On January 22, the White House released a statement on its website: “Today, in an [sic] historic ceremony in Davos, Switzerland, President Donald J. Trump formally ratified the Charter of the Board of Peace—establishing it as an official international organization. President Trump, who is serving as the Board’s Chairman, was joined by Founding Members representing countries around the world who have committed to building a secure and prosperous future for Gaza that delivers lasting peace, stability, and opportunity for its people.”

This commentary highlights concerns about the structure and intended function of the Board of Peace (BoP). While the idea of the BoP originated with the UN Security Council, its specifics are detailed in the BoP Charter (Charter). The Charter grants extraordinary powers to the Chairman, Trump, something without a clear precedent in international organizations.

The BoP is envisioned in Resolution 2803 as an international entity that would maintain peace and security in Gaza, develop its infrastructure, disarm militants, and establish a viable Palestinian Authority, all of which would pave the way for Palestinian statehood. The BoP was established for Gaza.

Cleverly, the BoP Charter shifts the focus from Gaza to “other places where peace has been elusive.” Gaza is not even mentioned in the Charter. The BoP’s expanded scope in the Charter conflicts with Resolution 2803 and diverts attention from the work needed in Gaza to Trump’s self-authorizing roving agenda to settle wars.

Some countries have refused to join the BoP, and those that have might withdraw if the BoP functions as a sole proprietorship rather than a genuine international organization to stabilize and develop Gaza, as Security Council Resolution (Res) 2803 aimed to accomplish.

Although it resembles a sole proprietorship, the BoP could succeed in its mission to rebuild Gaza. If the goal outweighs the form, the BoP’s structure becomes less important. However, it remains crucial to understand how the concept of a sole proprietorship has been combined with the appearance of an international organization.

The BoP under Resolution 2803

On November 17, 2025, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2803 at its 10046th meeting, with 13 votes in favor (China and Russia abstained). The resolution endorses the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict” dated September 29, 2025 (annexed to the resolution), which is based on a 20-point plan proposed by Trump to support post-conflict reconstruction, demilitarization, and stabilization in Gaza following the Israel-Hamas war. Resolution 2803 recognizes the roles of the United States, Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey in facilitating the ceasefire. The Comprehensive Plan (Plan) is an integral part of Resolution 2803.

In addition to the ceasefire, the Plan specifically focuses on Gaza’s restoration. Point 2 of the Plan states: “Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, who have suffered more than enough.” Point 10 states: “A Trump economic development plan to rebuild and energize Gaza will be created by convening a panel of experts who have helped birth some of the thriving modern miracle cities in the Middle East.” Thus, Resolution 2803 sees Trump as an essential operator in the reconstruction of Gaza.

Resolution 2803 authorizes “the establishment of the Board of Peace (BoP) as a transitional administration with international legal personality that will set the framework, and coordinate funding for, the redevelopment of Gaza pursuant to the Comprehensive Plan, and in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles.” Thus, the BoP is and ought to be a creature of international law.

Under Resolution 2803, the BoP is not a private board, a corporation, or an investment company. Its legal status is that of an entity sanctioned by the Security Council, and it possesses international legal personality, much like a UN affiliate. Resolution 2803 conceives of the BoP as a transitional administration until a reformed “Palestinian Authority” takes over the administration of Gaza.

Resolution 2803 does not specify the details of the BoP, nor does it identify who may be authorized to launch it. There is no mention of any individual serving as the BoP’s ultimate authority. Most of the provisions in the BoP Charter launched by Trump are not referenced in Resolution 2803. The BoP organization and power structure are so new to the international arena that most countries will have legitimate concerns about joining it.

The BoP under the Charter

A thorough analysis of the main features of the BoP Charter is essential to determine whether it created a sustainable international organization in the long term and whether it can “secure peace in places where it has long proven difficult.” This is a stated goal of the BoP Charter, though it extends beyond the scope of Resolution 2803, which focuses solely on Gaza.

The BoP Charter identifies three main organs for its administration: member states, the Executive Board, and the Chairman. The term “Board” can be confusing because it refers to two different entities—the BoP itself and one of its organs, the Executive Board (EB). The BoP consists of member states, whereas the EB consists of individuals serving in their personal capacity, not as representatives of their governments, companies, or institutions, except for the President of the World Bank.

Perfunctory Member States

What disguises the BoP as an international organization is the inclusion of member states that subscribe to the Charter, but with limited powers. Per the BoP Charter, only states may be members of the BoP. Individuals, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), corporations, UN agencies (such as the World Bank), or communities of states (such as the European Union) are not eligible to be members of the BoP.

However, under the BoP Charter, the membership is invitation-only and not open to all states. The Chairman decides which state shall be invited. Thus, the BoP is a limited international organization. The Chairman extends the invitations and has exercised the power to disinvite a state before it accepts the offer, as happened with Canada.

The Charter or Resolution 2803 does not bind any state to apply for the BoP membership or serve if invited. Many states, including France and Germany, have declined the invitation to join the BoP. Roughly 20 of the more than 60 invitees have accepted the BoP membership.

The Charter also distinguishes between permanent and non-permanent members of the BoP. A state must pay more than a billion dollars to acquire a permanent seat. Non-permanent members, however, may serve without a fee for a renewable term of three years. The Chairman has the sole power to re-invite a serving member state to sit on the BoP.

The permanent membership of the BoP is not related to the size, economic, or military power of the member state. Any invited state could become a permanent member of the BoP by paying the required fee. There is also no limit on how many states may become permanent members. Several Muslim-majority states, including Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, have joined the BoP as non-permanent members.

President Vladimir Putin signaled openness to contributing $1 billion to the BoP, specifically proposing to use Russian state assets currently frozen in the US to meet the requirement. This offer seems like a non-starter. Russia has not yet accepted the offer to join the BoP.

Chairman as Sole Proprietor

The most distinctive feature of the BoP Charter is the Chairman’s supreme office. Article 3.2 (a) states: “Donald J. Trump shall serve as inaugural Chairman of the Board of Peace, and he shall separately serve as inaugural representative of the United States of America.” Thus, Trump is serving in two distinct positions: Chairman in his personal capacity and the US representative as Head of State.

A question arises whether the Chairman must always be the US representative. This does not seem to be the case. “The Chairman shall at all times designate a successor for the role of Chairman.” Thus, Trump may designate anyone, including his son or son-in-law, as the successor chairman. In doing so, Trump does not need the approval of the member states. This feature fits more with a sole proprietorship.

There is nothing in the BoP Charter that requires the Chairman to be the US President or even the head of state or government of any other member state. Trump and a person whom Trump designates as the successor will be the Chairman, even if they are private citizens.

There is a potential problem with this succession procedure. Article 2.2 of the BoP Charter mandates: “Each Member State shall be represented on the Board of Peace by its Head of State or Government.” Only Presidents and Prime Ministers can represent their states. This means that only the US President shall represent the US at the BoP.

This means the next President, Democrat or Republican, will be under Trump’s authority as Chairman.

Since a member state “may withdraw from the Board of Peace with immediate effect by providing written notice to the Chairman,” the BoP risks losing the US as a member if the new US President is unwilling to serve under Chairman Trump or his successor. It is unclear how the BoP will function effectively without the US involved.

No international organization permits any member state, let alone its head, to veto any change to the foundational document, such as the BoP Charter. However, the Chairman has the authority under Article 8 of the Charter to refuse to approve any modifications to the Charter, even if they are unanimously approved by the member states.

The Chairman also has the sole authority to interpret the provisions of the BoP Charter and can decide to dissolve the BoP whenever he “considers necessary or appropriate.” Nothing prevents Trump from dissolving the BoP when he leaves the presidency in 2028.

Executive Board Diversity

The BoP Charter empowers the Chairman to select “leaders of global stature” on the Executive Board (EB). The Chairman alone exercises this power of selection without any formal approval from the member states. The Chairman also nominates the EB’s Chief Executive. However, a majority of EB members (not member states) confirm the appointment. Each member of the EB, including the Chief Executive, serves for a period of two years, which the Chairman may renew.

The EB makes decisions by a majority of members present and voting. The Chairman retains the authority to veto any EB decision. However, if not vetoed, the EB decisions “go into effect immediately.” The EB is accountable to the Chairman but not to member states.

The EB differs from a corporation’s Board of Directors because shareholders elect the directors. It also differs from international organizations, such as the Economic and Social Council, in that the General Assembly elects its members by geographic regions. Like the BoP, the EB is also unfamiliar to member states, which have no formal input into the selection, retention, or removal of EB members.

The EB resembles an advisory council, where the sole proprietor appoints its members. Under the BoP Charter, EB members do not need to be part of any government, let alone the member states. They could be wealthy individuals, friends, or relatives of the Chairman.

In line with Trump’s ideological critique of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) at home, the selection of the first EB is significant. Seven of the eight members are white men, while the eighth is an Indian-American and the president of the World Bank. Resolution 2803 urges the World Bank to provide financial aid for Gaza’s development. Thus, unlike other EB members, the President of the World Bank may not be serving in his personal capacity, and Trump may not be able to exclude him.

There are no Muslims, Africans, Arabs, or women on the EB, even though dozens of Muslim-majority states have agreed to be members of the BoP. If wealthy Middle Eastern countries are to provide financial aid for Gaza’s reconstruction, they would presumably appreciate some representation on the EB.

Is the BoP Charter an Executive Agreement?

It is uncertain whether the BoP Charter is a US Executive Agreement. Under the US Constitution, treaties are the supreme law of the land, but they require the advice and consent of the Senate, with a two-thirds vote. Congressional-Executive international agreements need the approval of both houses of Congress.

Since the BoP Charter is neither a treaty nor a congressional-executive agreement, it appears to be an Executive Agreement, for which the President alone has the authority to make under his plenary foreign affairs power, as the Supreme Court has recognized in various cases. Executive Agreements do not need the advice and consent of the Senate or the approval of Congress.

However, if BoP is an international organization, the US involvement as a member state might be more extensive, including financial obligations and governance commitments, and may require congressional approval.

Furthermore, can a successor Chairman who is a private citizen legally “inherit” and execute the authority of a US Executive Agreement? The most likely answer is no.

Necessary Amendments

Certain amendments appear essential for the BoP’s sustainability as an international organization. The concentration of authority in the Chairman creates a fundamental structural vulnerability in the BoP rather than serving as a source of strength. The Chairman’s power to unilaterally select a successor must be eliminated to secure the organization’s long-term stability. Instead, succession should be decided collectively by the member states or linked directly to the US presidency. Such a mechanism would improve leadership continuity, operational effectiveness, and institutional legitimacy.

Additionally, the Charter should be amended so that the Chairman is always a sitting Head of State or Government of a member state, preventing a private citizen from potentially outranking Heads of State and government. This amendment reinforces the BoP’s sustainability for resolving the Gaza problems.

Likewise, the EB must be freed from the Chairman’s domination. The EB would function more effectively as an organ of the BoP if member states could contribute meaningfully to its governance. To this end, the Charter should be amended to render the EB accountable to the member states collectively, rather than exclusively to the Chairman.

These amendments will strengthen the BoP, render its work legitimate under international law, and enable it to survive Trump’s tenure.

Conclusion

Absent meaningful amendments, the BoP looks less like an international organization and more like a sole proprietorship controlled by Trump, whose authority rests on a hybrid of personal and institutional factors. While some countries hesitate to join, others go along, hoping that Trump will deliver. Trump’s authority ultimately draws from the US presidency, not from the Charter. Yet the Charter disconnects that authority from constitutional and multilateral constraints, making the BoP incompatible with the legal framework of international organizations. Form matters, not as ritual but as a tested restraint. Still, if Trump successfully executes the 20-point plan and achieves reconstruction and stability in Gaza, the BoP will set a disruptive precedent, demonstrating that effective international action can occur outside traditional legal forms.