fully trust one another, and the founders were deeply concerned about how to hold them together in a workable union.

If the system had simply been one person, one vote, with the majority determining the outcome, the smaller states feared they would be dominated by the larger ones. So, the framers made two key compromises. First, they created the Senate, in which every state, regardless of size, would have equal representation. Second, they created the Electoral College as a mechanism for electing the president—an arrangement that reflected the fragile political realities of that time.

In other words, the Electoral College was an emergency response to a very particular historical situation. But the question today is whether that situation still exists. After more than 150 or 200 years, are the states still so divided that they require this kind of protection? Today, if there is federal overreach, states can challenge it in the courts, including the Supreme Court. The structural fears that existed in 1787 do not apply in the same way.

This is why many people have sought alternatives. The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact is one such attempt. It tries to work within the existing constitutional framework by encouraging states to pledge their electors to the candidate who wins the national popular vote, without formally amending the Constitution. It is seen as the easiest available path, though it has not yet secured the required number of participating states.

Ultimately, however, I argue that the Electoral College has outlived its purpose. It is possible—and necessary—to elect the president and vice president by popular vote. Many other large democracies, including Indonesia and Brazil, elect their presidents through a direct popular vote, sometimes using a runoff system if no candidate wins a majority. There are workable models around the world. I do not see why the United States cannot adopt a more straightforward and democratic method.

Shanmugathas: In your book, you ask the question: Are we one nation under God seeking a more perfect union? Given that you are a professor of theology, I am especially interested in your thoughts on the strong infusion of religion by both Democrats and Republicans into mainstream U.S. political discourse. This seems particularly significant considering that the founders believed in a separation of church and state.

What are your thoughts on how religion has been brought into the public and political domain? Do you believe this has harmed electoral politics? And do you believe there should be a firm separation between church and state?

Dr. Ariarajah: I am one hundred percent in favor of a firm and complete separation between church and state. What is happening today is that religion is being abused in the political process. So-called religious people are increasingly becoming part of party politics.

This raises a broader question about what is happening to religion in the United States, and what role religion is actually playing in the country. I strongly believe in complete separation. Religious groups can certainly have opinions and make public statements. But when they begin, as they have in recent years, to become part of a political bloc—aligning themselves formally with one party—that becomes a denial of what true religion is meant to be. Religion should not be reduced to a political instrument.

Shanmugathas: I believe it was Jimmy Carter who was the first modern U.S. president to really begin a public infusion of religion into a presidential campaign. His 1976 campaign is often described as a watershed moment because it transformed “born-again Christianity” from what had largely been a private—and often misunderstood—religious identity into something of a political brand.

Before 1976, modern presidential candidates generally treated deep religious conviction as a private matter, and sometimes even as a potential liability. It was usually downplayed. But Carter defied his advisers who encouraged him to soften his religious language. Instead, he chose to openly embrace his identity as a born-again Christian and as a Southern Baptist Sunday school teacher.

Since then, religion has increasingly been co-opted and fused into the political system by both parties for political gain.

Trump can’t recite a single passage in the Bible. And in fact, when he was asked to do so in an interview, he deflected. Yet Trump has been using religion in various different ways on the domestic front, on the foreign policy front, in terms of anti-immigration policies and extreme support for Israel on the foreign policy side.

Dr. Ariarajah: There are really two different kinds of problems here.

The first is the idea that religion is purely a private matter, something that has nothing to do with politics. Some people believe that if you are religious, you should keep your faith to yourself and not become actively involved in the political process. You may speak as an individual citizen, but not as a religious person. That is one extreme.

President Carter’s position was somewhat different. His understanding was that if you are a born-again Christian, you cannot simply withdraw into private spirituality. You cannot remain only within the church and ignore what is happening in the nation. If you truly believe in certain moral and spiritual principles, you must also be concerned about the political life of the country. You must participate. In that sense, he was encouraging religious individuals not to hide behind religion as a shield and leave the nation in the hands of those who may not share their moral commitments.

So, there is, in my view, a possible and important role for religious individuals in the political process. Religious people should participate as citizens. They should speak on moral issues. They should engage in public life. That is legitimate and even necessary.

The second problem, however, is quite different. It arises when religious groups—organized bodies such as born-again Christian movements or other religious communities—begin to function as political blocs. When they align themselves formally with one party or one candidate, whether it is Trump or anyone else, they become part of the party machinery.

At that point, something changes. They lose a certain independence within themselves. They are encouraged to support a single political agenda, and they begin to compromise their own religious traditions in order to maintain that political alliance. Instead of standing as an independent moral voice that can critique any party, they become tied to one side.

That, to me, is deeply troubling. Religious traditions in the United States have been highly compromised in this way. When religion becomes fused with partisan politics, it ceases to function as a prophetic or moral force. It becomes a tool for political mobilization. And that is not what religion is meant to be.

Shanmugathas: In your book, you argue that national elections should not be run primarily by the states. Instead, you suggest that the main responsibility for organizing presidential elections should lie with Congress, working in close collaboration with the states. Recently, President Donald Trump made a somewhat similar argument that U.S. elections should be nationalized. However, Article I of the U.S. Constitution designates individual state legislatures with determining how elections are conducted.

Wouldn’t an argument be made that if overwhelming control were given to the central government—or even to Congress—in terms of how elections are run, it might make it easier for a president like Donald Trump, especially with a Republican majority in the House and Senate, to attempt to rig the elections?

One of the reasons publicly credited for why Trump failed in his effort to overturn the 2020 election is that individual state officials—such as those in Georgia and Arizona—refused to comply with his requests to overturn results in states where Biden had won. If election administration were centralized in the way you suggest, wouldn’t that make it easier for someone like Trump to manipulate the process?

Isn’t the decentralization of elections actually a safeguard? Don’t the states function as a check and balance against the wishes of a majoritarian or authoritarian-leaning president?

Dr. Ariarajah: Perhaps this is the issue on which I was most hesitant and had to think very carefully. The problem is that, on the one hand, the election system is extremely decentralized. It is in the hands of many different authorities, not directly accountable to Congress or to a central body. As a result, we see corporate gerrymandering, voter suppression, disputes over mail-in ballots, and different rules in different places. We do not truly have a national election. Elections are conducted at the local and state level, and the procedures vary widely.

In many other countries, there is no difficulty in holding a nationwide election supervised by a central electoral authority. The concern, of course, is that such an authority could be manipulated by a president. But in my proposal, the electoral bureau would function under Congress, not under the president alone. And even if one party controlled Congress, there would be enormous public backlash if the common will of the people were clearly thwarted.

In some ways, this is a choice between two problems—perhaps two evils. One is excessive decentralization, leading to endless court cases, delays, gerrymandering, voter suppression, and inconsistent systems across the country. The other is the risk that a centralized system could be abused.

To me, a uniform national system—administered by a central bureau in collaboration with the states, not excluding them—seems less problematic than the chaos and fragmentation we currently experience. Still, I recognize that many states and citizens might resist such a change. It remains a difficult issue.

The current system is not only decentralized in counting votes; at every stage it is open to challenge. It often takes an extraordinarily long time for election results to be finalized because procedures differ from state to state. While there is some risk in centralization, many other countries manage national elections without such complications.

Shanmugathas: On January 6, 2021, there was a formal process in Congress to certify the Electoral College votes. The vice president’s role was essentially ceremonial—simply to formalize the results in favor of Joe Biden. At that time, Republicans controlled the Senate and the Presidency, and President Trump was putting significant pressure on Vice President Mike Pence not to comply with his constitutional obligation.

It was merely a formality, yet there was a public rebellion that sought to prevent Pence from carrying out that duty. That episode shows how even a symbolic centralized moment in the process can become a focal point for attempts to disrupt a democratic transition.

One might argue that if the process were more decentralized—without a single ceremonial moment in Congress—it would be harder for a rebellion to focus its energy on overturning the results.

Dr. Ariarajah: Yes, and this illustrates my concern with the present process. There are too many stages and too many points of vulnerability. The Electoral College itself adds another layer of complication. In other countries, once the majority of the people have voted and the result is clear, it is simply announced. Here, the process continues through multiple steps.

Because of these additional stages, even when Congress gathers merely to formalize the results, objections can be raised and delays introduced. We are facing unnecessary complications in the election process—complications rooted in decisions made in 1787 for very specific historical reasons.

The Electoral College and the layers built around it are no longer necessary. The vote is counted in the states, then transmitted, then counted again in Congress. The entire procedure has become unbelievably complicated.

I understand that smaller states may resist changes to the Electoral College. But in my view, there must be a constitutional convention to rethink the election process altogether. That is the central argument of that chapter.

Shanmugathas: You mentioned earlier in our interview that one of the powers of the president is the pardon power. In your book, you are critical of the current executive branch and what you describe as its undemocratic tendencies. You discuss the pardon power, its arbitrariness, and how it has been used by presidents to pardon friends. You even describe the pardon power as monarchical in nature.

But while you are critical of it, you also discuss reforms. Talk about the ways in which you believe the pardon power should be restricted. And more broadly, outline your general criticisms of the executive branch in the U.S. political system.

Dr. Ariarajah: What I say there—very clearly, even in highlighted words—is that the pardon power should be abolished. That is my first statement. I still hold that view. There is no real need to give the president that power. If, however, it is to be continued, then it must be severely restricted. But my conviction is that there is no necessity for the president to have this authority at all. We already have a judicial system. If someone has been wrongfully convicted, there are mechanisms to reopen the case, to appeal, to review evidence. The courts are there to correct errors.

When the judiciary has gone through the full legal process, found someone guilty, and imposed a sentence, for a president—who is not part of that judicial process—to suddenly intervene and pronounce a pardon is, in my view, a violation of the separation of powers. It looks strange, almost monarchical.

Shanmugathas: But if courts are increasingly hyper-partisan, and Congress is hyper-partisan, wouldn’t leaving everything within those institutions make pardons almost impossible? There have been instances where the pardon or commutation power has been used positively.

For example, President Obama commuted the sentence of Chelsea Manning. President Biden commuted the sentence of Leonard Peltier, an Indigenous rights activist whom many believe was wrongfully convicted. These are cases where executive clemency produced results that might not have come from a partisan Congress or judicial system.

So, while I understand your concern, there have been important instances where the power has been used for good.

Dr. Ariarajah: Yes, and I acknowledge that. But if you compare those cases with the tens of thousands of pardons granted historically—and especially the recent ones—it is troubling. Take, for instance, the pardons of those involved in January 6. These were individuals who went through the judicial process, were found guilty by juries, and were sentenced. Then suddenly, without explanation, they are pardoned.

How can that be justified? The president does not have to give reasons. There is no requirement for consultation. There is no binding process. It is absolute.

If it is truly necessary to have some pardoning mechanism, then it should be built into the judicial system itself. There should be a structured review process, not an individual decision made at will.

Shanmugathas: You also mention in your book that President Gerald Ford pardoned the Vietnam draft dodgers. It’s not clear that such an action would have been possible through the court system alone. And while Donald Trump’s use of the pardon power—such as pardoning January 6 rioters—raises serious concerns, he is arguably a fringe political figure. It may not have happened under other Republican presidents.

So, would abolishing the pardon power entirely be, in a sense, throwing the baby out with the bathwater? There have been numerous positive uses of the power, as you acknowledge in your own book.

Dr. Ariarajah: The core problem is that the pardoning power is absolute. If pardons were granted on the basis of investigation, review, and a transparent process—like in the case of non-violent drug offenders whose sentences President Obama commuted—then there is at least some rationale.

But as it stands, the president does not have to give reasons. There is no obligation to consult anyone. Even though there is a pardon attorney in the Department of Justice, that office has no authority to veto the decision. That is why I call it monarchical. A president can simply declare someone free.

Yes, there are benefits in certain cases. I do not deny that. But if the power is retained, it must be confined and regulated through a clear process. It cannot remain absolute and unreviewable.

Shanmugathas: But isn’t the reason it is absolute precisely so that a successive president cannot reverse it? For example, if Obama’s commutation of Chelsea Manning’s sentence had not been absolute, a successor like Trump could have reversed it. The same could be said of pardons like those for Vietnam draft dodgers.

So perhaps the power should remain absolute—but narrowed in scope—so that it cannot be undone by a president of the opposing party.

Dr. Ariarajah: That is why I say it should be abolished. But if it is not abolished, then strict conditions must be imposed. There can be another process through which presidents may pardon in exceptional cases—such as with the Vietnam draft resisters—but it must be part of a defined legal framework.

What troubles me most is that the president does not even have to give a reason for granting a pardon. There is no explanation required. That, to me, is deeply problematic.

Shanmugathas: One of the things you discuss in your book is the need to depoliticize the judiciary. We’ve seen how the judiciary—especially the U.S. Supreme Court—has become increasingly politicized. Even from an abstract perspective, you can see this in the hyper-partisan voting patterns during Supreme Court confirmation hearings. Not that long ago, nominees put forward by presidents from one party would receive overwhelming bipartisan support—sometimes 98 votes from both Republicans and Democrats. But more recently, we’ve seen deeply divisive episodes, such as the blocking of Merrick Garland and the contentious confirmation of Brett Kavanaugh which you discuss in your book.

Talk about how the judiciary has become so hyper-polarized, why you think that has happened, and how it could be depoliticized.

Dr. Ariarajah: The core problem is that when the founders gave the president the power to nominate judges, there were no political parties. The Constitution rests on a great deal of good faith. At that time, there were no entrenched party structures.

Today, however, a president elected on a partisan basis nominates judges. That changes everything. So, the first issue is the nomination process itself. I do not believe it should remain solely in the hands of the president, with the Senate simply approving or rejecting the nominee.

In many other countries, there is a judicial appointments committee. Such a committee deliberates extensively, evaluates candidates carefully, and works toward consensus. It is not driven purely by party considerations. By contrast, in the United States, a president can nominate whomever he wants. He may receive recommendations, but he is not required to follow them. That is the first structural problem.

The second issue is the Senate. In theory, the Senate could function as a moderating institution. But it, too, is driven by party politics. In both the Merrick Garland and Brett Kavanaugh cases, we saw how political parties acted strategically and along partisan lines. The entire process has become highly politicized.

A third problem is lifetime appointments. At the time the Constitution was written, the founders believed lifetime tenure would protect judicial independence. But again, we must remember there were no political parties. The political system was entirely different.

There was no compelling reason to grant lifetime appointments. Judges could serve long, secure terms without the need for reappointment, but with a mandatory retirement age—say, 75. That would preserve independence while ensuring renewal.

You cannot fully understand this problem unless you begin with the historical fact that political parties did not exist when these rules were written. The emergence of parties—almost like tribes—has fundamentally changed how the system operates.

Shanmugathas: In your book, you also discuss age requirements and term limits. There are minimum age requirements to run for the Senate or Congress, but there is no maximum age—no point at which someone must step down.

You outline arguments both for and against imposing age limits. What was your ultimate conclusion, and what are the strongest arguments on each side?

Dr. Ariarajah: There has been some justification for not having age limits. Members of Congress must stand for reelection every two or six years, depending on the chamber. In theory, voters can remove them. That provides a mechanism for change.

However, we have seen members serve for decades—sometimes until they die in office. When these rules were established, average life expectancy was around 50 years. Today, people routinely live into their 70s and 80s. The context has completely changed.

The question becomes: can someone remain fully effective in the same office for 60 or 70 years? And what about the need for fresh ideas and generational change?

I argue that a mandatory retirement age—perhaps 75—would allow individuals to continue contributing in other roles but not remain indefinitely in Congress. It would introduce necessary renewal. Life expectancy has nearly doubled since the founding era, yet our institutional rules have not adapted accordingly.

Shanmugathas: I understand that point. At the same time, there are concerns about imposing strict age limits. Some members remain highly capable and effective well into their 80s. For example, Bernie Sanders has been repeatedly reelected and is over 80, yet many view him as fit and competent. His constituents in Vermont continue to support him. So, it seems like a mixed issue.

Dr. Ariarajah: Yes, and I thought about Bernie Sanders while writing that section. I asked myself; do I want him to leave? Personally, no.

But then I considered the broader principle. Should we create exceptions because there are a few exceptional individuals? Or should we establish a general rule that ensures renewal and generational change?

Reluctantly, I concluded that a retirement age would be necessary. While some individuals may still be capable, the larger institutional interest lies in bringing in younger generations and new ideas.

The purpose of the book is not to impose definitive answers but to raise questions. It is an attempt, after nearly 250 years, to reexamine the Constitution and ask what improvements might be possible. I recognize that many of these proposals may not be adopted, but I believe the conversation is necessary.

Shanmugathas: Supporters of Donald Trump, including Steve Bannon, have hinted at the possibility of Trump running for a third term, despite the 22nd Amendment prohibiting it. Bannon has even suggested there might be a loophole, though he has not specified one.

Do you think Donald Trump would attempt to run for a third term? And do you think he could succeed?

Dr. Ariarajah: I think he might want to, and he might attempt it. But I do not think he would succeed.

After his time in office and the controversies surrounding it, even parts of his own base may begin to question him. While he may have ambitions for extended power—perhaps even for life—I doubt that the country would accept such a move.

Recently, he has spoken less about a third term. His more immediate concern may be the midterm elections. If he were to pursue a third term, I believe it would provoke significant opposition.

So, my prediction is that while he might desire it, he is unlikely to succeed—and may not ultimately attempt it.

Shanmugathas: Your book briefly discusses the growing redistribution of wealth to the very top. It’s important to note that this has been a bipartisan effort. Both Democratic and Republican administrations have contributed.

For example, Ronald Reagan ushered in the modern era of neoliberalism with widespread tax cuts, massive deregulation, and reduced social spending—policies that disproportionately harmed the working class. Then you had President Clinton, who signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, effectively ending welfare as it existed, replacing open-ended federal entitlements with block grants, strict work requirements, and a five-year lifetime limit.

Clinton also repealed Glass-Steagall, a major deregulation that shifted power and wealth to the financial elite, which many credit as a contributing factor to the 2008 financial crash. So, this is clearly a bipartisan issue: even the Democratic Party has abandoned the interests of the working class.

Talk about how this redistribution of wealth has harmed the integrity of the U.S. democratic system.

Dr. Ariarajah: At the heart of this is the problem of insufficient financial regulation. As Obama mentioned in his address to Congress, the Supreme Court has prevented meaningful controls on campaign contributions.  As long as there are no limits on the amount of money that parties or candidates can raise, the system is skewed. Running for office requires massive funds for television and media campaigns, which both parties rely on. Even candidates like Kamala Harris, despite her ideological positions, had to solicit corporate donations.

Without strong campaign finance laws, democracy is essentially controlled by corporations. The wealthy fund candidates to protect their interests, ensuring that elected officials remain beholden to them. Today, billions are required to run for office. If one party raises more money than another, it creates an unlevel playing field. The media and advertising infrastructure make it nearly impossible to reach voters directly.

Strict campaign finance regulations are essential to save U.S. democracy. Otherwise, corporate money dominates elections.

Shanmugathas: We’ve seen this problem worsen with the Citizens United decision. The implication of the Supreme Court’s ruling in that case is that corporations are people with the same First Amendment speech rights as individual citizens, allowing them to spend unlimited amounts on independent expenditures. This strengthened super PACs and allowed them to accept unlimited contributions from individuals and corporations to influence elections.

Dr. Ariarajah: Exactly. Billionaires and millionaires are no longer just contributing—they are effectively taking over government. Many hold key positions in the administration, and the president hand-picks advisors from wealthy elites, rather than ordinary citizens.

This creates systemic corruption, enabled by campaign finance rules—or the lack thereof. Money now has an outsized influence on democracy, and few are willing to confront this problem. It’s a deeply entrenched issue.

Shanmugathas: I also feel that even before Citizens United, there were troubling signs. Consider Barack Obama’s assumption of the U.S. presidency in 2009 — right on the heels of the 2008 financial crisis. Obama wins a supermajority in both the House and the Senate, a President FDR-type majority. And what does he do when he comes into office? He bails out the major financial institutions and banks responsible for the financial crisis through the Troubled Asset Relief Program — but does not bail out the homeowners and working class who suffered the brunt of it and were the main victims. I feel this was a result of him being beholden to wealthy corporate interests. And it further disillusioned the public. After the 2010 midterms, Obama famously said the Democratic Party got a “shellacking” as Republicans took back the House. That’s how someone like Obama, beholden to wealthy interests, further fueled a lack of trust in the democratic system.

Dr. Ariarajah: This is a deep problem, because even people like Obama — people who initially come with goodwill — get into a structure that entraps them. It’s very difficult to function outside of that system. If you want to win the next election, you need the money, otherwise you can’t. Even the well-intentioned people finally give in, because that is the only way the country works. Other countries have managed — at a different level — to have much more genuine elections than the United States. But more recently, the election results have become totally unacceptable, because billionaires and millionaires elected these people, and these people are going to serve them. Campaign finance law is, without question, a very, very important issue.

Shanmugathas: In your book, you talk about this notion of American exceptionalism, and you challenge it on a number of fronts. First, can you explain what is meant by American exceptionalism and some of the “gaping holes” in this claim?

Dr. Ariarajah: First of all, I wanted to affirm the positive side of the United States — economically, politically, and all of that — and to acknowledge why they claim exceptionalism. But then I identify four main areas of concern.

The first is the economy. The number of people who are homeless, the number who are poor, the number depending on food stamps. Bernie Sanders keeps asking: how can the richest country in the world have people who do not have enough to eat, people who cannot send their children to school? So, the first and most important problem is that there is no serious attempt to remove poverty and bring about the well-being of all people in the country. I always begin this discussion by saying: if democracy is by the people and for the people, it is not for the people in the United States, because a large section of the people is not cared for.

The second is healthcare. Millions of people cannot afford it, and so many millions have to sell their homes or exhaust everything they have when faced with long-term illness. Even with Medicare and Medicaid and all the rest, nothing approaches the kind of healthcare provided in Switzerland, Sweden, Germany, or anywhere where everybody knows that when they are ill, they can be looked after. How can the United States, with all its wealth, not be able to create a healthcare system that caters to all its people?

The third, and most troubling for me personally as a teacher, is education. Beyond grade 12, you are on your own. How can that be? Student debt runs into the millions. People spend their entire working lives paying it back. So many cannot afford to go at all, or they drop out. We are producing a whole generation of young people who have the capacity to study but no possibility of doing so because they cannot afford it.

In Switzerland, I have three daughters who went from kindergarten to university, and I never had to pay fees. Of course, my taxes were higher — but I could see my taxes working. When they went to school, the paper, the pencil, the notebooks, all the books used in the classroom were given free. One of my daughters is a medical doctor, and throughout her studies I paid only around 1,000 francs a year — not tuition, just facility fees. Imagine coming out as a doctor having paid only that. It can be done, and it can be done so much more in the United States if there is the will to do so. But this old system — you are on your own, you have the opportunity, and if you don’t succeed, it’s your problem — that is simply not the reality people face.

The fourth area is international relations — how the United States has gradually lost its standing as a leader of the free world. Getting out of almost all the international organisations that were doing any good, alienating allies, and supporting dictators around the world. What has become of its standing in international affairs?

So, exceptionalism is a notion that needs to be highly qualified. Without some major reforms to the country’s social life, I don’t think exceptionalism has any real meaning. It is a hollow concept.

Shanmugathas: You’ve highlighted two very important gaps: education and healthcare. You don’t even need to look at Europe or Scandinavia. Just compare the U.S. with its neighbor, Canada. Bernie Sanders often points this out. I’m Canadian, and having lived briefly in the U.S. state of Vermont, I could never understand why some Americans view having healthcare as a right to be a “communist plot.”

One reason I’ve refused to live permanently in the United States is the lack of a reliable social safety net. The U.S. is a country where you can make a lot of money, especially in professions like medicine, but if you fall on hard times—due to illness or a financial setback—you have no real protection. Your health insurance can disappear, your savings can be wiped out, and you can end up homeless. In Canada, however, you can fall ill and receive medical treatment, including surgery, at no cost. That security is far more important than any potential income.

The erosion of educational opportunities in America is equally troubling. In the 1970s, American students could earn enough in a summer job to cover a full year of university. Today, that is practically impossible. The degree to which neoliberalism has been infused into the US political system, and the erosion of quality of life it has produced in terms of education and healthcare — it is just so troubling, and it puts a real stain on this notion of American exceptionalism.

Dr. Ariarajah: It is, for me, very real. This is a rich and advanced country with so many institutions — and yet nobody takes notice of these problems and tries to attend to them. Politicians are only interested in being re-elected, re-elected, re-elected, paying no real attention to the state of the country. People like Bernie Sanders are a voice in the wilderness. They can say anything, but it doesn’t touch the ruling elite.

All I wanted to do with this book was to raise these issues and show — especially for those who do not know the constitution, who do not know how things are working — what can be done to improve things. It was not a scholarly book, but a book that tries to explain the whole process and its problems to ordinary people.

Shanmugathas: In your book, you talk about the notion of how America First became “America alone.” Donald Trump wasn’t the first president to use this notion of America First; Woodrow Wilson used it as well. Can you explain this concept of America First and what it means today?

Dr. Ariarajah:  It has been a wavering thing. There are times when America saw itself as a leader of the world — giving an example, being involved, fully engaged in international organizations. But then, partly for political reasons, a different impulse takes hold. On the one hand, there is this altruistic streak in the United States — this urge to lead the nations, to be involved, to help people. On the other hand, gradually, especially for political reasons, people begin to say that we have to look after ourselves first. America first.

From time to time, presidents have come and declared that America comes first. But gradually, in the course of doing that, they lose all the connections they need with other nations and the ability to work within international organizations. And that is exactly the situation we find ourselves in now — where America first has finally become America alone.

You lose your status on the international stage, you lose the contribution you could make to international life, and you don’t only lose your friends — you also encourage your enemies to move into areas that you have vacated. This shift from America first to America alone is going to be a very serious problem for the future of the United States in the international scene. It has diminishing legitimacy, a diminishing role, diminishing leadership, and it is earning enemies.

Even America’s closest friends, though they may not say so openly, are writing America off. I could not believe that Europeans would finally say openly that they have to look after themselves and can no longer depend on the United States — in spite of the NATO arrangements. But after the Greenland issue, that is exactly what they said. That, for me, was the last straw.

America first has become America alone. I hope that future presidents will begin to rebuild — but rebuilding international relationships is a very difficult task, and I can only hope that some of them will have the will to do it.

Shanmugathas: How would you define the concept of the American Dream? Do you believe it still exists? Comedian George Carlin once joked in one of his standup specials that “it’s called the American Dream because you have to be asleep to believe it.”

Dr. Ariarajah:  That’s a very good statement. There was a time when it genuinely appeared that if you went to the United States, you had more opportunities than elsewhere — that unlike other countries with rigid social structures, where poverty was a permanent condition, here you could come, work hard, and make something of yourself. But that was quite some time ago.

Today, I don’t think there is any dream — only illusions for those who still believe they can make it. I am absolutely sure that the American Dream is now just rhetoric. Most people don’t believe it can be achieved. It remains a dream. And this is all part of the process by which the country has undergone a diminishing of its place among nations.

Shanmugathas: You’re a professor of theology, so I want to get your thoughts on something I don’t often discuss. Earlier, we talked about a religious president like Jimmy Carter, who embraced progressive evangelicalism as a way to advocate for social justice, civil rights, and human rights, both during his presidency and in his post-presidential work.

You also have the concept of liberation theology, which is deeply ideological and views the Gospels as a guide to liberate the marginalized and socially oppressed. Haiti’s first democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was a liberation theologian. He used his beliefs to combat the HIV-AIDS epidemic, reduce illiteracy, increased the minimum wage, and, during his party’s time in power, more schools were built than at any other period since Haiti’s independence.

So, we see individuals using liberation theology or progressive evangelicalism to drive policies that materially benefit the oppressed and marginalized. Given your firm belief in the separation of church and state, do you think such individuals are justified in bringing religious values into the political sphere? Could this happen in the U.S. context as well?

Dr. Ariarajah: What they are doing is not bringing religion into the political stream — they are bringing religious values into the political stream. Gospel values. That is a very different thing from, say, mobilizing born-again Christians to support a particular candidate. Liberation theologians are doing something else entirely. I often quote Dom Hélder Câmara, who said: “When I give food to the poor, they call me a saint. But when I ask why they are poor, they call me a communist.” That captures it precisely.

What liberation theology did was translate the values of the gospel — not only for personal life, but for social life as well. The problem in places like the United States is that the culture has changed so profoundly, and money and power have become such overwhelming forces — the very two things Jesus rejected when he spoke of mammon. You cannot serve God and mammon. And so it becomes very difficult. People like Bernie Sanders are lonely voices in this country.

But recapturing the values of the gospel for the lives of ordinary people — that is the emphasis of liberation theology, and that spirit must still be kept alive. That, to me, is the true meaning of the gospel.

Shanmugathas: You and I are both Sri Lankan Tamils. I know this is a book on U.S. politics, but I couldn’t help noticing some similarities between the U.S. and Sri Lanka: the hyper-religious nature of politics, the strong executive system, and the deep political fractures.

I’m curious about your thoughts on the lack of inter-religious harmony in Sri Lanka and the politically fractured system. Sri Lanka needs constitutional reform, as you know.

Dr. Ariarajah: The core problem in Sri Lanka, as in many countries, is that politicians use religion as a tool to gain and maintain power. This goes back to Sri Lankan Prime Minister SWRD Bandaranaike, whose religious and linguistic policies introduced long-term problems. His followers saw that emphasizing the majority—Sinhalese and Buddhist identity—was the only way to gain political office.

When I lived in Jaffna, a town in the Tamil-minority dominated Northern Province, there was a time when Buddhist priests could walk freely through the city without issue, and we were learning Sinhalese in school. But after the “Sinhala Only” Act (which made Sinhala the sole official language of the country), the books were removed, and the study of Sinhalese effectively ended. Political interests gradually eroded both the social and religious fabric of Sri Lanka.

There have been individuals striving for interfaith harmony—people like Sri Lankan Jesuit priest Aloysius Pieris who worked to build relationships with Buddhist priests. Some Buddhist priests were also receptive. But these were isolated efforts; there was no national movement. Dialogue exists today, but mainly among small groups of friends across religious lines. Sri Lanka started with great promise, but political manipulation and religious instrumentalization led to a tragic outcome.

Shanmugathas: Thank you so much for speaking with me.