The Non-Proliferation Regime in Peril: An Analysis of US-Israeli Military Action in Iran Commentary
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The Non-Proliferation Regime in Peril: An Analysis of US-Israeli Military Action in Iran

US-Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear sites raise serious questions of international law under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, or Treaty). While these attacks may be evaluated under the UN Charter and other international treaties, customary laws, and principles, this commentary focuses on their implications for the NPT regime, which serves as a cornerstone of global nuclear governance, furnishing a balance between security and energy needs.

NPT Obligations and Rights

The NPT strikes a balance between the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the right to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. This duality is the most appealing aspect of the Treaty that nations appreciate. A simple prohibition of nuclear weapons might not have established a successful non-proliferation regime.

Adopted in 1968, the NPT entered into force in March 1970. As of 2025, 191 states, including the US and Iran, are parties to the Treaty, with full rights and obligations under its provisions. The US and Iran signed the Treaty on July 1, 1968. Iran ratified the Treaty in February 1970, and the US ratified it in March 1970. The Treaty identifies five states as nuclear-weapon states: the US, Russia, China, the UK, and France. All other parties to the Treaty are referred to as the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS).

Israel, India, and Pakistan have not signed the Treaty and are believed to have developed nuclear weapons. Technically, however, they are neither nuclear-weapon states nor NNWS. They are simply non-parties.

Article II of the Treaty obligates the NNWS “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Thus, Iran, as an NNWS, is obligated not to acquire nuclear weapons by any means whatever. This is an absolute, non-negotiable obligation under the Treaty.

However, the Treaty does not prohibit the development of nuclear energy. Article IV explicitly recognizes “the inalienable right of all Parties to develop research, production, and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.” This inalienable right predates the existence of the Treaty and does not depend on signing it. Furthermore, the Treaty allows NNWS to seek “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”

Every nation, whether a signatory to the Treaty or not, possesses a robust sovereign right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with or without the assistance of other countries. Iran cannot be excluded from exercising this inalienable right to obtain peaceful energy for socioeconomic development. The US-Israeli attacks on Iran do not assert that Iran lacks such a right. Instead, they argue that Iran is cheating and building nuclear weapons in violation of the Treaty.

Iran’s NPT Violations

To enforce compliance, the Treaty mandates that each NNWS negotiate and finalize an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure that the State Party meets its obligations under the Treaty to prevent “diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

In 1974, the Shah of Iran signed a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. However, after the 1979 Islamic revolution, strong revolutionary rhetoric against the US and Israel generated distrust among Western nations, creating fears even among Arab neighbors that Iran would develop nuclear weapons to strengthen its dominance in the Middle East. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 further exacerbated this atmosphere of distrust, prompting Iran to reassess its military deterrence.

In 2005, the IAEA identified that Iran was non-compliant with the NPT Safeguards Agreement, accusing Iran of concealment of nuclear activities, and later reported the matter to the UN Security Council. The US imposed economic sanctions on Iran. Several nations, including the US, China, Russia, and the EU, negotiated with Iran and in 2015 crafted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which imposed restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. In 2016, the IAEA verified that Iran had completed the necessary steps under the JCPOA.

In 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, alleging that Iran continues to cheat on its NPT obligations. The atmosphere of mutual distrust returned to the region. On his return to the White House in 2025, Trump is determined to deny nuclear weapons to Iran.

On June 12, 2025, the IAEA adopted a resolution reporting that “the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Iran accused the IAEA of being a political tool of Western nations that hold a majority on the agency’s decision-making body, the 35-member Board of Governors.

Unlawful Attacks and Consequences

The NPT grants no nation the authority to attack a non-compliant Party under the Treaty. The UN Security Council may hold the authority under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter to resort to the use of force to implement international obligations, including those under the NPT, if peaceful means of dispute resolution and economic sanctions fail to achieve compliance.

However, the unilateral US attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities undermine both the U.N. Security Council and the NPT regime, sending a message that countries hostile to the United States risk attack even for their peaceful production of atomic energy. The US needs global goodwill to be regarded as a great power and to reap tangible economic benefits.

Even more troubling is the scenario in which a non-party to the NPT, such as Israel, attacks a party to the NPT for violating the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. However, Israel has attacked Iranian nuclear facilities, citing an existential threat, as it did in 1981 when it destroyed the Osirak atomic energy production facility in Iraq and in 2007 when it struck the Al-Kibar reactor in Syria. Such preemptive use of force rarely musters international legality, does not yield beneficial results, and deepens ill will against Israel.

By attacking Iran, Israel now confronts direct Iranian missile attacks on its cities, including Tel Aviv and Haifa. A protracted Israeli-Iranian war will likely alarm Israeli citizens and prompt many to leave the country, as reported in Israeli newspapers.

Catch-22 of Attacking a Nuclear Facility

Attacking a nuclear facility does not merely punish the target state; it potentially endangers the region, if not the entire planet. The most significant threat is that radiation that knows no borders. According to the IAEA, the three sites targeted by the US—Fordo, Esfahan, and Natanz—contained nuclear material in the form of enriched uranium, which may cause radioactive and chemical contamination within the targeted facilities.

The extent of damage to the stricken facilities is unknown. It is unclear whether the radioactive leakage from the facilities, if attacked again, will harm the people of Iran and beyond. Attacking an operational nuclear facility is a Catch-22. If the facility is severely damaged, the attack may release a radioactive cloud. If the damage is limited, Iran can restart the process of making a nuclear bomb.

Withdrawal

One possible repercussion of the attacks on the Iranian nuclear facility could be that Iran may withdraw from the treaty. Article X of the NPT allows parties to withdraw: “Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” While withdrawal is legally permissible and Iran would do no legal wrong, it would nonetheless sow more turmoil.

North Korea, a party to the Treaty, announced in 2003 that it would no longer be bound by it. Later, it acquired nuclear weapons. This withdrawal occurred weeks before the US invasion of Iraq, following the US threatening rhetoric that grouped Iraq, Iran, and North Korea into the Axis of Evil. This NPT impairment serves as an example of how relentless pressure on a State Party can backfire, leaving the world to contend with another state possessing nuclear weapons.

There is political pressure on the Iranian leadership to withdraw from the Treaty. Suffering attacks by two allied nations, the US and Israel, possessing nuclear weapons, is the ultimate jeopardy a country can face. Although Iran has obligated itself with a religious directive (fatwa) of not going nuclear, that can change. A fatwa is not an absolute rule of Islamic law. In addition to withdrawing from the NPT, the Iranian leaders may reverse the fatwa against the acquisition of atomic weapons, which would, unfortunately, destabilize the region even further.

Conclusion

Iran has taken a confusing stance on enforcing the NPT, showing less than full transparency in its nuclear energy development, which it has an inalienable right to pursue, rooted not in the Treaty but in its sovereignty. However, the 1979 Islamic Revolution initiated a practice of concealing its nuclear activities that alarms its Arab neighbors, Israel, and Western nations. A more transparent commitment to the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA would have been a much wiser Iranian policy than the current approach of mutual distrust.

Iran must also restrain its rhetoric. As a people of literature nurtured by the writings of Rumi, Hafez, Omar Khayyam, and numerous other world-class writers, Iran recognizes that words are powerful weapons and must be wielded with care. The narrative of “Death to America” is not only offensive under the Islamic etiquette of speech but also unnecessarily provokes a superpower, the US, which finds excuses to test its state-of-the-art weapons that inflict massive harm.

Unfortunately, Israel and the US pursue a legally blind foreign policy that undermines the already fragile system of international law. There is no justification under international law or the NPT for the US or Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear sites. Let the IAEA and the UN Security Council address any Treaty violations. Attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities poses a radiation threat to everyone in the region and beyond. As mandated by the UN Charter, negotiated solutions offer a more sensible approach for all nations, regardless of size or strength. When a superpower adheres to international law, it significantly strengthens the rule of law. The US must do so.

Ali Khan is the founder of Legal Scholar Academy and an Emeritus Professor of Law at the Washburn University School of Law in Topeka, Kansas. He has written numerous scholarly articles and commentaries on international law. In addition, he has regularly contributed to JURIST since 2001. He welcomes comments at legal.scholar.academy@gmail.com

Opinions expressed in JURIST Commentary are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of JURIST's editors, staff, donors or the University of Pittsburgh.