

RECEIVED

JUN 09 2026

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA****CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA**

State of Minnesota,	Hennepin County, Fourth Judicial District Court File No. 27-CR-26-9656
 Plaintiff,	 NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF STATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 and 1455
v.	
Gregory Donnell Morgan, Jr.,	
 Defendant.	

**NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF STATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION &
REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING**

Defendant Gregory Donnell Morgan Jr., a Special Agent with the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal Operations ("ICE/ERO"), through counsel, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 and 1455, files this Notice of Removal of State Criminal Prosecution ("Notice") to remove the case of *State v. Gregory Donnell Morgan Jr.*, Case No. 27-CR-26-9656 from the Hennepin County District Court, Fourth Judicial District, to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.

This Notice is filed on June 9, 2026, which is within 30 days after Defendant's arraignment on May 22, 2026, and before any trial setting, and therefore is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(1).

While on duty and following an order to extract himself, his ICE agent partner, and his ICE team from a hostile neighborhood, and to safely regroup with his team and protect each other while operating, Agent Morgan followed orders and drove toward the Minnesota Air Force Reserve base to regroup in a safe place with his team where they continued their operational duties for an additional 2 hours. While driving, and with his partner seated in the middle row, Agent Morgan and his partner were put in fear of immediate bodily harm by a Cadillac sedan that intentionally swerved in front of them twice,¹ nearly causing Agent Morgan and his partner to be in a rear end collision or be run off the road. The Cadillac driver did this without any provocation from Agent Morgan. Fearing for his and his ICE partner's safety, as well as the safety of nearby motorists, Agent Morgan brandished² his service weapon and yelled "Police, Stop, back off!" The State has charged Agent Morgan with two counts of Assault in the Second Degree — Dangerous Weapon. Because he was acting in his official

¹ Agent Morgan turned out to be driving on the shoulder of eastbound highway 62, and the driver of the Cadillac claims he/she was upset Morgan was driving on the shoulder.

² The two occupants of the Cadillac allege that Morgan *pointed* his service weapon at them. The County Attorney has redacted all identifying information for those occupants in discovery, and obtained an Ex Parte order from the Hennepin County district court permitting this. This has hindered the defense investigation.

capacity and raises the defense that his actions were necessary and proper, he is entitled to have his case heard in federal court.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1455(a), copies of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon Agent Morgan are attached as Exhibits A-H. (A) the criminal complaint and warrant filed April 16, 2026; (B) Certificate of Representation; (C) Defendant's Rule 9.01 Discovery Demand; (D) Bond; (E) Notice of Hearing and Judicial Assignment; (F) Conditional Release Order; (G) Waiver of Extradition hearing; (H) Register of Actions. Defendant verifies that, to the best of his knowledge, these constitute all materials served in the state prosecution to date. As grounds for removal, Agent Morgan states the following:

BACKGROUND

Agent Morgan has been a sworn federal law enforcement agent since September, 2025, employed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, a component of the department of Homeland Security, as an ICE/ERO Special Agent/Officer. He is based in the Washington D.C. area, but, as discussed below, was detailed to the Twin Cities metro area for the second wave of operation Metro Surge in February, 2026. He is and was unambiguously an "officer of the United States or agency thereof" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).

As operation Metro Surge built up from December, 2025 through February, 2026, community resistance and hostility towards Federal law

enforcement agents increased. Citizens organized rapid-response networks. Many citizens were hostile to the presence of unmarked federal vehicles and undercover ICE agents conducting random street stops. Locals crowdsourced identifying information – such as unmarked federal law enforcement vehicle makes, models, and license plate numbers, sharing these details across social media and encrypted applications to track ICE movements, warn neighbors, and sometimes harass, threaten or assault ICE agents. The community was in a frenzy over operation Metro Surge, and community hostility grew as there were three shootings in the Twin Cities metropolitan area involving federal agents all in January, 2026.

On arriving to Minnesota late January, 2026, Agent Morgan and his team were briefed regarding the dangers posed to ICE agents by some hostile civilians. These included but were not limited to civilians using their vehicles to obstruct or assault ICE agents, throwing rocks and objects at ICE agents, cutting their tires, breaking their vehicle windows, among other actions.

On February 5, 2026, multiple ICE agents, including Agent Morgan and his ICE/ERO team were conducting a federal enforcement operation in Twin Cities neighborhoods. This operation included a combination of surveillance as well as support to other ICE officers as they came under harassment and threats of assaultive behavior from some citizens. The team had encountered significant

hostility during their operations each day, including February 5, 2026. The threats to Agent Morgan as well as other ICE officers included hostile people surrounding and following their vehicles throughout their deployment, making verbal threats of assault at them, throwing rocks, dildos, and other objects at them, calling them "niggers" and obstructing their operations on foot and in vehicles. Earlier that day, a Jeep Cherokee had dangerously swerved at Agent Morgan and his partner, causing both of them fear of imminent bodily harm.

As a result of the escalating danger to the ICE agents in the neighborhood, Agent Morgan's team's supervisor issued a direct order to the team to withdraw from the operational area because it was getting too dangerous for the ICE officers, and to protect each other and to regroup at the Minnesota Air Force Reserve base where they would get further instructions and continue their work. Agent Morgan as driver, with his partner accompanying him, began to extract from the neighborhood. Their vehicle got caught at a red light during the extraction, and they lost the rest of their team ahead of them. Agent Morgan and his partner were tailed out of the neighborhood by two Subaru vehicles, further causing them fear for their safety. They continued to be under duty to protect each other and fellow federal officers.

When Agent Morgan and his partner were ordered from their normal assignments in the Washington D.C. area, they were prohibited from bringing

their law enforcement vehicles to Minnesota. Instead, Morgan and his partner were required to rent a civilian Ford Expedition, the same as any other citizen would rent. This rental vehicle was devoid of any law enforcement equipment or markings: no obvious or even undercover police blue/red lights, no intercom, no spotlight, no law enforcement decals, no siren. Nothing. It was just a black SUV with out of state license plates: the exact type of vehicle that citizens in the community were suspecting to be undercover ICE vehicles and deciding to target. This is the vehicle that Agent Morgan operated on February 5, 2026.

While trying to regroup and safely reunite at the Air Force Reserve base to continue on working with their team, and as Agent Morgan and his partner were still under order to protect each other and their law enforcement team, the driver of a Cadillac sedan intentionally, aggressively, and dangerously swerved in front of the unmarked rental vehicle that officer Morgan was driving and his partner was a passenger in. The second swerve from the Cadillac, which was targeting Agent Morgan's vehicle, was so dangerous that it nearly caused a rear end collision with Agent Morgan and his partner. Because of the multiple, aggressive and dangerous swerves and braking by the Cadillac driver, Agent Morgan feared for his safety, the safety of his partner in the vehicle, and others on the road. While alongside the Cadillac, Agent Morgan yelled words to the effect of "Police, Stop, back off!" and brandished his service weapon to identify himself as

law enforcement and to assure that the Cadillac did not again make any additional dangerous, aggressive moves at or near Morgan and his partner. After the threat from the Cadillac appeared to be over, Agent Morgan peacefully merged into the lane of traffic and continued to follow orders to safely regroup with his team at the Air Force Reserve base and continue their federal operations.

Because ICE had required Agent Morgan to operate a rental vehicle with no law enforcement equipment, he employed available means of identifying himself as a federal law enforcement officer while at the same time brandishing his service pistol and rapidly deterring the Cadillac driver to stop his or her dangerous behavior directed at Morgan and his partner so Agent Morgan and his partner could continue their federal duties.

The State concluded that Agent Morgan committed Assault in the Second Degree – Dangerous Weapon because he purportedly pointed (or brandished) his service weapon, charging Agent Morgan³ with two counts – one for each occupant of the Cadillac sedan – in violation of Minn. Stat. Sec. 609.222, subd. 1. Ex A. Agent Morgan cooperated with the process, turned in for booking, posted bond, and made his initial appearance and was arraigned on May 22, 2026. Exs. D, F, G, and H.

³ Despite law enforcement conducting interviews of all parties the day after the alleged incident, and having fully identified Morgan, the State waited two months to charge him. Rather than issuing a summons, the Hennepin County Attorney sought a nationwide warrant for his arrest.

Agent Morgan denies and reserves the right to dispute the allegations against him,⁴ and asserts that at all relevant times he was acting as a federal officer under color of his office, and that he has a colorable federal defense to the charges against him: immunity under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, Agent Morgan has the right to have his case heard in federal court.

Because Agent Morgan was providing immediate assistance to another ICE agent who was threatened with bodily harm which arose out of the duty to enforce federal law, and intends to raise a defense that his actions were necessary and proper in the performance of his federal duties, he is entitled to have this case heard in federal court. Agent Morgan asserts defenses including but not limited to Supremacy Clause immunity, official duty self-defense (implicating federal law), official duty defense of another (implicating federal law), applicable ICE Use of Force policy (which does *not* require a duty to retreat in contradiction to Minnesota state law), and official duty necessity (implicating federal law). In the context of the relevant events, some of these defenses are a subspecies of the broader immunity defense. Agent Morgan specifically avers that he was authorized to do what he is charged with, whether it be by brandishing or, for

⁴ “It was settled long ago that the federal officer, in order to secure removal, need not admit that he actually committed the charged offenses.” *Willingham v. Morgan*, 395 U.S. 402, 408 (1969) (citing *Maryland v. Soper*, 270 U.S. 9, 32-33 (1926)).

the sake of argument, even pointing his service pistol. The actions of Agent Morgan on February 5, 2026 were in performance of an act that federal law authorized him to undertake, and in performing those authorized acts, he did no more than what was necessary and proper to do. He subjectively believed that his actions were appropriate to carry out federal duties, and his belief was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

I. GROUNDS FOR FEDERAL OFFICER REMOVAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. SEC. 1442

A. Removal Generally

Congress long ago decided that federal officers should not be subject to prosecution in state court for acts that occurred while they were operating within the scope of their federal employment; the removal statute accomplishes that goal. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1); *see also Willingham v. Morgan*, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969) (discussing that removal statute is broad enough to cover all cases where federal officers can raise a colorable defense arising out of their duties to enforce federal law); *Tennessee v. Davis*, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1880) (discussing constitutional and policy reasons necessitating removal to federal court). The federal removal statute permits removal of any "criminal prosecution that is commenced in a State court" against "any officer . . . of the United States or the agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of

Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue." 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The statute "grant[s] district court jurisdiction over cases in which a federal officer is a defendant." *Mesa v. California*, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989).

The statute makes clear that "the right of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) is made absolute whenever a suit in a state court is for any act 'under color' of federal office, regardless of whether the suit could originally have been brought in a federal court." *Willingham*, 395 U.S. at 406. "To qualify for removal, an officer of the federal courts must both raise a colorable federal defense, and establish that the suit is for a[n] act under color of office [.] To satisfy the latter requirement, the officer must show a nexus, a causal connection between the charged conduct and asserted official authority." *Jefferson County, Ala. v. Acker*, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999) (internal citations omitted/cleaned up).

For removal to be proper, the officer need not prove that his federal defense will be successful, only that it be "colorable." *Acker*, 527 U.S. at 431. "For a defense to be considered colorable, it need only be plausible; § 1442(a)(1) does not require a court to hold that a defense will be successful before removal is appropriate." *United States v. Todd*, 245 F.3d 691, 693 (8th Cir. 2001). This Court must credit the federal officer's theory of the case when considering whether he has satisfied the jurisdictional elements. *Acker*, 527 U.S. at 432.

The statute sets out a clear procedure for evaluating a removal notice. This Court must promptly examine the notice to ensure "it clearly appears on the face of the notice and any exhibits annexed thereto" that removal is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(4). In other words, the notice must make clear that the defendant (1) was acting in his official capacity; and (2) has a federal defense.

If the United States district court does not order the summary remand of such prosecution, it shall order an evidentiary hearing to be held promptly and, after such hearing, shall make such disposition of the prosecution as justice shall require. If the United States district court determines that removal shall be permitted, it shall so notify the State court in which prosecution is pending, which shall proceed no further. 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(5).

Agent Morgan requests that this Court find that removal is proper on the face of this Notice and promptly schedule an evidentiary hearing.

B. Removal is Proper

Removal is proper in this case because Agent Morgan was acting "under color of his office" and has a "colorable" federal defense. *Acker*, 527 U.S. at 431. Importantly, while Agent Morgan must make a preliminary showing that he has such a defense, he need not "win his case before he can have it removed." *Id.* (citation omitted). This Court must credit Agent Morgan's theory of the case when evaluating the jurisdictional elements. *Id.* at 432.

The reason for the removal is to ensure that Agent Morgan's defense of federal immunity is heard in federal court. *Id.* The three elements for removal are met here.

1. Agent Morgan is Federal Officer

First, Agent Morgan is an Officer of the United States. There is no dispute that Agent Morgan is a sworn federal law enforcement officer employed by ICE/ERO, a component agency of the United States Department of Homeland Security. He was detailed to the Minneapolis area on official federal business at the time of the incident, February 5, 2026. Agent Morgan is an officer of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).

2. Agent Morgan Was Acting Under Color of his Office

Second, Agent Morgan was acting "under color of his office."

28 U.S.C. § 1442(c) provides, in pertinent part:

Solely for purposes of determining the propriety of removal under subsection (a), a law enforcement officer, who is the defendant in a criminal prosecution, shall be deemed to have been acting under the color of his office if the officer —

(1) protected an individual in the presence of the officer from a crime of violence;

(2) provided immediate assistance to an individual who suffered, or who was threatened with, bodily harm

Removal requires only that "his acts or his presence at the place in performance of his official duty constitute the basis, though mistaken or false, of the state prosecution." *Maryland v. Soper*, 270 U.S. 9, 33 (1926). Agent Morgan was executing a direct supervisory order under official duties to extract his federal team from an active federal enforcement operation in a hostile neighborhood, protect each other, and to assure their safe regroup to the Air Force Reserve base when the charged conduct occurred. The Cadillac driver intentionally swerved — twice — and applied its brakes hard at Agent Morgan's vehicle, nearly causing a dangerous crash on the highway. Agent Morgan was driving the rented vehicle ICE required him to operate, with his ICE agent partner in the vehicle with him, while wearing his police vest. He had his service weapon issued by ICE. The charged conduct — drawing his service weapon and verbally identifying as law enforcement — arose directly and entirely from his federal role. He protected himself and his ICE partner from a crime of violence and provided immediate assistance to his partner who was threatened with bodily harm. Nothing more is required. *See Id.*

3. Agent Morgan Has a Colorable Federal Defense.

Third, Agent Morgan has a colorable federal defense. Agent Morgan intends to assert federal immunity under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, among other defenses cited above.

"Under *Neagle*, a state court has no jurisdiction if (1) the federal agent was performing an act which he was authorized to do by the law of the United States and (2) in performing that authorized act, the federal agent did no more than what was necessary and proper for him to do." *Kentucky v. Long*, 837 F.2d 727, 744 (6th Cir. 1988); *see also California v. Dotson*, No. 12CR0917 AJB, 2012 WL 1904467, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 25, 2012).

a. Agent Morgan Acted Within Course and Scope of His Authority

Agent Morgan intends to prove that he was acting within the scope of his authority when the charged incident occurred. He is authorized and required to drive the rented ICE vehicle, to work with his partner and to drive him, to effect ICE operations in the Twin Cities Area during metro surge, including but not limited to surveillance, protection of ICE and other federal agents, and moving from neighborhood to neighborhood as well as back and forth from the Air Force Reserve base to regroup and continue operations. Their orders required fluid movements every day, from neighborhood to base, back to another neighborhood to base, with frequent diversions being ordered over their radios. From day one of their arrival in Minnesota, Agent Morgan and his team were warned of the danger posed to ICE agents and to protect each other during all operations.

As a sworn federal officer, Agent Morgan was authorized to carry and display his service weapon, to identify himself as a law enforcement officer, and to take reasonable steps to protect himself and his partner in the performance of their federal duties when necessary to accomplish and ensure their safety while being ordered to complete a tactical withdrawal and assure their safety while they regroup and continue operating. His training included no duty to retreat. The Eighth Circuit has confirmed that the colorable defense standard does not require the officer to prove that his actions were in fact authorized — only that it is plausible that they were. *Todd*, 245 F.3d at 693. Agent Morgan's display of his service weapon and verbal identification as law enforcement in response to a perceived threat while executing a supervisory extraction order and assure their safety while he and his partner operate and regroup plainly falls within the scope of authority possessed by a federal law enforcement officer.

b. Agent Morgan's Actions Were Necessary and Proper

"For a federal employee to be stripped of the Supremacy Clause immunity it must be shown that the employee employed means which he cannot honestly consider reasonable in discharging his duties or that the act was made out of malice or with criminal intent." *Dotson*, 2012 WL 1904467, at *3 (citing *Clifton*, 549 F.2d at 728).

To be necessary and proper, an officer must (1) subjectively believe that his action is justified; and (2) that belief must be objectively reasonable. *See Clifton v. Cox*, 549 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing *Cunningham v. Neagle*, 10 S.Ct. 658 (1890); *see also New York v. Tanella*, 374 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2004). Critically, a defendant need not "show that his action was in fact necessary or in retrospect justifiable, only that he reasonably thought it to be." *Clifton*, 549 F.2d at 728.

Both conditions are met here. Agent Morgan subjectively believed his actions were justified based on the following facts: (1) his team had experienced active, escalating hostility throughout their operation that day, including being surrounded, threatened and followed by individuals in and then out of the operational area; (2) approximately one hour before the Cadillac incident, a Jeep Cherokee had swerved at Agent Morgan's vehicle in what he perceived as another targeted act against his team, and he had been required to identify himself as law enforcement during that incident; (3) the Cadillac targeted Morgan's unmarked vehicle by intentionally swerving into his path at least *twice* — without any provocation from Agent Morgan — and aggressively applied its brakes, nearly causing a rear end collision or running Morgan off the road, and created a threat of imminent bodily harm to Agent Morgan, his ICE Partner, and perhaps other motorists — conduct that Agent Morgan reasonably perceived as additional targeted hostility toward himself and his partner, like they had

already experienced that day. The Cadillac's intentional actions were so aggressive that if they continued and sideswiped the ICE rental vehicle, great bodily harm may have occurred to Agent Morgan, his partner, occupants of the Cadillac, or other motorists on the busy highway; (4) Agent Morgan had a duty to continue to protect himself and his ICE partner as they tactically withdrew and attempted to safely regroup with their team (that he and his partner had been separated from) at the Air Force Reserve base; and (5) ICE had provided Agent Morgan with a vehicle that had no law enforcement markings, law enforcement lights, sirens, spotlight, or intercom equipment, leaving him with few options of identifying himself as a federal officer and deterring the Cadillac driver's assaultive actions in a rapidly developing and increasingly dangerous situation. In fact, the driver of the Cadillac admits that he/she "made the not so bright decision and tried to stop (Morgan)." The Cadillac driver also admitted Agent Morgan "was yelling something" but couldn't make out what Agent Morgan was saying because the Cadillac's windows were up.

Agent Morgan's belief was also objectively reasonable. He was an ICE/ERO agent executing a direct supervisory order to extract from an active operational area where his team had been subjected to ongoing, escalating hostility, and to get himself and his law enforcement partner safely back to the Air Force Reserve base. He was operating in an unmarked rental vehicle — not

by personal choice but because ICE required it. This rental vehicle was just a normal rental vehicle that any civilian would rent. This deprived Agent Morgan of the ability to put on red/blue lights, order the Cadillac driver to cease over the intercom, flash a spotlight, identify as police with conspicuous markings on the doors, etc. These facts further constrained the way in which officer Morgan was able to carry out his duties. And because the Cadillac driver swerved at least twice, its conduct was clearly threatening to Agent Morgan.

Additionally, Agent Morgan and his partner were separated from their team during the tactical extraction operation, and had been followed out of the neighborhood by two civilian Subaru vehicles. They had already encountered one hostile civilian Jeep that day in nearly identical circumstances. When the Cadillac twice swerved in front of him and then aggressively applied its brakes directly in front of Morgan's vehicle, the circumstances as they appeared to Agent Morgan supported a reasonable belief that another hostile act against his federal team was underway.

Because ICE required use of an unmarked rental vehicle with no lights, sirens, or intercom, displaying the service weapon in conjunction with a clear verbal identification — 'Police, Stop' — was his available method to deter an imminent vehicular threat and communicate lawful authority. It was known to Agent Morgan and his partner that many hostile community members were

targeting nearly identical unmarked, rented ICE vehicles by crowd sourcing their information, especially black SUV's with out of state license plates. Whether or not the Cadillac driver was part of a crowd sourcing situation or not, the targeted and threatening driving conduct put Agent Morgan and his partner in danger of imminent bodily harm while they were acting in the color and scope of their federal duties and authority.

II. THIS CASE IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM CASES DENYING REMOVAL

The State may rely on *Minnesota v. Weber*, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Minn. 2008), *North Carolina v. Ivory*, 906 F.2d 999 (4th Cir. 1990), and *North Carolina v. Cisneros*, 947 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1991), to argue that removal is improper. Those cases are factually distinguishable in critical respects.

Weber arose in this district. But *Weber* involved a Border Patrol agent on a routine patrol who "conceded at the evidentiary hearing that there are no facts in the record sufficient to establish an 'exigency or emergency.'" *Weber*, 589 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. There was no active operation, no supervisory directive, no hostile threat, no team extraction, and no duty-related constraint on the agent's conduct. The agent was simply patrolling a road. *Id.* at 1171-72. Agent Morgan's situation is the opposite. He was executing a direct supervisory order to extract his team

from an active operational area under hostile conditions with limited equipment.

The exigency here is not manufactured — it is documented in the record.

Ivory and *Cisneros* both involved military convoy drivers with no duty-related exigency requiring their specific conduct. In *Ivory*, the Marine was returning from a routine transport with no emergency and no order prohibiting him from stopping to yield the right of way. *Ivory*, 906 F.2d at 1003. In *Cisneros*, the alleged exigency — brake failure — was not "the type which inheres in the very nature and object of the federal duty at issue." *Cisneros*, 947 F.2d at 1140. Neither case involved an agent executing a supervisory tactical withdrawal, separated from his team, operating in a vehicle that his agency required him to use despite having no law enforcement equipment, and responding to what he reasonably perceived as a targeted hostile act increasing the exigency.

This case aligns instead with cases where removal was properly granted. In *California v. Dotson*, the court granted removal where a federal agent was conducting active drug surveillance when the charged conduct occurred, finding defendant's actions were within the scope of the federal authority, necessary and proper, and dismissing the charge on Supremacy Clause immunity. *Dotson*, 2012 WL 1904467, at *4-7. In *United States v. Landis*, No. 6:23-cr-00330-MC (D. Or. 2023), removal was granted where a DEA agent was conducting active fentanyl surveillance when involved in an accident. Here, as in those cases, there is a

direct and meaningful connection between Agent Morgan's charged conduct and his federal law enforcement duties — not merely the coincidence of being on duty.

Agent Morgan's decision to display his service weapon, identify himself as law enforcement, and warn the Cadillac occupants arose directly from: (1) a supervisory order to extract from a hostile operational area, protect each other, and safely regroup with his team at the Air Force Reserve base while still under duty; (2) active, ongoing hostility toward his federal team that day; (3) the operational requirement to use an unmarked rental vehicle with no law enforcement equipment; and (4) his reasonable perception that the Cadillac's assaultive driving conduct was targeted at these agents, placing Agent Morgan and his partner in a position of imminent bodily harm. The "law enforcement urgency" is not merely background context — it was the direct cause of the conduct now charged.

In an interview to the State Trooper investigating this matter, Agent Morgan's partner confirmed that Agent Morgan was wearing his police vest at the time of this incident and that Agent Morgan was yelling "police, stop!" At all times during this dangerous encounter with the Cadillac, Agent Morgan and his partner were still under active enforcement operations, during performance of their duties and as part of the exercise of this official authority, being required to

extract from a dangerous situation, continue to protect one another in the hostile environment, and safely regroup back at the Air Force Reserve base, where they remained on duty and engaged in the performance of their official federal duties for approximately two hours *after* this incident, contrary to the allegations in the criminal complaint. This brandishing of his service weapon in response to an immediately perceived threat by a twice-swerving and hard braking Cadillac was a defensive response necessary to make federal enforcement effective, and was in accordance with ICE Use of Force policy, as well as in valid self-defense and defense of his federal law enforcement partner. This was a duty-constrained emergency/exigency that arose after the intentional, aggressive behavior of the Cadillac without any provocation from Agent Morgan.⁵ Agent Morgan honestly and reasonably believed he and his partner were in danger of imminent bodily harm.⁶ This action involved not only protecting himself but protecting another federal official, and this minimal use of force and warning was a necessary and proper incident of that federally authorized act.

Agent Morgan denies the charges and reserves the right to dispute the allegations against him, and asserts that at all relevant times he was acting as a

⁵ The Cadillac driver admitted his/her driving conduct was intentional.

⁶ Minnesota law recognizes a vehicle can be a “dangerous weapon” for purposes of state assault statutes. See, e.g., *State v. Jones*, 2022 WL 4074794 at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. September 6, 2022) (citing to cases where vehicle is a dangerous weapon); *State v. Bakdash*, 830 N.W.2d 906 (2013); *Mell v. Commissioner of Public Safety*, 757 N.W.2d 702 (2008), and *State v. Greyeagle*, No. A19-550 2020 WL 4932838 (Minn. Ct. App. August 24, 2020 (unpublished) (holding no actual contact necessary for conviction of second degree assault using vehicle as dangerous weapon).

federal officer, under color of his office, and that he has a colorable federal defense to the charges against him as referred to above.

Accordingly, Agent Morgan has the right to have this case heard in federal court.

CONCLUSION

Because it does not clearly appear on the face of this Notice that removal is improper, Defendant requests the Court accepts jurisdiction over this matter, proceed under § 1455(b)(5) and set an evidentiary hearing to make such disposition of the prosecution as justice shall require. § 1455(b)(4) directs the Court to summarily remand only if it “clearly appears” removal is improper; otherwise, § 1455(b)(5) authorizes an evidentiary hearing.

Promptly after filing this Notice, Defendant will serve all adverse parties and file a copy of this Notice with the Clerk of the Hennepin County District Court, Fourth Judicial District, which shall effect removal under § 1455(b)(1). Proof of such service and filing will be lodged with this Court.

Respectfully submitted,

PACYGA TRIAL LAWYERS

Dated: June 9, 2026

By: /s/ Ryan M. Pacyga

Ryan M. Pacyga (#321576)

860 Blue Gentian Rd.


Suite 175

St. Paul, MN 55121

612-339-5844 (phone)

E-mail: Ryan@ArrestedMN.com

Attorney for Gregory Donnell Morgan, Jr.



MINNESOTA
JUDICIAL
BRANCH

State of Minnesota
County of Hennepin

District Court
4th Judicial District

Prosecutor File No. 26A01457
Court File No. 27-CR-26-9656

State of Minnesota,

Plaintiff,

vs.

GREGORY DONNELL MORGAN JR DOB: 02/22/1991

2334 JAMESON ST
TEMPLE HILLS, MD 20748

Defendant.

COMPLAINT

Warrant

The Complainant submits this complaint to the Court and states that there is probable cause to believe Defendant committed the following offense(s):

COUNT I

Charge: Assault-2nd Degree-Dangerous Weapon

Minnesota Statute: 609.222.1, with reference to: 609.222.1, 609.11.5(a)

Maximum Sentence: 7 YEARS AND/OR \$4,200-\$14,000

Offense Level: Felony

Offense Date (on or about): 02/05/2026

Control #(ICR#): 26401115

Charge Description: That on or about 2/5/2026, in Hennepin County, Minnesota, GREGORY DONNELL MORGAN Jr, assaulted Victim 1, while using a firearm.

COUNT II

Charge: Assault-2nd Degree-Dangerous Weapon

Minnesota Statute: 609.222.1, with reference to: 609.222.1, 609.11.5(a)

Maximum Sentence: 7 YEARS AND/OR \$4,200-\$14,000

Offense Level: Felony

Offense Date (on or about): 02/05/2026

Control #(ICR#): 26401115

Charge Description: That on or about 2/5/2026, in Hennepin County, Minnesota, GREGORY DONNELL MORGAN Jr, assaulted Victim 2, while using a firearm.

RECEIVED

JUN 09 2026

1

Ex. A

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

27-CR-26-9656

STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE

Complainant has investigated the facts and circumstances of this offense and believes the following establishes probable cause:

On Thursday, February 5, 2026, at 4:22:50 PM, the Minnesota State Patrol received a report that the driver of a Ford Expedition had just pointed a gun at the occupants of another vehicle, identified as Victim 1 and Victim 2, on eastbound Minnesota State Highway 62 (Hwy 62) at the interchange with Interstate Highway 35W (I-35W), located in Hennepin County, Minnesota. Troopers investigated the incident; spoke to both victims; and identified the gunman as GREGORY DONNELL MORGAN, JR (DOB: 02/22/1991) ("Defendant" herein). At the time of the incident, Defendant was employed as a federal agent with Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") Enforcement Removal Operations ("ERO") and was detailed to the Minneapolis area.

Location of the Incident

Based on statements from Victim 1 and Victim 2, and a review of traffic camera video, Troopers determined that the incident occurred at the interchange of Hwy 62 and I-35W. Troopers are aware that at that interchange, eastbound Hwy 62 reduces from two lanes to one lane for a brief distance until traffic from southbound I-35W merges onto Hwy 62 and adds a second lane. Because of the large volume of vehicles that move through this interchange, especially during rush hour times, coupled with the reduction down to one lane, vehicles often must queue and reduce speed as they proceed, resulting in slower-moving, congested commuter traffic.

In the eastbound direction, the right shoulder is clearly marked as not a legal lane of traffic. The right lane of traffic exits Hwy 62 onto local streets. There are many signs leading up to that point that indicate the right lane must exit and that traffic continuing on eastbound Hwy 62 must be in the left lane. Solid white lines immediately following the exit indicate that the shoulder is not legal for driving.

Investigators are aware that occasionally at this interchange a driver will flout the need to merge into one-lane traffic, drive illegally on the right shoulder, pass slower-moving traffic, and then merge later, saving a few seconds on a commute while irritating other drivers on the roadway.

Statements of Victims

At the time of the incident, Victim 1 was driving east on Hwy 62 through the above-described I-35W interchange. Victim 2 was in the front-passenger seat. Victim 1 stated that they were queued with other vehicles in the single lane of traffic when they saw a black Ford Expedition approaching from behind, driving illegally on the right shoulder. Victim 1 moved their car partially onto the shoulder in front of the Expedition, attempting to "cut him off a little bit" and block the Expedition driver's effort to bypass traffic unlawfully. Victim 1 was unaware that the driver, later identified as Defendant, was associated with a law-enforcement agency. There were no markings on Defendant's vehicle that would identify it as law enforcement and the vehicle was not displaying or using lights or sirens.

After briefly using the vehicle to attempt to block Defendant from using the shoulder, Victim 1 returned the vehicle to the legal traffic lane. Defendant continued to travel on the shoulder but rather than continue to drive past the victims, he pulled alongside their vehicle, rolled down his window, and pointed a black handgun directly at Victim 1 and Victim 2. Victim 1 had a clear view of Defendant's appearance, saw that Defendant was wearing a black t-shirt, saw that the gun was pointed directly at their heads, saw that the gun was a Glock or Sig Sauer handgun with what appeared to be a red-dot sight, and noted that Defendant

yelled something indiscernible. The windows on Victim 1's car were closed, and the victims were not able to hear what Defendant was yelling. Victim 1 felt threatened for their safety and immediately called 911.

Victim 2 corroborated Victim 1's report. Victim 2 was in the front-passenger seat and saw the Expedition driving on the right shoulder of Hwy 62 "really, really fast." Victim 2 said that Victim 1 moved the car into the shoulder to "slow him down." Victim 2 explained that in response Defendant pulled alongside them, rolled down his window, and pointed his gun straight at Victim 2 and Victim 1. This caused Victim 2 to feel threatened and scared for their safety. As with Victim 1, Victim 2 was unaware that Defendant was a federal agent, noting that the Expedition had no markings to indicate it was being used by law enforcement.

Victim 2 shared with troopers two videos recorded with a cell phone after Defendant pointed his firearm at them. On the videos, Victim 1 and Victim 2 are driving behind Defendant and recording the back of the Expedition, which had an identifiable Utah license plate.

Statements of Defendant; Defendant's Partner; and Defendant's Supervisor

State Patrol investigators searched the Expedition's license plate in law-enforcement databases, determined that it was a rental vehicle, and learned that the vehicle had been leased to a male, M.V-C., who was later identified as an ICE employee. Troopers accessed license-plate-reader ("LPR") data, observed that the Expedition had passed by an LPR camera at the Federal Whipple Building recently, recognized that the Whipple Building is located on Hwy 62 near the location of the incident, and surmised that M.V-C. might travel back to the Whipple Building again. On Feb. 6, 2026, investigators learned that M.V-C. was at the Whipple building and that he was with his partner, who was later identified as Defendant. Investigators made arrangements to speak with M.V-C. and Defendant.

During his voluntary interview, Defendant admitted that he was driving the Expedition at the time of the encounter with the victims and that his partner, M.V-C., was in the backseat. Earlier in the day, he and his partner had been conducting surveillance on behalf of ICE in Minneapolis, but Defendant acknowledged that at the time of the encounter he was driving to the Whipple Building to end his shift and get gas. During his interview, Defendant made no claim that he was conducting any law-enforcement operation or activity or responding to any emergency situation during the incident. Defendant stated that he was driving on "the right" and that Victim 1 was driving on "the left." He stated that Victim 1 swerved over in front of him and cut him off. Defendant claimed that he feared for his safety and the safety of others so, in response, he pulled alongside Victim 1's vehicle, rolled down his window, drew his firearm, and yelled "Police Stop." He stated he was trying to get Victim 1 to "back up." Defendant acknowledged that his firearm was a Glock 19 with a laser light, which Defendant had holstered on his right hip at the time of the interview. Defendant stated that after he pulled the gun on Victim 1 and Victim 2 he got in front of their vehicle and drove to the Whipple Building.

M.V-C. confirmed that he was in the backseat of the Expedition at the time of the incident; that Defendant was driving; that they were traveling "back to base, last call;" and that the Expedition had no markings, decals, or lights to inform others that they were associated with law enforcement. He stated that Victim 1's vehicle was in the left lane, stopped in traffic, and that Defendant was driving on "the right." Victim 1 "[came] out" in front of them, requiring Defendant to slow down. In response, Defendant drove further to the right of Victim 1, drawing side-by-side; rolled down his window and yelled, "Police!" M.V-C. volunteered that by that point Defendant "already had the firearm with the window down."

Defendant's supervisor, an assistant field-office director for ICE, informed investigators that neither Defendant nor M.V-C. had reported this incident.

Review of Footage from Traffic Cameras

Investigators reviewed footage from traffic cameras mounted on Hwy 62 from the time of the incident. The video shows slow moving traffic queued in the single lane of eastbound Hwy 62. At 4:21:54 PM, Victim 1's vehicle comes into view and is seen moving from the single traffic lane across a solid-white line and partially onto the right shoulder. At 4:21:56 PM, Defendant's vehicle comes into view. It is completely in the shoulder and appears to be slowing down. As the video continues, Victim 1 remained partially on the shoulder in front of Defendant until 4:22:01 PM, when Victim 1's vehicle returned to the traffic lane and Defendant veered further to the right and continued to drive fully in the shoulder. At that point, Defendant had an opportunity to proceed well past the victims or merge behind their vehicle. Rather than pass or merge, however, Defendant positioned his vehicle side-by-side with Victim 1's vehicle. Due to the angle of the camera and the distance from the incident, the traffic camera does not capture Defendant's gun-pointing conduct. But the footage does reveal that the two vehicles remained side-by-side from approximately 4:22:03 PM to 4:22:09 PM. At approximately 4:22:10, Defendant accelerated forward past Victim 1's vehicle, still driving illegally on the shoulder. Ahead of Defendant, the shoulder came to an end, requiring Defendant to finally merge into the traffic lane at 4:22:29 PM. At that time, Defendant merged directly in front of Victim 1's vehicle. At 4:22:50 PM, Victim 1 called 911 to report the gun pointing conduct. Defendant's vehicle then proceeded east on Hwy 62 in the direction of the Whipple Building.

Follow-up Interview with Victim 1

In a follow-up interview with investigators, after Victim 1 was informed that Defendant was an ICE agent, Victim 1 noted there were no markings on the Expedition or on Defendant's clothing to indicate that Defendant was affiliated with law enforcement. Instead, at the time of the incident, Victim 1 was led to believe only that there was a "crazy person driving down the road aiming guns at people, ... the type of individual that should [not] be out there but they are."

A warrant is necessary because there is a substantial likelihood that Defendant will fail to respond to a summons and because his present location is not reasonably discoverable.

SIGNATURES AND APPROVALS

Complainant requests that Defendant, subject to bail or conditions of release, be:
(1) arrested or that other lawful steps be taken to obtain Defendant's appearance in court; or
(2) detained, if already in custody, pending further proceedings; and that said Defendant otherwise be dealt with according to law.

Complainant declares under penalty of perjury that everything stated in this document is true and correct. Minn. Stat. § 358.116; Minn. R. Crim. P. 2.01, subds. 1, 2.

Complainant

S. A. Schneider
Sergeant
3489 Hadley Ave N
Oakdale, MN 55128
Badge: 304

Electronically Signed:
04/16/2026 10:51 AM
Washington County, Minnesota

Being authorized to prosecute the offenses charged, I approve this complaint.

Prosecuting Attorney

Morgan D Kunz
Senior Assistant Hennepin
County Attorney
300 S 6th St
Minneapolis, MN 55487
(612) 348-5550

Electronically Signed:
04/16/2026 10:45 AM

MINNESOTA
JUDICIAL
BRANCH

27-CR-26-9656

FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE

From the above sworn facts, and any supporting affidavits or supplemental sworn testimony, I, the Issuing Officer, have determined that probable cause exists to support, subject to bail or conditions of release where applicable, Defendant's arrest or other lawful steps be taken to obtain Defendant's appearance in court, or Defendant's detention, if already in custody, pending further proceedings. Defendant is therefore charged with the above-stated offense(s).

☐ **SUMMONS**

THEREFORE YOU, THE DEFENDANT, ARE SUMMONED to appear as directed in the Notice of Hearing before the above-named court to answer this complaint.

IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR in response to this SUMMONS, a WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST shall be issued.

☒ **WARRANT**

To the Sheriff of the above-named county; or other person authorized to execute this warrant: I order, in the name of the State of Minnesota, that the Defendant be apprehended and arrested without delay and brought promptly before the court (if in session), and if not, before a Judge or Judicial Officer of such court without unnecessary delay, and in any event not later than 36 hours after the arrest or as soon as such Judge or Judicial Officer is available to be dealt with according to law.

☐ *Execute in MN Only*
☒ *Execute Nationwide*
☐ *Execute in Border States*
☐ **ORDER OF DETENTION**

Since the Defendant is already in custody, I order, subject to bail or conditions of release, that the Defendant continue to be detained pending further proceedings.

Bail: \$100,000.00

Conditions of Release: No Possession of Weapons; Remain Law Abiding; Make All Appearances

This complaint, duly subscribed and sworn to or signed under penalty of perjury, is issued by the undersigned Judicial Officer as of the following date: April 16, 2026.

Judicial Officer

Paul R Scoggin
 District Court Judge

Electronically Signed: 04/16/2026 11:09 AM

Sworn testimony has been given before the Judicial Officer by the following witnesses:

COUNTY OF HENNEPIN
 STATE OF MINNESOTA

State of Minnesota

Plaintiff

vs.

GREGORY DONNELL MORGAN Jr

Defendant

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER RETURN OF SERVICE
 I hereby Certify and Return that I have served a copy of this Warrant upon the Defendant herein named.

Signature of Authorized Service Agent:

27-CR-26-9656

DEFENDANT FACT SHEET

Name: GREGORY DONNELL MORGAN Jr
DOB: 02/22/1991
Address: 2334 JAMESON ST
TEMPLE HILLS, MD 20748

Alias Names/DOB:**SID:****Height:****Weight:****Eye Color:****Hair Color:****Gender:****Race:****Fingerprints Required per Statute:****Fingerprint match to Criminal History Record:** No**Driver's License #:****SILS Person ID #:****SILS Tracking No.****Case Scheduling Information:****Alcohol Concentration:**

MALE

Black

Yes

969851

3508265

Please process ASAP

MINNESOTA
JUDICIAL
BRANCH

27-CR-26-9656

STATUTE AND OFFENSE GRID

Cnt Nbr	Statute Type	Offense Date(s)	Statute Nbrs and Descriptions	Offense Level	MOC	GOC	Controlling Agencies	Case Numbers
1	Charge	2/5/2026	609.222.1 Assault-2nd Degree-Dangerous Weapon	Felony	A2513		MNMHP0100	26401115
	Penalty	2/5/2026	609.11.5(a) Minimum Sentences of Imprisonment-Firearm Use or Possession	Felony	A2513		MNMHP0100	26401115
	Penalty	2/5/2026	609.222.1 Assault-2nd Degree-Dangerous Weapon	Felony	A2513		MNMHP0100	26401115
2	Charge	2/5/2026	609.222.1 Assault-2nd Degree-Dangerous Weapon	Felony	A2513		MNMHP0100	26401115
	Penalty	2/5/2026	609.11.5(a) Minimum Sentences of Imprisonment-Firearm Use or Possession	Felony	A2513		MNMHP0100	26401115
	Penalty	2/5/2026	609.222.1 Assault-2nd Degree-Dangerous Weapon	Felony	A2513		MNMHP0100	26401115

MINNESOTA
JUDICIAL
BRANCH

STATE OF MINNESOTA
COUNTY OF HENNEPIN

DISTRICT COURT
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

CERTIFICATE OF REPRESENTATION

State of Minnesota,

Plaintiff,

Division: Criminal

v.

Court File No.: 27-CR-26-9656

Gregory Donnell Morgan, Jr.,

Defendant.

Pacyga Trial Lawyers

860 Blue Gentian Rd, Ste. 175

St. Paul, MN 55121

612-339-5844

I hereby represent the above-named defendant on the following matter or matters before the court:

CHARGES:

1. Assault-2nd Degree-Dangerous Weapon
2. Assault-2nd Degree-Dangerous Weapon

I understand that I cannot withdraw from this representation unless said withdrawal is approved by the court after hearing on a written motion pursuant to Rule 703 of the General Rules of Practice for the District Courts.

Dated: May 20, 2026

By: /s/Ryan M. Pacyga

Ryan M. Pacyga (ID #321576)

RECEIVED

Ex. B

JUN 09 2026

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

27-CR-26-9656

STATE OF MINNESOTA

DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY OF HENNEPIN

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Court File No.: 27-CR-26-9656

State of Minnesota,

Plaintiff,

v.

**RULE 9.01 DEFENDANT'S
DEMAND FOR DISCLOSURE
AND DISCOVERY**

Gregory Donnell Morgan, Jr.,

Defendant.

TO: The State of Minnesota by and through its prosecuting attorney, Morgan
Kunz.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Ryan M. Pacyga, as defense counsel for the above-named Defendant, hereby requests full and timely disclosure of all evidence and information required to be disclosed to the Defendant, pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01 Subd. 1 and 9.03 Subd 2, and all relevant Minnesota Law; including but not limited to the following:

1. All police reports, witness statements, audio and video recordings, search warrants and related documentation and all other investigation information.

2. A copy of and the substance of the agreement between the Hennepin County Attorney's Office and the Attorney General's Office related to the prosecutions of federal agents.

3. Recorded statements made by Defendant, co-defendants and/or accomplices, whether before or after arrest pursuant to State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994).

4. Any and all video and audio, 911 calls, books, grand jury minutes or transcripts, law enforcement officer reports, reports on prospective jurors, papers, documents, photographs and tangible objects which relate to the case.

RECEIVED

Ex. C

JUN 09 2026

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

5. **Trial Witnesses:** The names and addresses of persons whom the State intends to call as witnesses, if any; any evidence tending to diminish the credibility of the State's witnesses in addition to their prior convictions, evidence of character, conduct, or bias bearing on witness creditability (Minnesota Rule of Evidence 608). See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); United States v. Bagley. The relevant written or recorded statements made by said witnesses; any written summaries or substance of relevant oral statements of witnesses; and the substance of any relevant oral statements made by witnesses not reduced to writing, including all prosecutors' notes of interviews with any witnesses. See State v. Galvan, 274 N.W.2d 269. Pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 612, any writing or document used by a witness to prepare for trial.

6. Pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, Subd. 1(2)(c), Defendant hereby demands the State disclose all oral communications, as well as any notes taken during those communications, between any member of the prosecution's office, including victim-witness coordinator, and the complainant, or other witnesses. State v. Harris, No. A22-1809, 2023 WL 8890509 (Minn. App. Dec. 26, 2023).

7. **Statements of Defendant and any Accomplices:** All statements made by the Defendant and/or any accomplices (whether written, recorded or oral and to whomever made) and the substance of any oral statements made by the Defendant and/or any accomplices (whether said statements were made before or after arrest). If the Defendant was charged by indictment, the names and addresses of the witnesses who testified before the grand jury. The names and addresses of persons having information relating to this case.

8. **Notes and Copies:** Of all books; grand jury minutes or transcripts; law enforcement officer reports; reports on prospective jurors; notes of any meetings or communications with any witnesses, prospective witnesses or other persons; papers; documents; photographs and tangible objects that the State intends to introduce into evidence at the trial; or which were obtained from or belonged to the Defendant; or concerning that which the State intends to offer as evidence at trial. The Defense also requests to inspect and photograph buildings or places that relate to the case. Additionally, pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 612, any writing or document used by a witness to prepare for trial.

9. **Reports of examinations and tests:** The results or reports of physical and/or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, and/or comparisons made in connection with this case, and the opportunity to have a qualified expert observe

the test, experiments or examinations, together with copies of the original notes of the persons conducting any and all examinations and/or tests. Any matter the prosecution seeks to have judicially noticed under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 201 so that the Defense may exercise its right to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice.

10. Exculpatory information: All material or information within the possession or control of the State of Minnesota and/or the prosecuting authorities just that tends to negate or reduce the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged. The names of all law enforcement officials and Prosecution agents who have participated or are presently participating in the investigation of the case. The Defense requests to be informed of the records of prior conviction of the Defendant, if any, and of any Defense witnesses disclosed under Rule 9.02, subd. 1(3) (a) that are known to the Prosecution.

11. Any material or information within the State's possession and control that tends to negate or reduce the guilt of the accused. Including but not limited to any evidence that could impeach the credibility of law enforcement officers or other state employees, including but not limited to the following:

- a. Information indicating that a law enforcement officer and/or state employee, who is expected to testify, has a history of misconduct, such as:
 - i. Prior instances of dishonesty or untruthfulness;
 - ii. Prior instances of bias or prejudice;
 - iii. Prior instances of criminal behavior, whether charged or uncharged; and
 - iv. Prior instances of disciplinary action within the department.
- b. Documents, reports, or internal memos pertaining to investigations into the credibility, integrity, or conduct of law enforcement officers or state employee who is expected to testify.
- c. Any other information or material that may be relevant to the credibility of law enforcement or state employee witnesses in the case.

See Minn. R. Crim. Pro. 9.01; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Kyles vs. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).

12. Written notice of other offenses the State intends to introduce at trial, i.e., Spreigl evidence pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 7.02, State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167(1965); State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 149 N.W.2d 281 (1967).

13. **Scope of prosecutor's obligations:** Disclosure under this request extends to material and information in the possession or control of all members of the prosecuting authorities and their staff and all others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of this case, or who have reported in reference to this case.

14. **Continuing duty:** Prompt disclosure under this demand is required at all times before and during trial.

Respectfully,

PACYGA TRIAL LAWYERS

Dated: May 20, 2026

/s/Ryan M. Pacyga

Ryan M. Pacyga (#321576)
860 Blue Gentian Rd., Ste. 175
St. Paul, MN 55121
(612) 339-5844
Ryan@ArrestedMN.com
Attorneys for Defendant

2026-EE-001441

POWER OF ATTORNEY
LEXINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE CORPORATION
P.O. Box 6098, Lutherville, Maryland 21094 • 410-625-0800
info@lexingtonnational.com

Power No. 7026-445 001441
THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY NULL AND VOID UNLESS USED BEFORE 11/1/27

THE OBLIGATION OF THE COMPANY SHALL NOT EXCEED THE SUM OF ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS (\$100,000). THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY IS VOID IF ALTERED OR ERASED, VOID IF USED TO FURNISH BAIL ON THE SUBJECT BOND IN EXCESS OF THE STATED MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF THIS POWER AND VOID IF USED WITH OTHER POWERS OF THIS COMPANY OR OTHER POWERS OF OTHER COMPANIES TO MAKE BAIL ON THE SUBJECT BOND. EACH POWER OF ATTORNEY CAN ONLY BE USED ONCE AND MAY BE EXECUTED ONLY FOR RECOGNIZANCE OF CRIMINAL BAIL BONDS.

Defendant: GREGORY DONNELL MOIRAN JR
First Court Date: _____ Case Number: 27-CR-269654

First Court Date: _____ Case Number: 27 C.K. - 2010-10-11

Defendant's Address: _____

Court: Hennepin County/City: Hennepin

Offense(s): ASSAULT 2nd degree WEAPON(2)

Date of Execution: 5-21-26 Court Assigned Agent #: 1

Attorney-In-Fact: Mark Higgins MSO
Print Name Signature

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, LEXINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE CORPORATION,
by virtue of authority conferred by its Board of Directors, has caused these presents
to be sealed with its corporate seal, signed by its Chief Executive Officer and attested
by its Secretary on April 9, 1936.


Chief Executive Officer

Secretary David L. Katz

[illegible]

Ex. D

RECEIVED

JUN 09 2026

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota

MAY 21 2026

BAIL BOND FORM – APPEARANCE ONLY (also known as FORM 702)

STATE OF MINNESOTA, Plaintiff

Court File No.: 27-CR-26-9656v. Gregory Morgan, DefendantFiled in Minneapolis

County District Court

Bond Amount

one hundred thousand (\$100,000.00)

Charges:

ASSAULT 2nd degree without (2)

(including amendments and lesser included charges)

BOND OBLIGATION AND CONDITIONSThe Defendant, as Principal, Gregory Morgan (print name)

and Lexington National Insurance Cooperation (print name), as Surety, hereby agree and acknowledge that they are indebted to pay to the above named District Court the Bond Amount if the Defendant fails to personally appear in Court at such times and on such dates as specified by the Court to answer the charge(s) identified in this Bond, including any amendments of these charges or lesser included charges.

The obligation of the Surety becomes null and void upon the occurrence of any of the following events:

1. The dismissal of the charge(s) identified on this form and accompanying Bond;
2. The finding or verdict that Defendant is not guilty of the charge(s) identified on this form and accompanying Bond; or
3. The sentencing of Defendant (whether imposed or stayed) with respect to the charge(s) identified on this form and accompanying Bond.

This is an appearance bond only and does not guarantee compliance with conditional release requirements imposed upon the Defendant by the Court. This bond shall not be used for payment of any fines, surcharges, costs, or other financial obligation(s) imposed upon the Defendant by the Court.

Defendant/Principal signature

Gregory Morgan

Printed Name

5/21/26

Date

Attorney in Fact for Surety Company (Bail Bond Agent) signature

Matthew Higgins

Printed Name

5/21/26

Date

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SURETY RELATIONSHIP

This instrument remains valid for 180 days after the date signed below by the Bail Bond Agency (e.g., Owner/President/CEO).

This instrument acknowledges that the above-named Attorney in Fact, Matthew Higgins (763-502-1370) (print name)is employed by Midwest Bonding, LLC (Bonding Agency) and is authorized to post bondson behalf of Lexington National Insurance Cooperation (Surety Company).

Bail Bond Agency (e.g., Owner/President/CEO)

Vice President

Job Title

12/1/2025

Date

STATE OF MINNESOTA
HENNEPIN COUNTYDISTRICT COURT
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT**Filed In District Court
State of Minnesota**

State of Minnesota

MAY 22 2026

v.

GREGORY DONNELL MORGAN, Jr.

Court File: 27-CR-26-9656

Notice of Hearing and Judicial Assignment



Your next court appearance is:		
Monday, June 29, 2026 9:00 AM	with	Judge Paul Scoggin Hennepin County Government Center 300 South Sixth Street Minneapolis, MN 55487

This appearance is for: Omnibus Hearing

- If you do not appear for this hearing, a warrant may issue for your arrest. If you fail to appear for a petty misdemeanor, a conviction may be entered.
- Arrive 15 minutes early to allow time to go through security.
- Court may take a few hours – please plan for this.
 - If set for Trial: You must plan to be available for trial for the entire week, including rescheduling work and personal appointments. This applies Monday through Friday from 8:30 a.m. until 5:00 p.m.
- If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer and want to apply for a court-appointed attorney, go to 4thcourtspe.courts.state.mn.us or scan the QR code to start the application.
- If you represent yourself, visit www.mncourts.gov/Help-Topics/Representing-Yourself-in-Court.aspx.
- If you are appearing on a traffic offense, bring your driver's license and proof of insurance.
- If you are paying a fine, credit cards, cash, and checks are accepted.
- You can receive automatic reminders of future court dates via email or text. Visit www.mncourts.gov/hearing-reminders.aspx or scan the QR code to enroll.



I received a copy of this notice.

 Defendant's Signature	 Date
--	---

FILE COPY

RECEIVED

JUN 09 2026

Printed on 5/22/2026

HC 3758 (11/2024)

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

Ex. E

STATE OF MINNESOTA
COUNTY OF HENNEPINFiled in District Court
State of MinnesotaDISTRICT COURT
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTState of Minnesota
v.

MAY 22 2026

Case: 27 CR 26 9656Gregory MorganDOB (SILS): _____
Charge: 2nd Assault

CONDITIONAL RELEASE ORDER

☐ New Order ☐ Amended Order

You are released on any of the following marked options (and marked conditions):

- ☒ Post bail/bond of \$100,000 with no conditions. ☒ Post bail/bond of \$100,000 with the following conditions.
☐ Post cash bail of \$_____ with no conditions. ☐ Post cash bail of \$_____ with the following conditions.
☐ You are released with no bond, bail, or conditions. ☐ You are released with no bail on the following conditions.

- ☒ Obey all laws.
- ☒ Attend all court appearances and appointments with Psychological Services and Probation, including any Pre-Sentence Investigation Interview.
- ☒ Do not have direct or indirect contact (including through social media) with witnesses.
Stay away from a three-block radius of any such person and where they live, work, or go to school.
☐ except with a police escort to recover your clothing, prescriptions, electronics, and toiletries.
☐ except to facilitate parenting time/child-care, for which ☐ contact through _____ is required or ☐ written contact is permitted; if future Family/Juvenile Court order allows parenting time, you may seek modification of this order.
- ☐ Stay away from _____.
- ☒ Do not possess any firearm or ammunition ☐ or other item used as a weapon.
- ☐ You cannot leave Minnesota without court permission.
- ☒ sign waiver of extradition
- ☒ don't leave the United States

The following marked conditions require supervision by Probation. Sign releases to confirm your compliance.

- ☐ Your release will be supervised. Contact your assigned Probation Officer within 48 hours of release. If you need help contacting your Probation Officer, call 612-348-3218. Notify your Probation Officer of any changes to your contact information.
- ☐ Complete an in-custody substance use disorder assessment with Probation Officer collateral. Follow recommendations. You are released: ☐ upon completion of the assessment interview ☐ to recommended treatment without posting bond/bail ☐ only upon court order.
- ☐ Within _____ days of release, complete a substance use disorder assessment with Probation Officer collateral. Follow recommendations.
- ☐ Do not use any alcohol or non-prescribed controlled substance; provide a list of all medications to your supervising officer.
☐ You are subject to ☐ random testing and/or ☐ Remote Electronic Alcohol Monitoring (REAM) at your expense.
You must report to REAM within 24 hours. You are approved for REAM step-down after 60 days of no violations regarding use and testing, consistent with policies of conditional release, unless this box is checked: ☐
- ☐ You must remain on Electronic Home Monitoring (EHM) and follow EHM rules. If eligible, you are approved for immediate work/school release and furloughs for job-seeking, medical care/treatment, legal meetings, and court. Your supervising officer may approve additional furloughs. When EHM concludes, you must return the base station and other equipment.
☐ You will remain in custody until placed on EHM.
☐ You must go to Client and Community Restoration at 3000 2nd Street North, Minneapolis, on _____ to activate EHM.
- ☐ _____

Internal Use Only (as needed):	
REVIEWED WITH DEFENDANT WHO WAS RELEASED TO:	
☐ Self	☐ Treatment ☐ Other _____
Signatures:	
Probation Officer _____	Date _____
Deputy _____	Date _____

R. N. Smith
Judge
[Signature]
Defendant

5/22/26
Date
5/22/26
Date

HC 2921 (10/2025)

RECEIVED

JUN 09 2026

Ex. F

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota

MAY 22 2026

STATE OF MINNESOTA

DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY OF HENNEPIN

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

State of Minnesota,

Plaintiff,

PRE-SIGNED WAIVER OF
EXTRADITION HEARING

vs.


Court Case No. 27-CR-26-9656
C.A. Case No. 26A01457

GREGORY DONNELL MORGAN Jr,

Defendant.

I, GREGORY DONNELL MORGAN Jr, having been informed by the judge before whom this waiver is executed, of my rights to demand the issuance and service of a warrant of extradition and to apply for a Writ of Habeas Corpus against detention, do hereby, as part of my conditions of release, waive the issuance and service of all extradition proceedings for a warrant arising from this case. I freely and voluntarily agree to return to the state of Minnesota from any jurisdiction in or outside of the United States, accompanied by a peace officer thereof, for the purpose of answering this criminal charge pending against me.

Jr


GREGORY DONNELL MORGANSubscribed to in my presence
this 22 day of May, 20 24Judge of District Court
Hennepin County, Minnesota

Paul Scowin

RECEIVED

JUN 09 2026

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

Ex. G

**MINNESOTA
JUDICIAL BRANCH****MINNESOTA PUBLIC ACCESS COURTHOUSE (MNPAC)****Case Details (Register of Actions)**

Search executed on 06/09/2026 10:49 AM

Upcoming Hearing:

Omnibus Hearing on 06/29/2026 at 9:00 AM

Case Information

Case Number: 27-CR-26-9656

Case Title: State of Minnesota vs GREGORY DONNELL
MORGAN, Jr.

Case Type: Crim/Traf Mandatory

Date Filed: 04/16/2026

Case Location: Hennepin County, Hennepin Criminal
Downtown

Judicial Officer: Scoggin, Paul

Case Status: Open

Party Information**Jurisdiction**State of Minnesota
NONE**Attorneys Active**

- KUNZ, MORGAN DAVID - Lead Attorney
- Work Phone: 612-348-0817

Defendant

MORGAN, GREGORY DONNELL, Jr.

Attorneys Active

- PACYGA, RYAN MICHAEL - Lead Attorney

RECEIVED

JUN 09 2026

Ex. H

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

DOB: 02/22/1991
2334 JAMESON ST
TEMPLE HILLS, MD 20748

Work Phone: 612-454-4306

Warrants

Inactive Warrants

MORGAN, GREGORY DONNELL, Jr. Arrest, Complaint, Order of Detention

Judicial Officer: Scoggin, Paul

05/21/2026 03:48 PM Status: Bond/Bail Posted

04/16/2026 11:13 AM Status: Issued Active

Bond/Bail Options

Bond or Cash Bail

Amount: \$100,000.00

Charges

1 Assault-2nd Degree-Dangerous Statute: 609.222.1

Weapon

Additional Statutes: Minimum Sentences of Imprisonment-Firearm Use or Possession
(609.11.5(a)); Assault-2nd Degree-Dangerous Weapon (609.222.1)

Level of Charge: Felony

Offense Date: 02/05/2026

Community Of Offense: Richfield

Law Enforcement Agency: MN State Patrol - Oakdale

Prosecuting Agency: Hennepin County Attorney

2 Assault-2nd Degree-Dangerous Statute: 609.222.1

Weapon

Additional Statutes: Minimum Sentences of Imprisonment-Firearm Use or Possession (609.11.5(a)); Assault-2nd Degree-Dangerous Weapon (609.222.1)

Level of Charge: Felony

Offense Date: 02/05/2026

Community Of Offense: Richfield

Law Enforcement Agency: MN State Patrol - Oakdale

Prosecuting Agency: Hennepin County Attorney

Interim Conditions

05/22/2026 Interim conditions for MORGAN, GREGORY DONNELL, Jr.
Judicial Officer: Scoggin, Paul

- Post Bail or Bond with No Conditions
\$200,000.00
- Post Bail or Bond with Conditions
\$100,000.00
- Remain law-abiding
- Make all future court appearances
- Do not ship/transport/possess or receive firearm or ammo
- No contact with witness(es)
- Sign Waiver of Extradition
- Conditions, other

Comment: Don't Leave the United States. \$100,000 already posted can apply

Case Events

06/05/2026 Correspondence
Index #16



2 pages

Comment: Letter to Prosecutor Kunz

05/29/2026 Pre-Plea Worksheet
Index #15
Comment: CRS

05/28/2026 Transcript
Index #14
Comment: 5/22/26 First Appearance -
Judge Scoggin



14 pages

05/22/2026 Waiver of Extradition
Judicial Officer: Scoggin, Paul
Index #13
Comment: presigned



1 page

05/22/2026 Order for Conditional Release
Judicial Officer: Scoggin, Paul
Index #12



1 page

05/22/2026 Identity Verified

05/22/2026 Notice of Hearing
Index #11
Comment: given in person



1 page

05/22/2026 Statement of Rights
Index #10

05/22/2026 Hearing Held In-Person

05/21/2026 Warrant-Make Inactive-Bail/Bond Posted

05/21/2026 Non-Cash Bond Posted

Index #9

Comment: 2026-EE-001441 \$100,000



2 pages

05/21/2026 Proposed Order or Document

Index #8

Comment: Order with Respect to
Prosecutor's Certificate

05/21/2026 Proposed Order or Document

Index #7

Comment: Sealed Order with Respect to
Prosecutor's Certificate

05/21/2026 Affidavit of Attorney

Index #6

Comment: Affidavit of Joshua Larson

05/21/2026 Other Document

Index #5

Comment: Prosecutor's Certificate of
Non-Disclosure

05/20/2026 Demand or Request for Discovery

Index #4

Comment: .



4 pages

05/20/2026 Certificate of Representation

Index #3

Comment: .



1 page

04/16/2026 Warrant Issued

Index #2

04/16/2026 E-filed Comp-Warrant

Index #1



8 pages

Hearings

Upcoming Hearings

06/29/2026

09:00 AM

Omnibus Hearing

Judicial Officer: Scoggin, Paul

Location: GC-C1756

Previous Hearings

05/22/2026

01:31 PM

First Appearance

Judicial Officer: Scoggin, Paul

Location: PSF 141

Result: Held On
the Record

Bond/Bail Activity

Appearance Bond

MORGAN, GREGORY DONNELL, Jr.

05/21/2026 Status: Posted

\$100,000.00

Search executed on 06/09/2026 10:49 AM