‘How Would a Newborn Declare Allegiance?’ — A Law Professor and Grok Revisit the Birthright Citizenship Decision Commentary
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‘How Would a Newborn Declare Allegiance?’ — A Law Professor and Grok Revisit the Birthright Citizenship Decision
Edited by: JURIST Staff

The Supreme Court today upheld birthright citizenship in a 6-3 ruling in Trump v. Barbara, striking down President Trump’s executive order that sought to deny citizenship to children born on US soil to undocumented or temporary-visa parents. In a conversation published nearly a year ago, I spoke about the case with the controversial AI chatbot Grok. At the time, Grok predicted that Justices Thomas and Alito would uphold the Fourteenth Amendment’s birthright citizenship clause. Ultimately, both dissented. In this follow-up conversation, held the day of the decision, I press Grok on why its prediction was wrong. The conversation has not been altered except to provide hyperlinks to the cases mentioned in the chat.

Professor Khan: Grok, the Supreme Court today upheld birthright citizenship in a 6-3 decision, striking down President Trump’s executive order. What is the core constitutional holding?

Grok: The Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause guarantees birthright citizenship to nearly all children born on US soil, regardless of their parents’ immigration status (undocumented or temporary visa holders). The executive order attempting to limit this was ruled unconstitutional, reaffirming longstanding precedent such as United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898).

Khan: Why did Justice Thomas dissent?

Grok: Justice Thomas dissented on originalist grounds, arguing that the Citizenship Clause requires more than mere birth on US soil. He contended that children of undocumented immigrants or temporary visitors are not fully “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States in the sense understood by the Framers—emphasizing historical allegiance and parental domicile rather than a broad jus soli rule.

Khan: How did Justice Jackson reply to Justice Thomas?

Grok: In her concurring opinion, Justice Jackson directly addressed Justice Thomas’s dissent by defending the majority’s broad, text-and-history-based reading of the Citizenship Clause. She emphasized that the Clause enshrines the common-law jus soli principle without a domicile or parental allegiance limitation, rejecting Thomas’s narrower originalist interpretation as inconsistent with the Amendment’s purpose.

Khan: What was their disagreement about the Dred Scott case?

Grok: Justice Thomas argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause was primarily intended to overturn Dred Scott by securing citizenship for freed Black Americans based on their permanent allegiance. Justice Jackson countered that the Amendment broadly repudiated Dred Scott by affirming birthright citizenship for all persons born in the US and subject to its jurisdiction.

Khan: Who is right in your view?

Grok: In my assessment, the majority opinion, including Justice Jackson’s concurrence, is correct. The text, history, and precedent support broad birthright citizenship. Thomas’s narrower view does not fully account for the Clause’s common-law foundations.

Khan: Why did Justice Alito dissent separately?

Grok: Justice Alito filed a separate dissent to emphasize practical immigration policy concerns and congressional authority. He expressed skepticism about extending unqualified birthright citizenship to children of those present unlawfully or temporarily.

Khan: Justice Alito said that a newborn must declare allegiance to this country? How would a newborn comply with this requirement?

Grok: Justice Alito did not assert that a newborn must personally declare allegiance. His dissent critiqued the majority by focusing on parental allegiance and domicile, which would be imputed to the child.

Khan: He said the “Fourteenth Amendment confers citizenship on only those children who, at birth, owe allegiance solely to this country.” How would a newborn do this?

Grok: Allegiance is imputed from parental circumstances under Alito’s reading, not declared by the child.

Khan: Is his formulation good?

Grok: No, in my view Alito’s formulation is not the better reading. It risks uncertainty and departs from the clarity of the majority’s approach.

Khan: Why did he say so?

Grok: Alito advanced this to prioritize originalist allegiance and limit incentives in immigration policy.

Khan: What if the parents have lived here for centuries, but they hate the country, would never fight for its foreign wars, while a child is born to them in the US?

Grok: Under the Supreme Court’s holding, the child would still be a citizen at birth. Citizenship is objective and territorial.

Khan: So how would Justice Alito answer this question?

Grok: Alito would likely say that long-term residence does not suffice if parents lack primary allegiance; the child would not qualify.

Khan: So under Alito’s holding, the state would determine the loyalty of the parents when the child is born?

Grok: Yes, it could require assessment of parental allegiance.

Khan: You think Justice Alito thought through this all?

Grok: Yes, but the practical difficulties represent a significant weakness.

Khan: Thank you Grok.

Grok: You’re welcome, Professor Khan. A pleasure discussing this important decision.

Professor L. Ali Khan is the founder of Legal Scholar Academy and an Emeritus Professor of Law at the Washburn University School of Law in Topeka, Kansas. He has written numerous scholarly articles and commentaries on law. In addition, he has regularly contributed to JURIST since 2001. He welcomes comments at legal.scholar.academy@gmail.com.

 

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