The US Supreme Court will hear oral arguments on Wednesday, November 5, in a pair of cases challenging President Donald Trump’s authority to impose broad tariffs on nearly all imported goods.
The consolidated cases, Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump and Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., ask whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) allows the President to impose global and country-specific tariffs by declaring a national emergency. The Court will also consider, if the statute is read to permit such tariffs, whether that delegation of authority to the executive branch is constitutional.
What is the law at issue here?
IEEPA authorizes the President, upon declaring a national emergency about an “unusual and extraordinary threat” originating abroad, to “regulate . . . importation or exportation” of property in which a foreign country or national has an interest. Relatedly, the National Emergencies Act (NEA) governs how emergencies are declared, renewed, and reported to Congress.
Who is challenging the law and why?
President Trump began issuing a series of executive orders in February imposing tariffs, stating that large trade deficits posed an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to US national security and the economy.
Small businesses such as wine importers and an apparel company and 12 states challenged two sets of tariffs: (1) “trafficking” tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China tied to fentanyl concerns; and (2) “reciprocal” or “worldwide” tariffs setting a 10% baseline and higher rates for many countries. Challengers argue that IEEPA has never been used to tax and Congress did not authorize tariffs via the word “regulate.”
In a separate case, Learning Resources and hand2mind, both educational-toy companies, challenged the tariffs in the D.C. district court, arguing that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose taxes. The court preliminarily blocked the tariffs as to those plaintiffs.
What is the procedural background of the case?
The V.O.S. case started in the Court of International Trade, where importers challenged the “reciprocal” tariffs and a group of States challenged both those tariffs and the fentanyl-related “contraband-drug” tariffs. The CIT denied a temporary restraining order, consolidated the cases, and fast-tracked briefing. On the merits, it ruled for the challengers: it vacated the tariff orders, issued a nationwide permanent injunction, and ordered a return to pre-emergency rates within ten days. The court held that while IEEPA lets a president “regulate importation by means of tariffs,” Congress expressly routed balance-of-payments surcharges through Trade Act § 122 (capped at 15% for 150 days), and the contraband-drug tariffs did not “deal with” the emergency but instead operated as leverage. The court also relied on Yoshida II to conclude that even if IEEPA allows some tariffs, it does not authorize the worldwide “reciprocal” tariffs beyond the limits in Trade Act § 122, nor the fentanyl-related tariffs, which were aimed at exerting pressure rather than directly addressing the stated threat. The Federal Circuit immediately stayed that order.
Sitting initially en banc, the Federal Circuit affirmed declaratory relief but wiped out the universal injunction and sent remedies back to the CIT. It did not decide whether IEEPA ever authorizes tariffs, but held it does not authorize tariffs “of the magnitude” imposed here, citing Congress’s practice of explicit tariff delegations, IEEPA’s omission of “tariff/duty/tax,” historical IEEPA use (freezes, embargoes, targeted sanctions), and major-questions concerns. The Federal Circuit stayed its mandate pending Supreme Court review, leaving the earlier stay in place and the tariffs in force.
Meanwhile, Learning Resources and hand2mind filed a similar suit in D.C. district court, arguing that Congress did not use IEEPA to give the President taxing authority—something Congress has historically granted only in specific trade laws with clear limits. The district court agreed at the preliminary stage, finding that IEEPA likely does not allow the President to impose and adjust tariffs at will to reshape global trade, and that the companies faced serious harm. It issued a plaintiff-specific preliminary injunction and briefly stayed it to allow an appeal.
The government’s appeal led the district court to stay its injunction pending the D.C. Circuit’s review. The D.C. Circuit later deemed the government’s stay request moot, and the plaintiffs moved to coordinate briefing with the related Federal Circuit case.
What specific legal issue is the Supreme Court being asked to decide?
Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose tariffs and, if yes, whether IEEPA unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority. Expect the Court to decide the statutory question first and reach nondelegation only if necessary.
What is the challengers’ position?
The challengers argue that IEEPA’s words do not give the President a taxing power. In their view, when Congress wants a President to impose tariffs, it says so expressly and sets hard limits (rate caps, time limits). By contrast, IEEPA says the President may “regulate . . . importation,” language the challengers read to cover things like blocking, licensing, or embargoing particular goods—not levying duties across the entire economy. They point to historical practice to prove the point: when President Nixon used the Trading with the Enemy Act to impose a 10% surcharge, Congress quickly responded with Trade Act § 122, which explicitly authorized a temporary surcharge but capped it at 15% for 150 days, illustrating that broad emergency statutes are not understood as blank checks for tariffs.
V.O.S. also invokes two separation-of-powers doctrines. Under the major questions doctrine, policies with vast economic and political significance require a clear statement from Congress; the challengers say nothing in IEEPA clearly grants the power to impose worldwide tariffs that shift trillions in costs. And if “regulate” were stretched to include open-ended tariff authority, the nondelegation doctrine becomes a problem because Congress would be handing over core Article I taxing power without intelligible limits, a concern made sharper after INS v. Chadha, which eliminated the legislative-veto mechanism Congress once used to rein in emergency delegations under the National Emergencies Act.
What is the government’s position?
The government responds that tariffs are a way to regulate imports, so IEEPA’s plain text to “regulate . . . importation” naturally includes tariff measures. It would be illogical, the government says, to read IEEPA to permit far more drastic emergency tools like embargoes or asset freezes yet forbid the more traditional and often less severe tool of duties. They say the challengers’ attempt to carve tariffs out of “regulate” finds no footing in text or history.
IEEPA’s language tracks the Trading with the Enemy Act, and presidents, including Nixon, used that statute to impose import surcharges. When Congress adopted the same language in 1977, the government argues, it did so against that backdrop. Likewise, the Supreme Court in Algonquin upheld presidential authority to impose monetary import adjustments. Congress did not need to spell out “tariffs” to include them.
The government argues the major-questions doctrine does not apply. This is not an agency expanding its mandate, it is the President invoking a foreign-affairs emergency statute where Congress historically grants broad discretion. If limits are needed, the government says, they should come at the margins, not by reading tariffs out of IEEPA.
What could happen at oral argument?
Expect a text-and-history workout. Several Justices will press the government to identify instances where Congress used “regulate…importation” to delegate tariff-setting, rather than using explicit words like “tariff,” “duty,” or “surcharge” with caps and time limits. Conversely, they will press the challengers on why “regulate” can include embargoes and quotas but categorically exclude tariffs; tools that also control the flow and price of imports.
Watch for avoidance pathways. If the Court sees a reasonable textual reading of IEEPA that excludes broad tariff authority, it can decide on the statute and avoid nondelegation. A middle path is possible: the Court could say IEEPA might allow some tariffs in emergencies but not tariffs that are too sweeping in scope, duration, or rationale, then remand for tailoring of relief.
Also expect remedial questions: nationwide injunctions post-Trump v. CASA, whether declaratory relief suffices, and whether CIT vs. district court posture affects the scope of any order. A few Justices may float threshold issues such as jurisdiction, finality, stays, but the center of gravity will be statutory authority first, constitutional questions second.
What to watch in argument
The Justices are likely to start with an analysis of IEEPA’s text. Expect sustained probing of whether “regulate importation” in the 1977 IEEPA naturally sweeps in tariffs or, as a matter of ordinary usage and statutory practice, more often means permitting, forbidding, licensing, embargoing, or capping quantities without authorizing rate-setting. That will invite dictionary tours, founding-era references, and hypotheticals that pit quotas against tariffs: if both instruments alter the price–quantity mix of imports, why would one fit the verb “regulate” while the other does not?
From there, the conversation will turn to precedent. One path analogizes IEEPA to the bounded tariff delegations the Court has approved, like Field v. Clark and the import-adjustment logic in Algonquin, where Congress cabined the President with triggers and limits. The other draws on the broader foreign-affairs latitude suggested by Curtiss-Wright, though that case involved a targeted arms embargo rather than a global baseline tariff. The Justices will test which model IEEPA most closely resembles: a specific tariff grant that Congress typically cabins, or a general emergency toolkit that incidentally reaches tariffs.
Institutional design after Chadha will shadow the discussion. With the legislative veto gone, the Court may ask how much real constraint the NEA’s annual renewals, reporting, and termination-by-statute provide. If those checks feel politically thin, reading IEEPA to include open-ended tariff power may sharpen nondelegation concerns; the government will answer that the statutory framework supplies meaningful oversight, while the challengers will argue those levers are insufficient given the economic stakes.
A few signals may reveal the Court’s trajectory. If several Justices hunt for a limiting principle by pressing how to distinguish permissible from impermissible tariffs, they may be angling for a narrow ruling that rejects these tariffs without categorically excluding all tariffs under IEEPA. If questioning centers on Section 122’s 15-percent and 150-day caps, that focus may reflect a view that Congress speaks clearly and narrowly when it means tariffs, pushing the Court toward a no-tariffs-under-IEEPA reading. If the Justices spend a lot of time on remedies and which court is proper, they may be aiming for a narrow decision by deciding the case on the statute alone, offering a declaratory judgment and perhaps a limited injunction, instead of issuing a broad constitutional decision.
What impact could this case have for you?
If the Court rules that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs, the broad emergency-based duties could be rolled back fast which is good news for importers and likely downward pressure on some consumer prices. If the Court greenlights tariffs under IEEPA, expect a more volatile trade landscape: future presidents could cite national-security-adjacent threats and rework tariff schedules on short notice. Beyond dollars and cents, the decision will broadcast how far major-questions and nondelegation limits reach when national security and foreign commerce collide with domestic taxation.
