Pakistan’s proposed Twenty-Seventh Constitutional Amendment (PCA), which is being hurried through Parliament, introduces sweeping changes to the country’s judicial and military structures. The amendment seeks to restructure the Supreme Court, establish a new Federal Constitutional Court, and redefine the hierarchy of the armed forces. Whether the PCA undermines judicial independence is a serious concern in the legal community. However, judicial independence is not the primary focus of this commentary.
This commentary examines how the PCA, through changes to Article 243 of the Constitution of Pakistan, transforms the office of the Army Chief into a constitutionally supreme post. What renders the PCA particularly consequential is the invention of the office of the Field Marshal.
These amendments establish a framework in which the Chief of the Army Staff (Army Chief) simultaneously becomes the Chief of the Defense Forces (CODF) and may further be elevated to the rank of Field Marshal, accompanied by lifelong privileges and immunity.
Note at the outset that any powers given to the Field Marshal are the powers granted to the Army Chief. The rank of Field Marshal strengthens the office of the Army Chief, which has become vulnerable following the prosecution and conviction of Army Chief Pervez Musharraf for treason under Article 6 of the Pakistan Constitution.
The proposed amendments to Article 243 have a direct impact on accountability and the rule of law. Specifically, the changes establish the Army Chief’s dominance, constitutionalize the Field Marshal position, politicize the Field Marshal rank, and grant an unprecedented immunity that could shield the Field Marshal from any legal accountability.
Army Chief Supremacy
The PCA’s timing—before the retirement of a senior general—suggests it aims not just to streamline command but to centralize unprecedented authority in a single military leader, the Army Chief. Since the government has already awarded the title of Field Marshal to General Asim Munir, the proposed amendments to 243 directly and exclusively empower him.
By amending Article 243 of the Constitution, the PCA eliminates the post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and transfers its coordinating authority to the Army Chief, who will also hold the new title of Chief of the Defense Forces (CODF). Henceforth, every Army Chief will command not only the land forces but also the Navy, Air Force, and intelligence branches under a unified structure.
Structurally, the merger appears efficient, offering a single chain of command. Substantively, however, it centralizes power in a manner unknown even during Pakistan’s prior military regimes. Historically, while the Army Chief was always the most influential figure within the armed forces, the Air and Naval Chiefs were formally independent of his direct command.
The PCA now institutionalizes an explicit hierarchy that elevates the Army Chief above all other military officers in all branches, transforming a historically dominant position into a constitutionally supreme one.
The unified command, a prominent military structure in many countries, is becoming a vital part of a rapidly changing world. However, given Pakistan’s history of overthrowing elected governments, the Parliament should be cautious in granting the office of the Army Chief powers that are unprecedented and unique in the world, not found in any other military system.
The expansion of command authority finds its ultimate expression in the proposed constitutional recognition of the Field Marshal—a title that converts military distinction into enduring political power.
Field Marshal as a Constitutional Office
Following a brief outbreak of fighting with India in May, the government awarded the current Army Chief, Asim Munir, the title of Field Marshal as a symbolic gesture of recognition for his military service. Currently, this title is purely honorific, with no additional powers or privileges. However, the PCA elevates the title of Field Marshal to a recognized constitutional position by amending Article 243 of the Constitution.
The proposed Section 7 to Article 243 states: “Where the Federal Government promotes a member of the Armed Forces to the rank of Field Marshal, Marshal of the Air Force, or Admiral of the Fleet, such officer shall retain the rank, privileges, and remain in uniform for life.” Since the Air Chief and Admiral answer to the Army Chief under the PCA, they are not discussed separately.
Although presented as a recognition of distinction for national heroes, the PCA converts a ceremonial rank into a constitutional office with lasting legal effects. By making the rank of Field Marshal permanent and allowing its holder to “remain in uniform for life,” the amendment essentially establishes a lifelong military identity for the Army Chief outside the usual system of tenure and retirement.
Politicization of the Field Marshal
Not every Army Chief will automatically be promoted to Field Marshal. However, every Field Marshal shall be the Army Chief. The option of selective promotion to the Field Marshal adds an extra political factor: the Federal Government’s power to grant or deny lifelong military prestige and protection. Making this discretion part of the constitution risks politicizing the office of the Army Chief, as loyalty to the ruling party could become a hidden condition for promotion to the rank of Field Marshal.
The PCA politicizes the office further by making impeachment the only constitutional mechanism for removal. It creates a confusing distinction between the rank and the office of the Field Marshal and then combines the terms to give more authority to the Army Chief.
Ordinarily, a rank signifies status and seniority within the armed forces; an office refers to an institutional position with defined duties and tenure. This distinction is most relevant in understanding the nature of the Field Marshal and Army Chief.
The proposed Section 7 to Article 243 states that the rank of Field Marshal is retained for life. This means the Field Marshal retains the rank even after retiring from the position of Army Chief, regardless of whether he acquires any new office or responsibility under the PCA.
In contrast, the proposed Section 8 to Article 243 introduces the notion of office by stating: “The Field Marshal shall not be removed from office except on the grounds or charges and in the manner provided under Article 47.” Article 47 of the Constitution of Pakistan governs the impeachment of the President for violating the Constitution and committing gross misconduct. The reference to the impeachment article suggests that a Field Marshal may only be removed through the same extraordinary process, which requires a two-thirds vote of Parliament during a joint session.
Thus, the Field Marshal will be impeached, not removed from office. By contrast, an Army Chief without the Field Marshal title remains removable through ordinary executive authority. This distinction motivates any Army Chief to initiate wars to gain the national hero status or to pressure the elected government to acquire the rank of Field Marshal.
Since impeachment under Article 47 can be initiated in either house of Parliament, opposition parties might try to impeach the Field Marshal. Even if the impeachment process fails, the Field Marshal turns into a politically contentious figure. Any such attempt becomes even more problematic if, at the time of impeachment, the Field Marshal is serving as Army Chief and the top leader of the armed forces.
Under the PCA, for example, Field Marshal Asim Munir can no longer be removed from office except through the political process of impeachment. What happens if the Field Marshal refuses to relinquish the position of Army Chief after his tenure ends?
Lifelong Absolute Immunity
Even more concerning than the idea of political impeachment is the notion of lifelong absolute immunity for the Field Marshal. Section 9 of the PCA Article 243 grants immunity to the Field Marshal under Article 248 of the Constitution, which states that “No criminal proceedings whatsoever shall be instituted or continued against the President . . . in any court during his term of office.” This protection would extend to the Field Marshal.
Unlike Turkey, which constitutionally subordinates the military to civilian oversight, or the United States, where no military office carries absolute immunity, the PCA enshrines a model of absolute immunity for generals that is rare in constitutional democracies.
By amending Article 248, the PCA breaks a fundamental barrier between civilian and military accountability. The immunity would apply not to the Army Chief but to the Field Marshal. Consequently, once an Army Chief is promoted to Field Marshal, he would enjoy immunity for life. If he commits crimes as the Army Chief, he is protected because he is also the Field Marshal.
This innovation creates a serious legal inconsistency. The President’s limited immunity lasts only while in office; the Field Marshal’s absolute immunity would be permanent for life. Even if he leaves the command, his absolute immunity remains constitutionally protected. Essentially, the amendment would grant a lifelong exemption from criminal law for the Army Chief promoted to Field Marshal.
Consider the implications. Article 6 of the Constitution classifies any abrogation, suspension, or subversion of the Constitution as high treason. Under the PCA, however, an Army Chief who commits such acts as the Field Marshal would be protected from prosecution under Article 248. Whether such conduct occurs or not, the PCA itself weakens the deterrent effect of Article 6.
Practically, Field Marshal Asim Munir will enjoy lifelong absolute immunity against any illegal acts he commits as the Army Chief, even though he can be impeached. But impeachment will not undermine his lifelong absolute immunity for violating the Constitution.
The potential consequences are systemic. An Army Chief with both the rank of Field Marshal and lifelong immunity could, in practice, dictate policy to elected institutions. Civilian governments, fearing institutional confrontation, would be deterred from exercising oversight. Over time, this imbalance could ossify into a constitutionalized supremacy of the Army Chief, masquerading as Field Marshal.
The Need for Constitutional Safeguards
If the PCA is to proceed, Parliament needs to consider the following suggestions to safeguard the constitution, the rule of law, and accountability:
- Impeachment: The impeachment provision for the Field Marshal should be entirely removed because it politicizes the highest office in the armed forces. No military officer should be subject to impeachment, which is inherently a political process. For example, the U.S. Constitution allows for the impeachment of civil officers but not military officers.
- Scope and Duration of Immunity: Lifelong absolute immunity conflicts with the principle of equality before the law and accountability under Islamic law that the constitution upholds. Granting the Field Marshal lifelong absolute immunity means he will not be held accountable for any unlawful acts before, during, or after receiving the title of Field Marshal.
- Preservation of Article 6: The PCA should explicitly affirm that nothing in its provisions relating to the Field Marshal shall be construed to dilute or override Article 6 of the Constitution, which penalizes acts of treason and unconstitutional usurpation of power.
Conclusion
The proposed Twenty-Seventh Amendment signifies not only a structural change to Pakistan’s defense system but also a constitutional shift in civil–military relations. By granting lifelong absolute immunity to the Field Marshal, the PCA risks placing the rule of law beneath his authority, especially when he serves as the Army Chief.
The principles of constitutional democracy require that all public power, whether civilian or military, be exercised in accordance with the law and remain subject to accountability and oversight. If passed without revision, the PCA will permit the Field Marshal to operate beyond those limits, institutionalizing a form of Field Marshal exceptionalism that conflicts with constitutional governance. No one should be above the law for life or exempt from Article 6 of the Constitution.
If enacted, Pakistan’s Twenty-Seventh Amendment will serve as a global example of how constitutional design can justify military dominance within a democratic framework. The lesson is clear: when absolute immunity replaces accountability, the constitution ceases to be a restraint and becomes a shield for those who violate it.
Ali Khan is the founder of Legal Scholar Academy and an Emeritus Professor of Law at the Washburn University School of Law in Topeka, Kansas. He has written numerous scholarly articles and commentaries on international law. In addition, he has regularly contributed to JURIST since 2001. He welcomes comments at legal.scholar.academy@gmail.com
