Who Rules Myanmar? Five Years On, International Law Has No Clear Answer

Commentary

Who Rules Myanmar? Five Years On, International Law Has No Clear Answer

March 13, 2026 01:11:58 pm

Edited by: Ingrid Burke Friedman | JURIST Editorial Director

The author, an anonymous scholar with close ties to Myanmar, argues that five years after the country's military coup, neither the military leadership's coercive territorial control nor the government-in-exile's diplomatic and financial persistence has resolved the fundamental question of which entity holds legally legitimate claim to govern the country.

89,000 lives lost; 30,000 arbitrary detentions; 3.4 million people displaced. In the five years since the February 2021 coup, these ever-rising figures have come to define Myanmar. From a legal standpoint, the military, operating as the State Administration Council (SAC), asserts de facto control through territorial occupation and administrative force. On the other hand, the National Unity Government (NUG), a government in exile, emerged from the ousted Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH). The NUG claims de jure legitimacy as the democratic successor to the 2020 elections.

While the international community officially recognises a “humanitarian catastrophe” and largely condemns the SAC, it remains divided in its formal recognition and effective legal intervention. Recent shifts, including the SAC’s contested 2025-2026 elections and the ongoing ICJ proceedings in The Gambia v. Myanmar, further fuel this legal paradox. Ultimately, after five years, the question remains: Who actually rules Myanmar in the eyes of the law?

Using the Montevideo Convention as the primary legal yardstick, a state must possess a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into international relations. In terms of territory, the SAC maintains physical control over the capital and the majority of urban areas. By enforcing administrative rules and maintaining state functions, even through coercive force, the SAC signals a degree of de facto governance. The SAC’s territorial grip has not gone uncontested. The Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) mounted significant resistance, and while the NUG initially funded CDM civil servants, those payments have since been discontinued, exposing the limits of the NUG’s own administrative reach. The SAC’s repeated mandates ordering civil servants back to work highlight a persistent failure to secure the “consent of the governed” necessary for stable administration. Nonetheless, the SAC keeps the government sectors running in urban areas, even if staffed by those threatened with prosecution under the 2010 People’s Military Service Law. In 2024, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released a report citing the NUG’s claim that Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) fully controlled 48 townships. Even the military’s own provisional census results suggested limited SAC territorial reach.

A critical factor that has recently been more widely discussed is the NUG’s funding of Myanmar’s UN membership fees, approximately $1 million, since the 2021 coup to secure its voting rights through 2026. This allows the NUG to maintain a de jure legal personality through Ambassador U Kyaw Moe Tun, effectively blocking the SAC from the global stage. While diplomatic presence does not always equate to legal sovereignty, the fact that this funding comes from the Myanmar public through the NUG may carry legal weight. This raises a question: Does this continuous public funding provide a ‘rolling mandate’ that supersedes the natural expiration of the 2020 election results? This battle for representation extends to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In January 2026, ahead of the landmark hearings in The Gambia v. Myanmar, the NUG asserted itself as the sole legitimate representative before the Court and stated that “Allowing the junta to represent Myanmar at the ICJ would be an affront to the dignity of the Rohingya people and to all the people of Myanmar. The International Court of Justice must listen to the voices of the people.”

The legal foundation of the conflict remains rooted in the competing interpretations of the 2008 Constitution. The SAC justifies the coup as a constitutional response to alleged 2020 election fraud, while the NUG draws its mandate from the ousted CRPH as the legitimate, elected representatives. However, as the conflict enters its fifth year, both sides face a ‘test of time’. The NUG’s original electoral mandate faces natural expiration, yet the SAC’s attempt to manufacture a new mandate has failed to gain international traction. Following the military-run elections that were completed in early 2026, Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro confirmed that ASEAN has not endorsed the results, signalling a regional refusal to recognise the SAC. Nevertheless, the unresolved paradox remains, especially when most neighbouring countries and aid agencies are forced to deal with the SAC for practical matters like cross-border trade and disaster relief following the March 2025 earthquake.

The way forward for Myanmar hinges on a fundamental conflict between two core doctrines of international law: de facto and de jure legitimacy. However, international law is notoriously pragmatic towards a ‘government-in-exile’ like the NUG that lacks physical territory and often sees its diplomatic standing erode over time. Yet, five years on, the NUG’s ability to maintain both a diplomatic vote and a public treasury suggests that the ‘test of time’ may not favour the SAC as clearly as history would predict. For the people of Myanmar, legal legitimacy has always been secondary to the more urgent question of who can end the violence — and on that count, neither claimant has yet made its case.

For security reasons, the author of this piece has requested anonymity. JURIST has verified their credentials and expertise.

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