Sri Lanka’s recently elected President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s political coalition, the National People’s Power (NPP), won an overwhelming amount of support from the majority Sinhalese community as well as the minority Tamil community, receiving a historic supermajority in the November 2024 Parliamentary elections. This broad mandate across ethnic lines presents a historic opportunity to address the constitutional deficiencies that have plagued the nation since independence, particularly the challenges of ethnic conflict and democratic governance. As the country seeks to rebuild after its devastating economic crisis, the lessons from the past attempts at constitutional reform offer crucial insights for crafting meaningful solutions.

On August 3rd, 1995, Sri Lanka’s then-President Chandrika Kumaratunga put forward a constitutional reform proposal known as the “Union of Regions” proposal. To date, it remains the boldest attempt to constitutionally redress the grievances of the minority communities of the nation. Unfortunately, due to political rivalry among the two major Sinhala political parties—and the refusal of the Tamil-separatist rebel group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), to engage with the proposals—the constitutional initiative was ultimately torpedoed.

President Dissanayake’s new constitution for Sri Lanka should incorporate many of the features that were present within the proposals put forward by the Kumaratunga government. The August 3rd proposals, developed with significant input from Harvard Law-educated constitutional scholar Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam, offered a comprehensive framework for power-sharing that could address the root causes of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict while maintaining the country’s territorial integrity.

The urgency of constitutional reform has been underscored by Sri Lanka’s recent economic and political crisis. According to a 2024 survey on Democracy and Reconciliation by the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), three-quarters of Sri Lankans believe that democracy is preferable to any other form of government, while a majority (52.3 percent) preferred a new constitution—a figure that has increased considerably from 2016 to 2024. The public’s demand for constitutional reform was dramatically amplified during the 2022 Aragalaya protests, when citizens demonstrated their willingness to directly challenge and oust President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who had violated a social contract through authoritarian and corrupt governance that led to national bankruptcy.

President Anura Kumara Dissanayake campaigned on a platform of constitutional reform, vowing to “abolish the Executive Presidency” and replace it with a president “without executive powers” appointed by Parliament. He pledged to introduce a new constitution aimed at “strengthening democracy and ensuring equality of all citizens,” building on the reform process initiated in 2015, which he notes remains “incomplete.” Crucially, he promised that the proposed changes would guarantee “equality and democracy” through the “devolution of political and administrative power to every local government, district, and province,” allowing all citizens to participate in governance “within one country.” He also committed to creating “a new parliamentary electoral system,” tackling another deeply rooted concern in Sri Lanka’s governance.

The Executive Presidency: A Failed Experiment

The presidential system introduced by Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene in 1978 has repeatedly failed to fulfill its promises of political stability, economic growth, and lasting peace. As Sri Lankan academic Jayadeva Uyangoda noted, Jayewardene “undermined Sri Lankan parliamentary democracy” by establishing what he himself referred to as an “executive presidential system” through the 1978 constitutional reforms. This shift had far-reaching consequences: the presidency became “the sole center of power,” while Parliament was effectively subordinated to the president’s office.

British academic Jonathan Spencer described the Jayewardene era as marked by an “appalling decline,” pointing out that while the political environment in 1977 was far from ideal, the situation deteriorated significantly over the following decade, culminating in insurgency in the South and the presence of foreign troops.

Considering this legacy, President Dissanayake should therefore prioritize the long-overdue abolition of the executive presidency. The excessive concentration of power in a single office has repeatedly resulted in authoritarianism, corruption, and inconsistent governance. The Gotabaya Rajapaksa presidency starkly demonstrated the dangers of this system, as his unilateral decisions—such as sweeping tax cuts for the rich and a sudden shift in agricultural policy—played a major role in precipitating the country’s economic crisis.

Beyond the Unitary State: Reimagining Sri Lanka’s Constitutional Identity

President Dissanayake must address the fundamental conceptual barrier to meaningful power-sharing: the designation of Sri Lanka as a “unitary state.”  As constitutional expert Rohan Edrisinha explained, this term was introduced in the 1972 Republican Constitution by Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandranaike as “a direct slap in the face of the Tamil people” who had been advocating for federalism within a united Ceylon. The term “unitary” in Sri Lankan politics carries heavy symbolic weight that extends beyond legal terminology. As Edrisinha noted, “there’s a lot of emotion, there’s a lot of ignorance and there’s a lot of misunderstanding about this term.” The conflation of “unitary” (akeya) with “united” (exa) in Sinhala has led many to wrongly believe that abandoning a unitary structure means fragmenting the country.

As highlighted by author Partha Sarathy Ghosh, the August 3rd proposals sought to divide the island into eight autonomous regions, fundamentally transforming Sri Lanka’s constitutional character. Instead of being defined as a unitary state, Sri Lanka would be recognized as a “union of regions” where they would be “fully autonomous both in terms of executive and legislative powers.” This represented a profound shift in the constitutional authority, as “Article 76 of the Constitution which gives absolute power of legislation in the country to the Parliament is to be abrogated as the same power is now to be shared by the Regional Councils as well.”

This linguistic and conceptual shift was far more than semantic; it represented a fundamental reconceptualization of the Sri Lankan state that acknowledged the country’s pluralistic character while providing constitutional safeguards for its territorial integrity. As former Constitutional Affairs Minister GL Peiris, who was one of the formulators of the August 3rd proposals observed, previous proposals were often characterized by “insincerity” where “on the surface, you appear to concede various things but then you incorporate into the proposal certain devices, certain techniques by recourse to which you are able to take back what you have professedly given.” The August 3rd proposals sought to break this pattern by offering genuine devolution without hidden mechanisms or recentralization.

Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, founder of the Centre for Policy Alternatives in Colombo, emphasized the significance of this change: the 1995 proposals represented “a major departure, qualitative departure, from this obsession with the unitary state.” By removing the unitary designation, the proposals sought to create space for genuine power-sharing without threatening the country’s territorial integrity. Journalist Jehan Perera observed that the Sri Lankan government, drawing inspiration from India’s model of a “union of regions” rather than a unitary state, incorporated this concept into its constitutional proposals, crediting Neelan Tiruchelvam as the key figure who inspired this shift. 

President Dissanayake should follow this lead and move beyond the restrictive unitary model, perhaps by adopting the “union of regions” concept or a similar formulation that acknowledges both unity and diversity. This would be consistent with his campaign promise to ensure “that all people can be involved in governance within one country.”

Current Limitations of the 13th Amendment: The Need for Meaningful Devolution

Any new constitution under President Dissanayake must address the fundamental flaws of the current devolution system established by the Thirteenth Amendment. As Rohan Edrisinha observed, the central issue lies in “the three lists” that define the powers of the National and Provincial Parliament, along with a concurrent list. The imbalance arises because the list for the central government is “comprehensive, all-embracing, sweeping,” while the provincial list is “extremely narrow,” leaving little meaningful space for regional autonomy.

Sri Lankan academic Jayadeva Uyangoda further pointed out that although there are “three lists,” in reality, “the concurrent powers” have consistently remained under the control of the central government. He also emphasized that Sri Lanka’s judiciary lacked the institutional development seen in India’s judicial system and was therefore unable to rule in favor of provincial councils when disputes over the division of powers arose.

The fundamental problem with the Thirteenth Amendment is that whatever powers the central government gave to the regions with one hand, could, in effect, be taken away with the other hand. The August 3rd proposals addressed this by abolishing the concurrent list contained in the Thirteenth Amendment. By removing the concurrent list, the proposals made powers between the center and the region more defined and distinct, and implemented checks that made it more difficult for the central government to unilaterally usurp powers given to the regions.

The proposals, with the removal of the concurrent list, advocated that

[T]he respective powers of the Center and the regions are contained in the Reserved List and the Regional List, respectively. To ensure that the center does not meddle in the affairs of the region, [the proposals] clearly provided that the Chief Ministers cannot be removed from office so long as they enjoy the confidence of the Regional Councils. The Governors are not supposed to be the watchdogs of the Central interests as is the case in India and their appointment by the President will be strictly with the concurrence of the Chief Ministers. To resolve disputes between the Center and the Regions or between and among the regions, there will be a permanent commission on devolution appointed by the Constitutional Council. The Commission would have powers of mediation as well as adjudication.

Essential Powers to Devolve: Drawing from the August 3rd Proposals

President Dissanayake’s constitution for Sri Lanka should draw inspiration from the August 3rd proposals. Several specific powers must be meaningfully devolved to the regions in President Dissanayake’s constitution.

Land powers were a central concern of the August 3rd proposals. As former Sri Lankan Constitutional Affairs advisor, Jayampathy Wickramaratne noted, the proposals included powers over “agriculture’ and “irrigation,” both of which are fundamentally connected to land use and management. Control over land use, administration, and development within their territories is vital for minority communities concerned about demographic changes through state-sponsored settlement schemes.

Police powers represent another contentious but essential area for devolution. As Wickramaratne explained, the 1995 proposals included provisions for “some of the law-and-order powers, leaving some to the center,” recognizing the need to balance local control with national security concerns. This balanced approach would allow regions to address local security concerns while preserving the center’s role in national security.  Furthermore, a level of regional autonomy with respect to police powers is desperately needed, as many Tamils in the North complain about the lack of police officers in the region who speak Tamil, even though more than 93% of the province consists of Tamil speakers. In 2019, the Senior Deputy Inspector General of Police, Roshan Fernando, said that only 12% of the province’s 6,000-strong police force speaks Tamil.

Financial autonomy was a key innovation of the August 3rd proposals. Dr. Tiruchelvam had identified the “extreme dependence of the province on the center with regard to financing” as a critical flaw of the Thirteenth Amendment. The August 3rd proposals addressed this by giving regional councils the power to borrow as well as set up their own financial institutions. Additionally, the proposals advocated for “a National Finance Commission entrusted with the job of allocating grants to the regions keeping in view balanced regional development.” The 1995 proposals recognized that meaningful autonomy is impossible without fiscal independence.

Education represents another vital area for devolution, with regions needing authority to shape educational systems that reflect their linguistic and cultural characteristics. As Wickramaratne noted, the Kumaratunga government’s proposals included provisions for “provincial education, provincial universities,” recognizing the importance of educational autonomy in preserving and promoting regional linguistic and cultural identities.

Protecting Regional Autonomy: Constitutional Safeguards

President Dissanayake must establish robust constitutional safeguards to protect regional autonomy from central encroachment. A new constitution must establish what Dr. Tiruchelvam described as “a constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority and allocation of revenue resources between the national and the regional orders of government, providing for areas of exclusivity and autonomy for each order.”  This clear division is essential for preventing the ambiguities and overlaps that have undermined previous devolution arrangements.

Critically, as Jayampathy Wickramaratne explained, the constitution must ensure “the center being unable to encroach without further constitutional amendment.” This protection is essential as Tamil communities need assurance that powers once devolved cannot be arbitrarily reclaimed. As Saravanamuttu noted, the 1995 proposals sought to create a situation where “you were giving the regions powers that the center could not take back. So you had a constitutional guarantee about a certain amount of autonomy.”

Dr. Tiruchelvam identified several essential safeguards in his analysis of the 1995 proposals. First, the proposed written constitution would “not be unilaterally alterable,” requiring regional consent for amendments affecting devolution or the distribution of powers. As he explained, “no bill for the amendment or repeal of the provisions of the chapter relating to devolution or relating to the distribution of subjects and functions between the center and the region shall come into operation in respect of a region unless such act or provision has been approved by a resolution of a regional council established for that region.”

Second, Tiruchelvam notes that the proposals established “an umpire to rule on disputes between the centre and the region” in the form of an arbitral tribunal, providing an independent mechanism for resolving intergovernmental conflicts.

Third, as Partha Sarathy Ghosh highlighted, the August 3rd proposals “clearly provided that the Chief Ministers cannot be removed from office so long as they enjoy the confidence of the Regional Councils. The Governors are not supposed to be the watchdogs of the Central interests as is the case in India and their appointment by the President will be strictly with the concurrence of the Chief Ministers.” This provision was crucial for preventing the central government from undermining regional self-government through appointed governors.

Fourth, Partha Sarathy Ghosh notes that the proposals created “a permanent commission on devolution appointed by the Constitutional Council. The Commission would have powers of mediation as well as adjudication” for resolving disputes between different levels of government. This institution would help manage intergovernmental relations and prevent conflicts from escalating into constitutional crises.

President Dissanayake should incorporate these safeguards into any new constitutional arrangement to ensure that devolution is meaningful and durable.

Creating a Second Chamber: A Key Missing Element

A significant element that President Dissanayake should incorporate into the new constitution is the second chamber that Dr. Tiruchelvam advocated for. Dr. Tiruchelvam identified “the absence of second chamber providing for the representation of distinct regional views” as a significant omission in previous proposals, including the August 3rd proposals which he helped draft. He noted that during the formulation of the Kumaratunga government’s proposals, the suggestion to create a second chamber “was made before the Select Committee but was subsequently withdrawn by the government, ostensibly on the grounds of expense.”

Rohan Edrisinha emphasized the importance of a second chamber, noting that in federal systems, “[Y]ou have a clear-cut division of powers between the center and the provinces, you have a Constitution that is supreme, you have a second chamber where the provinces of the regions have a voice at the center.” This institutional arrangement is essential for ensuring that regional interests are represented at the national level.

Jayampathy Wickramaratne elaborated on the value of such an institution: “Through a second chamber, representatives of the periphery come to take part in matters relating to the central government. And that would make the country as a whole stronger, so I see the second chamber as one way of strengthening the center without weakening the provinces.” This insight is particularly important—a second chamber does not diminish central authority but rather transforms it, making it more inclusive and representative of the country’s diversity.

The design of this second chamber would be crucial; it should provide for equal or weighted representation of regions regardless of population, ensuring that smaller provinces and minority communities have meaningful influence. This would transform the character of national governance, making it more inclusive and consensus-oriented rather than simply majoritarian.

Given President Dissanayake’s commitment to ensuring “that all people can be involved in governance within one country,” a second chamber would be an ideal institutional mechanism for realizing this vision. It would provide regions with direct input into national decision-making, creating an additional mechanism for protecting regional interests and ensuring regional perspectives are integrated into national policy formulation.

Judicial Review: Enforcing Constitutional Boundaries

A critical element that President Dissanayake must incorporate into the new constitution is robust judicial review. As Rohan Edrisinha pointed out, “Sri Lanka probably alone in the whole of South Asia, you have a constitution even today where once a law passed by Parliament, it cannot be challenged in the courts on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the supreme law of the land.” This limitation has serious implications for devolution, as it leaves provincial powers vulnerable to erosion through ordinary legislation.  Edrisinha stressed the risk, explaining that if Parliament enacts a law that contradicts the devolution framework, and “those shortcomings are not detected before the law is passed,” the law still takes effect—even if it violates the Constitution.

A new constitution must address this deficiency by empowering courts to invalidate laws that violate constitutional power-sharing arrangements. This would require establishing a strong, independent constitutional court with the authority to adjudicate disputes between orders of government and to strike down legislation that undermines the constitutional division of powers. Additionally, the constitution should establish specific standing rules allowing regional governments to directly challenge central legislation that allegedly infringes on their jurisdiction.

Effective enforcement mechanisms are also necessary to ensure court judgments are respected and implemented by all levels of government. Without robust judicial review and enforcement, even the most carefully crafted devolution provisions risk becoming mere paper guarantees.

Muslim Representation: Addressing a Complex Challenge

President Dissanayake’s new constitution must also address the concerns of Sri Lanka’s Muslim community, which has often felt marginalized in discussions dominated by Sinhalese-Tamil relations. As Dr. Tiruchelvam recognized, “There is clearly a need to have meaningful, adequate, institutional arrangements for the Muslims of the Eastern Province if we are to devise a durable solution.”

Dr. Tiruchelvam identified several potential approaches to this challenge. First, “power sharing arrangement which would ensure that Muslims would be able to enjoy representation at the legislative and executive level for which they feel is proportionate to their demographic presence in that area.” Second, “some means of equitable sharing of resources between the Muslims and the other communities with regard to issues of economic development, land, financial resources, credit and so forth, educational opportunities.” Third, potentially creating administrative arrangements specifically for Muslim-majority areas.

The complex demographics of the Eastern Province, where Muslims constitute a substantial proportion of the population alongside Tamils and Sinhalese, require particular attention. As Jonathan Spencer noted, the historical relationship between Muslims and Tamils in the Eastern Province was complicated by the actions of the separatist Tamil rebel group, the LTTE, during the civil war. The LTTE “had no problem with playing that game” of divide and rule, culminating in atrocities like “Kattankudy in August 1990 when over a hundred men and boys were massacred by the LTTE” while praying at a mosque. “Things like that pretty much drove a wedge between the two communities.”

Jayadeva Uyangoda explained that following the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, “the Muslims … thought that under a provincial council system and devolution with a merged Northern and Eastern province, Tamils would control and monopolize political power in the joint provinces and the Muslims would be reduced to the status of a permanent disempowered minority.”

To address the issue of the merging of the North and East and the status of Muslims, Tiruchelvam outlined three potential approaches. The first is to integrate Muslims into devolved administrations, ensuring their representation and influence. The second involves creating a devolution model that connects non-contiguous Muslim-majority areas, though he warned this would be “extremely difficult to administer” due to mixed populations and overlapping jurisdictions. The third option, which he found more viable, is to consider devolving power to a contiguous Muslim enclave, such as Muslim-majority electorates in the Ampara district like Pottuvil, Kalmunai, and Sammanthurai. However, he cautioned that while it is essential to protect Muslims living outside such enclaves, the non-contiguous model would likely face serious political and administrative obstacles.

President Dissanayake should draw on these insights to craft constitutional arrangements that protect the rights and interests of the Muslim community while maintaining the coherence of the overall devolution framework.

Buddhism’s Place in the Constitution: Balancing Recognition and Equality

President Dissanayake must also address the status of Buddhism in the new constitution. The current constitution gives Buddhism “the foremost place” while assuring the rights of all religions, a formulation that has been criticized for creating an implicit hierarchy of faiths in a multi-religious society.

A new constitution should reconsider the current approach, as Sri Lanka is a pluralistic nation that consists of Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, and Christians. The current approach could involve explicitly recognizing the historical importance of Buddhism while simultaneously affirming the principle of state neutrality in religious matters. This could involve separating the cultural and historical recognition of Buddhism from any implication of legal or political preference, while strengthening protections for religious equality and freedom.

As President Chandrika Kumaratunga noted, during her government’s constitutional reform process, “we had thousands of Buddhist monks walking on the roads in support of the constitution, there were a few loudmouth Buddhist monks who protested but there were a large number who were for it, we had managed to persuade them.” This demonstrates that a more balanced approach to the status of Buddhism is politically feasible with proper engagement and dialogue.

President Dissanayake’s constitutional drafters should engage in meaningful consultation with representatives of all religious communities, drawing inspiration from comparative constitutional examples where countries have balanced recognition of historical religious traditions with modern principles of religious equality.  The aim should be to craft language that acknowledges Sri Lanka’s Buddhist heritage while ensuring that this recognition cannot be interpreted to diminish the equal rights and status of other religious communities.

The Challenge of Implementing Constitutional Reform for President Dissanayake

Despite President Dissanyake’s election pledges to pursue constitutional reform, actual progress has been limited. According to observers, there has been little visible momentum on these constitutional reform promises in the first months of the NPP government.  On April 9, Sri Lanka’s current Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya stated that the government’s immediate focus is on economic stabilization and that constitutional reform will be pursued later “within a reasonable timeframe.” 

Mark Salter, an author and journalist based in Sri Lanka, points to several factors that may explain the NPP’s slow pace on constitutional reform, including the NPP government’s inexperience. With most of the Members of Parliament from the NPP being new to elected office at the national level, they arrived “with a lot of ideas and promises but very little experience” in navigating Sri Lanka’s complex governance structures. This inexperience has become “an obstacle” to delivering on reforms.

Salter emphasizes that timing is critical—most constitutional reforms succeed within the first six to nine months of a government. While the NPP’s strong mandate may buy some time, delays risk reforms being sidelined as economic pressures and debt repayments take over.

Conclusion: The Path Forward for President Dissanayake

President Dissanayake now has a historic opportunity to build on Dr. Tiruchelvam’s vision and fulfill his own campaign promises to create a more inclusive, democratic Sri Lanka. Drawing on the insights from past constitutional reform efforts, particularly the August 3rd proposals, the president should prioritize:

1. Abolishing the executive presidency, which has consistently undermined democracy and fostered authoritarianism since its introduction in 1978;
2. Moving beyond the restrictive unitary state model toward a union of regions or a similar concept that acknowledges both unity and diversity;
3. Establishing a clear division of powers between national and regional governments, with substantive devolution of land, police, and financial powers;
4. Creating a second chamber of Parliament (i.e. a Senate) to ensure regional representation at the national level;
5. Implementing robust constitutional safeguards to protect regional autonomy, including requirements for regional consent for constitutional amendments affecting devolution;
6. Establishing post-enactment judicial review to enforce constitutional boundaries and protect devolved powers;
7. Addressing the specific concerns of the Muslim community through appropriate institutional arrangements; and
8. Recalibrating the constitutional status of Buddhism to balance historical recognition with religious equality.

As former Tamil Member of Parliament M.A. Sumanthiran reflected, Dr. Tiruchelvam’s “legacy is one of peaceful negotiation and political settlement through constitutional realignment. That is something that he gave us as a hope to resolve this conflict and he articulated that position and pursued that at a time when the alternate method of armed struggle was at its height.”

The NPP government’s unprecedented cross-ethnic mandate offers the most promising opportunity in decades to implement these reforms. Despite the challenges of inexperience and competing priorities, President Dissanayake must seize this moment to create a constitutional framework that can heal the wounds of Sri Lanka’s past and create a more harmonious future.