Pakistan, established in 1947 as a homeland for South Asia’s Muslims, occupies a pivotal position in regional geopolitics, navigating complex relationships with neighboring Afghanistan and global powers. While Pakistan seeks strategic autonomy through cooperative alliances, its most pressing challenge emerges from the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, a nation it regards as a brotherly Muslim state.

This article examines the dual threat posed by the Taliban’s territorial ambitions, rooted in their rejection of the Durand Line, and their Deobandi ideology, which seeks to impose a rigid interpretation of Islam on Pakistan’s pluralistic constitutional federalism. Together, these forces form a “Durand–Deobandi nexus” that challenges Pakistan’s sovereignty and regional stability. For brevity, this analysis focuses on the Taliban’s actions and their historical and ideological underpinnings, setting aside the roles of other regional actors like China and India.

The Taliban: One Movement, Two Fronts

It is a mistake to treat the Afghan Taliban, now ruling Afghanistan, and the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP) as separate entities. Most TTP members were born in Pakistan, but many Afghan Taliban were raised as refugees inside Pakistan. Both factions share Pashtun ethnicity, coordinate operations, and follow the Deobandi ideology under a single authority—the Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada. The TTP’s operational head may change, but its allegiance to the Supreme Leader does not.

The Afghan Taliban gain politically by claiming separation from the TTP, thereby avoiding responsibility for cross-border attacks. Yet the two groups act in concert: the TTP executes militant strikes in Pakistan and retreats to safe havens in Afghanistan, where the Taliban leadership offers protection while publicly denying involvement. Demands that the Afghan Taliban restrain the TTP constitute a serious policy miscalculation, for it misses the point—they are asking one hand of the same body to stop the other.

The Taliban are Pashtuns. However, not all Pashtuns support the Taliban. Millions of Pashtuns in both Afghanistan and Pakistan reject the Taliban ideology, with Malala Yousafzai, a Pashtun Nobel laureate, as a prominent example. Of roughly 55-60 million Pashtuns across both countries, 15-20 million in Afghanistan and 30-35 million in Pakistan, only a small fraction support militant politics. Therefore, the Taliban’s claim to represent the Pashtun will, let alone the entire population of Afghanistan, is highly flawed.

Counterterrorism

Pakistan’s internal divisions are as dangerous as external threats. Pakistan’s ongoing military operations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to fight the TTP insurgency have severely impacted local communities. Thousands of families have been displaced, with their livelihoods destroyed as shops, farms, and small businesses shut down due to curfews and crossfire. Civilian casualties have increased as militant hideouts are targeted in populated areas, leaving families traumatized and distrustful.

The humanitarian toll is compounded by political discord. The provincial government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, led by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) of the imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan, openly criticizes the military campaign, accusing the army of overreach. This political division within Pakistan weakens the country’s unified stance, giving the Taliban opportunities to take advantage of the chaos, attack state institutions, and expand their influence in the region.

Pakistan must recognize that the Taliban phenomenon is more than a security issue; it is ideological. Killing “terrorists” has never been the solution to complex claims and grievances. The intertwined military, political, and social tensions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa should warn policymakers not to blur the line between counterterrorism and civil conflict. They also cannot ignore the historical and ideological factors—chiefly Deobandi ideology—that bolster the Taliban insurgency.

Deobandi Ideology

The Taliban’s ideological roots lie in the Deobandi movement, which was established in 19th-century Deoband, British India, to oppose Western and Christian influence. Deobandis reject secularism, Western education, and liberal governance, often opposing women’s rights and personal freedoms. The movement has a significant presence through madrassas in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Its Tablighi wing operates worldwide, including in the US, with the primary goal of guiding Muslims toward Deobandi teachings.

By the early 20th century, Deobandi leadership opposed the creation of Pakistan. Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani, in Composite Nationalism and Islam, argued that Muslims were indigenous to India and did not need a separate state. His opposition to Pakistan’s founding was politically strong, even if ultimately unsuccessful. The Taliban, inheriting this Deobandi ideology, still view Pakistan as a wrongful separation from India—an idea that fuels their hostility to Pakistan’s sovereignty, even when they avoid expressing it openly.

Thus, the Taliban’s ambition is not just territorial; it is ideological. It is a move to expand Deobandi influence into Pakistan and enforce its interpretation of Islam on a diverse state. Most Muslims in Pakistan, including millions of Pashtuns, do not subscribe to the Deobandi version of Islam or the Taliban.  The major Deobandi political party, Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F), though democratic, peaceful, and pro-Pakistan, has not been able to win a significant number of seats in any election in any province.

The Deobandi ideology is a Taliban creed; it is not inherent to Pashtuns or even to Afghanistan. The original Deobandi movement was a response to colonial modernity, not a call to militancy. The Taliban’s version represents its political mutation.

Nearly 60% of Afghanistan’s non-Pashtun population does not adhere to Deobandi beliefs. Therefore, opposition to Pakistan’s territorial integrity mainly stems from Deobandi Pashtuns, not Tajiks, Uzbeks, or Hazaras, who make up the majority of Afghanistan. The Taliban’s ideology has little broad-based support in either Pakistan or Afghanistan.

Diplomatic Isolation

Due to its destabilization of Pakistan and oppression of Muslim women, the Taliban government is losing its appeal as a legitimate authority. Building a strong and positive relationship with Pakistan, an influential member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), could have helped the Taliban gain diplomatic recognition in the Muslim world. However, the Taliban fail to realize that they cannot earn global recognition, which I once supported, by undermining constitutionalism at home and abroad.

Although both Afghanistan and Pakistan are Muslim-majority nations, their enforcement of Islamic principles diverges sharply. Pakistan operates through a legalistic framework with developed judicial institutions. Its 1973 Constitution enshrines Islam as the state religion (Article 2) and requires all laws to conform with the Quran and Sunnah (Article 227). Yet it allows plural jurisprudence, women’s education, and significant personal freedoms. Still, Pakistan needs to more proactively protect the rights and freedoms of Christians and other religious minorities, as Islamic law requires.

Afghanistan, under the Taliban rule, enforces Islam through state policing. After scrapping the 2004 Constitution—which, like Pakistan’s, declared Islam the state religion—the Taliban replaced its Ministry of Women’s Affairs with a Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. Under their regime, morality patrols regulate daily life, and women are barred from most education and employment.

Thus, while Pakistan allows individuals to freely practice different interpretations of Islam, the Taliban enforce law and morality through coercion. This contrast highlights the ideological divide between a constitutional republic and a Deobandi emirate.

None of the 57 Muslim nations in the OIC has fully recognized the Taliban government, so they remain an isolated exception to the generally diverse forms of governance in the Muslim world. So far, Russia is the only country in the world to quasi-recognize the Taliban government. India has reopened its embassy in Kabul, although it has not yet officially recognized the Taliban. Unfortunately, such small confirmations might encourage the Taliban to push forward with their ideological agenda, inspired by what they see as their glorious history.

Durrani Legacy

To grasp the Taliban’s ambitions, one must understand the enduring myth of Pashtun imperial unity. The Durrani Empire (1747–1823), founded by Ahmad Shah Durrani, united Pashtun tribes under a powerful Muslim dynasty. At its height, the empire stretched from Mashhad in the west to Sirhind in the east, encompassing modern Afghanistan and much of present-day Pakistan. Kandahar served as the capital, and Peshawar—the winter seat—symbolized control of the Khyber Pass.

Though the empire collapsed due to tribal infighting, its memory fuels modern Pashtun nationalism. The Taliban’s rhetoric of restoring Pashtun glory echoes this nostalgia. Yet the myth excludes Afghanistan’s Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, who reject Pashtun supremacy. By excluding a significant portion of the population from government, the Taliban remain highly vulnerable to internal subversions and uprisings, like those of the Northern Alliance in the 1990s and more recent plots.

Durand Line

The imperial memory of the Durrani Empire, which founded the modern state of Afghanistan in 1747, offers incentives to question the legitimacy of the Durand Line and forms the geographical backbone of the Taliban’s challenge to Pakistan’s territorial border. The Durand Line, drawn in 1893 by Sir Mortimer Durand to define the boundary between Afghanistan and British India, was reaffirmed in the 1905, 1919, and 1921 Anglo-Afghan treaties—each accepted by successive Pashtun rulers.

Under the uti possidetis doctrine (as you possess, so may you possess), colonial boundaries generally retain validity upon independence, strengthening Pakistan’s legal position. Since Pakistan’s creation in 1947, however, Afghan governments—especially Pashtun-led ones—have refused to recognize the validity of the Durand Line. Afghanistan was the only nation to oppose Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations, reflecting deep-rooted resentment toward the British-drawn frontier.

The Taliban’s current rejection of the Durand Line revives this century-old grievance, now armed with ideology and militancy.  What was a colonial boundary dispute for previous Afghan governments has, under the Taliban, developed into a campaign of cross-border insurgency. But can the Taliban unite the Pashtun areas to recreate a Greater Pashtunistan?

Pashtun Question

The Taliban ignore the historical lesson that the Pashtuns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa will not join Afghanistan. Before the 1947 partition of British India, the British held a referendum in the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) asking residents if they wanted to join India or Pakistan. The option for an independent Pashtunistan, supported by Bacha Khan, was left out. Almost half of the voters boycotted the referendum, but among those who voted, over 99% chose Pakistan.

Afghanistan’s Pashtuns, who were never under British rule, were not part of this referendum. Their continued rejection of Pakistan stems from two beliefs: that Partition was a historical error and that the Durand Line is illegitimate. Yet non-Pashtun Afghans—nearly half the population—do not share this hostility, making the issue a Pashtun, not Afghan, grievance.

Calls for ethnic states based on self-determination risk unraveling all nation-states. Were the principle applied broadly, even Afghanistan would fragment—Tajiks might merge with Tajikistan, and Uzbeks with Uzbekistan. The idea of uniting all Pashtuns under one state would dismantle both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Moreover, most of Pakistan’s Pashtuns are integrated into national life and unlikely to abandon it for the Taliban-style rule. Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement, a political organization, highlights human rights abuses during the military operations against the militants. As noted above, counterterrorism measures do not allow the government to suppress critics and abandon the constraints of law.

Conclusion

The Taliban’s threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty and constitutionalism comes from two linked sources: ethnic geography and theology. The dispute over the Durand Line fuels territorial ambitions to unite the Pashtuns; the Deobandi ideology promotes religious absolutism. Together, they create the Durand–Deobandi nexus—a blend of border revisionism and ideological expansion. The TTP militancy in Pakistan is inseparable from the Afghan Taliban.

In response, Pakistan’s strong counterterrorism efforts provoke discontent among many Pashtun families, leading the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province to question cooperation with the army. Despite legitimate political grievances, there is little evidence that Pakistan’s Pashtuns want to secede and join Afghanistan, an ethnically diverse country like Pakistan.

Pakistan, despite its imperfections, remains a constitutional state allowing plural interpretations of Islam, personal freedoms, and relative gender equality. The Taliban seek to replace this pluralism with theocratic uniformity. The future stability of South Asia thus depends on whether Pakistan can preserve its autonomy against this twin assault—from the Deobandi school of the Taliban and the disputed Durand Line that divides not only territories but also two visions of Islam.

L. Ali Khan is the founder of Legal Scholar Academy and an Emeritus Professor of Law at the Washburn University School of Law in Topeka, Kansas. He has written numerous scholarly articles and commentaries on international law. In addition, he has regularly contributed to JURIST since 2001. He welcomes comments at legal.scholar.academy@gmail.com