In June 2025, the US launched Operation Midnight Hammer against three Iranian nuclear sites. Iran retaliated with a missile attack on coalition forces at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Now, four months later, with tensions still high and Iran’s Foreign Minister having urged world leaders on September 19 to “[c]hoose diplomacy over confrontation” because “the stakes could not be higher,” this article assesses which alternatives “between war and peace” exist for the U.S. and Iran. It also proposes a four-point pathway to reduce the suffering, frequency, and duration of armed conflict—not just for these two nations, but for all.

The official justification for the US strikes was articulated by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth thusly: “The president authorized a precision operation to neutralize the threats to our national interests posed by the Iranian nuclear program and [in support of] the collective self-defense of our troops and our ally, Israel.” Preemptive self-defense in international law is a complex issue with no universally agreed-upon definition, but it generally refers to the use of force in response to an imminent threat of armed attack, rather than waiting for the attack to occur.

In direct military response, Iran is said to have made a “devastating and powerful missile attack of at least fourteen missiles (thirteen of which were intercepted and one crashed harmlessly) in Operation Besharat Fatah” (Glad Tidings of Victory) on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, where about 10,000 US and allied forces are stationed and which serves as the regional headquarters for the US Central Command. Iran’s actions were purportedly in response to what Tehran called the US’ June 2025 strikes “a blatant military aggression” and a “clear violation of international law.” Where not prohibited by international law, belligerent reprisals are subject to stringent customary international law conditions in international armed conflicts, to induce the adversary to comply with the law, as a measure of last resort, when no other lawful measures are available to induce, must be proportionate to the violation it aims to stop, the resort to reprisals must be taken at the highest level of government, and reprisal action must cease as soon as the adversary complies with the law

The battle damage assessment (BDA) of structures destroyed and casualties included secure communications systems but no casualties.

Today, the use of force and threats thereof present challenges regionally and globally to individuals, corporations, nations, and other organizations of persuasion. At its most benign and pacific, force or the potential use thereof may encourage and nurture peace or deter aggression. At its most belligerent, force or the potential use thereof may be a dramatic and overwhelming tool of compulsion. A multitude of terms emerged since the Geneva Conventions to describe such armed conflicts.

Not all of these terms/acronyms hold the same legal, political, or operational significance to the counselor, commander, coordinator, civilian, or political leader affected by or effecting change during these armed operations “between war and peace.”

This begs the question: what is war? It is generally recognized that, aside from political declarations, war is a contention, i.e., “a violent struggle through the application of armed force.” Elements of what constitutes a war may include: a) a contention; b) between at least two nation states; c) wherein armed force is employed; d) with an intent to overwhelm.

In that context, a multitude of applicable legal principles and broad statements of law have become particularly contentious in the instances of intranational armed conflicts, and certain international “undeclared” wars or armed conflicts, yet with respect to “international armed conflict,” this threshold is codified in Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Common Article 2 states: “[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” This is a true de facto standard, where the subjective intent of the belligerents is not relevant. Armed conflicts such as the 1982 Malvinas (Argentina)/Falklands (UK) War, the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, and the first (1991) and second (2003-04) US-led Coalition wars against Iraq could be considered “international armed conflicts” to which the Law of War applied. The 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions has expanded this scope of application to include certain wars of “national liberation” for parties to that convention, e.g., conflicts during the decolonializing period post-World War II, national liberation wars, and more. According to Pictet’s Commentary on the Geneva Conventions, the law of war applies to: “any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces.” While the law of war applies in all five domains of armed conflict (air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace), there is both support for and opposition to a so-called future “Digital Geneva Convention” that protects civilians from state-sponsored cyber-attacks.

For military operations under circumstances other than armed conflict, such as Palestine’s disputed status as a state and hence a state party to the Geneva Conventions, there are legitimate questions whether the conflict in Israel and territories inhabited by Palestinians, called Operation Gideon’s Chariot, is truly international. Regardless of whether the Fourth Geneva Convention is in effect in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Gaza Strip or whether Palestine is a state or not, civilians in that ongoing armed conflict are entitled to the Common Article 3 protections that the Convention affords.

While there is no objective definition for what lies “between war and peace,” IHL is somewhat clearer on what constitutes an “internal armed conflict.” Although no objective set of criteria exists for determining the existence of a non-international armed conflict, Pictet listed several suggested criteria: (1) the rebel group has an organized military force under responsible command, operates within a determinate territory, and has the means to respect the Geneva Conventions; and, (2) the legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against the rebels, who are organized and in control of a portion of the national territory. Protocol II of The 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions, December 12, 1977, was intended to supplement the substantive provisions of Common Article 3.

What, then, is the way ahead for the US and Iran?

Given the relatively recent Israeli, US and Iranian strikes, with the potential for further Israeli and US and actions, Iran could continue to retaliate directly against Israeli or other targets, potentially escalating the conflict significantly. Iran’s Parliament in June backed closing the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway for global oil transport, which could cause major economic disruption, as roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil passes through the strait each day, and a significant amount of Qatar’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) transits it, and remains the only sea route that connects the Persian Gulf to the open ocean for Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE.

Iran may also Iran could direct its regional proxies (like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, or Houthi rebels in Yemen) to attack US and Israeli targets, potentially drawing them further into the conflict. Iran could launch cyberattacks against US infrastructure, financial institutions, or other critical systems, and even US officials if Tehran believes the regime’s survival is at risk.

How might further bloodshed and destruction be avoided between these two warring nations and their allies? The answer comes from Sun Tzu with a modern twist:

When you surround an army, leave an outlet free

-Chapter VII, Maneuvering, The Art Of War

With a colorful flourish, this is sometimes (mis-)translated as “build your opponents a golden bridge to retreat across.” The “golden bridge” becomes the strategic advantage of offering an opponent an escape route when they are defeated or surrounded. By providing a way out, you can prevent a desperate last stand, allowing victory achievement with less resistance and potential losses. This strategy is based on the idea that a cornered enemy is more dangerous and likely to fight to the death.

How can this be accomplished? By diplomacy and de-escalation, even if the present US administration has by its actions and words renounced the international influence of soft power; that is, what Chester A. Crocker termed in Leashing the Dogs of War, a “strategic use of diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building, and the projection of power and influence in ways that are cost-effective and have political and social legitimacy,” also known as “Smart Power.”

Perhaps as a portend of the “golden bridge,” President Trump declared on June 23 that Israel and Iran had agreed to a cease-fire ending a so-called “12 Day War,” yet that day, Israel was still launching attacks on Tehran. Either the US, Iran, or both nations bilaterally or via intermediaries could pursue diplomatic channels to de-escalate potential for further conflict and seek a resolution. Specifically, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced on September 19 that he had submitted a “reasonable and actionable plan to E3 (European signatories of the 2015 nuclear deal)/EU counterparts to avert an unnecessary and avoidable crisis in the coming days.” Either or both might choose to delay a direct response to assess the situation, regroup, and prepare for future action. Worst-case scenario, in a form of “nuclear breakout,” some experts suggest Iran might accelerate its nuclear program to develop a nuclear weapon, or, less plausibly, to seek a nuclear weapon from another nation, especially if it feels threatened by the US and its allies, either for greater bargaining power and prestige, or as an ultimate retaliatory weapon.

ICRC President Mirjana Spoljaric’s August 12, 2024 speech commemorating the Geneva Conventions’ 75th anniversary, proposed a four-point pathway ahead in armed conflict:

• First, parties to armed conflict must make a renewed commitment to the Geneva Conventions, adhering to the letter and the spirit of the law.
• Next, I call on states to ratify and uphold IHL treaties, including the additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions.
• Third, we must see tangible humanitarian improvements in places affected by armed conflict.
• And fourth, states must affirm that the use of new technologies of warfare – AI, cyber operations, information operations – strictly adheres to IHL. More specifically, it is urgent that states develop a normative framework that imposes certain limits on autonomous weapon systems.

The Roman author Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus’ Dē Rē Mīlitārī exhorted “Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”). Now, more than ever as a rules-based order based on “[t]he one set of rules we all agree on” is “halted and even reversed in Ukraine,” the Middle East, and elsewhere, we should look to International Humanitarian Law, especially the Geneva Conventions’ universal values as a common denominator of humanity, and integral to public and private efforts “preserving and promoting ethics and the rule of law in national security, warfare, and democratic governance.”

Kevin Govern is the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and a Professor of Law at Ave Maria School of Law in Naples, Florida, and a founding executive board member of the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law. He began his legal career as an Army Judge Advocate, serving 20 years at every echelon during peacetime and war in worldwide assignments involving every legal discipline. He has served as an assistant professor of law at the United States Military Academy and has taught at PennWest University and John Jay College. Unless otherwise attributed, the conclusions and opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the US government, Department of Defense, or Ave Maria School of Law.