Introduction

In the spring of 2020, Kingfish Maine (KM) and the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (MDEP) began collaborating on a proposed $110 million onshore fish farm in Jonesport, a small fishing town in Maine. The path to MDEP approval has been convoluted and opaque, ultimately resulting in the green light for an international corporate project that raises serious environmental concerns and threatens the livelihoods of local fishing communities.

MDEP’s permit approval process lacks consistency and logical order. This inconsistent approval process stems from the agency’s failure to establish a sequential set of steps that both the MDEP and town planning boards could follow, offering them clear benchmarks to better guide the construction plan. Instead, MDEP uses a haphazard, piecemeal approval process—akin to purchasing and assembling a cabinet from IKEA without following the directions provided. For example, one could piece together the outside framework with screws only to discover that shelves need to be mounted using dowels before the cabinet is screwed together.

Background

Over the past 60 years, seminal works by Rachel Carson “Silent Spring,” Murray Feshbach’s “Ecocide in the USSR,” Theo Colborn’s “Our Stolen Future,” John Vandermeer & Evette Perfecto’s “Breakfast of Biodiversity,” and Paul Hawken’s “Ecology of Commerce” have clearly documented ecosystem dynamics and how the environmental “web of causality” can produce unanticipated and unexamined consequences. These works explore, in different ways, how ecosystems function, underscoring the need for understanding the complexity of causality webs.

Kingfish is a Norwegian company with a large, on-shore fish farm situated in the Netherlands and is the key player in this article. The company utilizes what is termed a Recycling Aquaculture System which is a land-based aquaculture system for raising its sushi-grade fish. The arrival of the KM subsidiary in Downeast Maine^[1] provides a compelling example of how the Rule of Law, environmental dynamics, and village ordinances intersect in a not-so-orderly fashion.

KM targeted Jonesport, Maine as a prime location for its land-based aquaculture system installation. Jonesport is a fishing community of approximately 1,800 residents who are primarily engaged in lobster fishing. A 2021 study by students at the Jonesport-Beals High School revealed this community generated over $34 million annually from lobster fishing alone.

Main Arguments

MDEP issued permits approving Kingfish Maine’s application to build the land-based aquaculture system which was then submitted to the Town Planning Board. MDEP has since become the focal point of emerging tensions between the Rule of Law and the policies followed by both the agency and the State of Maine—raising the potential for serious environmental consequences, even as MDEP assumes a peripheral role in the ultimate outcome of the KM land-based aquaculture system project. The agency’s handling of KM’s application demonstrates its practice of reviewing permit applications in isolation, without considering the broader context or the cumulative impact of related permits. This failure to assess how individual permit decisions interact could result in severe environmental harm if MDEP continues to ignore the interdependence of the project’s components. In this way, the agency has neglected to account for the environmental “web of causality.”

Below, I outline the key steps/processes involved in constructing the KM industrial complex, along with potential outcomes and commentary on how each step/process interrelates with the others.

1. 1. A current, accurate, and complete model exists^[2] that shows significant Nitrogen build up. MDEP continues to rely on an outdated and less accurate computer model rather than a more current one deciding whether to issue building permits. Is efficiency more important than accuracy?
   2. Rabobank wrote a letter promising a funding discussion with KM without offering proof of secured funding. MDEP requires concrete proof that the applicant can secure funding for its project. However, MDEP forged ahead on KM’s project despite KM providing only a tentative letter promising a loan discussion.
   3. An unvetted economic report containing speculative data at best. KM paid $40,000 to the University of Maine system to create an economic report demonstrating the need for economic development in Washington County, Maine. However, KM was the sole source of this speculative data.
   4. Inaccurate claims on state websites overstating KM’s benefit to local communities. Remarkably inaccurate information was posted on the Maine DECD website to promote KM’s land-based aquaculture system.
   5. Fresh water extraction that will likely compromise the village of Jonesport’s water supply. To run the fish farm, KM plans to extract 43,200 gallons per day from the Jonesport aquifer. When questioned, the MDEP showed very little concern, offering little more than checking the aquifer level after 18 months have elapsed. This past summer, a dry August resulted in Jonesport wells drying up for a few days.
   6. Electrical power requirements that appear complicated, yet have garnered almost no discussion. When questioned about power usage, KM representatives stated that it wasn’t their problem. Rather, they asserted that it would be the power company’s problem. This critical issue remains unresolved at present, yet MDEP has moved ahead with the approval process. The facility cannot run without power, yet MDEP has failed to consider this crucial issue in the approval process.^[3]
   7. A dye test that comes only after construction is complete, which would make it nearly impossible to then close down the industrial complex. MDEP uses an outdated dye test to demonstrate current water flow. According to MDEP, the dye test would only yield accurate results after facility construction is complete. This is deeply problematic because results showing a current that may lead to a chemical concentration build-up—such as nitrogen—would require KM to shut down the facility until the problem was remedied. Unfortunately, the facility would likely remain open in spite of dye test results.

The question remains as to why the MDEP does not coordinate with other agencies. For example, let’s say the Army Corps of Engineers (AoCE) issues a permit for a facility to dredge Chandler Bay in the hopes of installing two, four-foot diameter pipes to facilitate water inflow and outflow. At a later date, MDEP performs their dye test and finds a circular current. Finding a circular current would require the facility to then reinstall the pipes in another location. This scenario could conceivably be repeated a number of times, resulting in the destruction of half the Chandler Bay. Would it not make more sense to use a modern computer-generated model that would accurately calculate information necessary to construct the pipes before permanently damaging the Chandler Bay floor?

Viewing these procedural steps through a broader lens would help prevent permanent environmental damage. MDEP’s current practice of viewing each procedural step in isolation shows that the agency does not consider the possibility that the pipes may require moving, and ignores potential consequences.

Ecosystem Dynamics and Commentary Regarding the Obvious Lack of Attention to Marine Ecology

The MDEP does not appear to pay close enough attention to the “web of causality.”^[4] The term refers to the complex ecological systems that form the basis of all food webs—an ecological food supply chain of sorts. Rachel Carson’s seminal work “Silent Spring” illustrates a prime example of how the wonder chemical DDT—despite its many benefits—caused the demise and endangered species designation of the bald eagle because the DDT worked its way through the food web, eventually causing the softening of the egg shells which resulted in eagles cracking the eggs during the incubation stage. A responsible agency, like the MDEP, ignoring basic ecological principles reflects a gross negligence of purpose. It is disheartening to understand that the MDEP does not seem to fully comprehend its own “raison d-être” and that is frightening.

There are many questions before the MDEP. Why would the agency not properly vet information, such as the speculative economic report? How does a report devoid of facts and analysis qualify as believable enough to issue a permit?  Why isn’t there a way to conduct some sort of dye test before construction begins? Why does it seem that environmental costs are not factored into MDEP’s decision equation, or are simply ignored, yet economic development is blindly afforded all the advantages?

From 2018 to present, I have been involved in two high-profile environmental disasters supported by the State of Maine, both of which involved foreign interests and serious environmental costs. Perhaps it would be wise to consider convening a panel of independent experts who can provide untainted, data-driven recommendations for projects like KM and NECEC.^[5] Moreover, this panel could propose a logical order for steps in the permit-approval process. For example, towns could require proof of an electrical source; a current, accurate model; and form a third-party energy information administration or produce environmental impact statements for starters.

Part 2 of this commentary will flesh out some of these concepts in more detail, and will delve into issues relating to town planning boards and zoning ordinances. Further, an approach will be presented that could streamline processes and help avoid lawsuits.

[1] https://meinmaine.com/2017/01/15/downeast-maine-where-is-it-exactly/ (visited April 9, 2025)

[2] The ocean current modeling used by DEP has been heavily criticized and did not include required statistical verification.  Yet, MDEP approved a MEPDES (Maine Pollutant Discharge Elimination System) that used a totally useless current modeling simulation.

[3] One potential direction for power supply is blocked because of a protected “Bold Coast Highway”.  The only other access would be across private land with multiple landowners.

[4] https://archive.foodfirst.org/publication/breakfast-of-biodiversity/

[5] NECEC is the New England Clean Energy Connect project with CMP and the Spanish energy conglomerate Iberdrola.  It was rejected by each of 26 towns along the electric power Corridor, yet still approved by the State.

Richard W. Aishton is currently an independent consultant and the President of Protect Downeast. His previous assignment was for the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) as the Program Coordinator for the ENPI FLEG Program (Forest Law Enforcement and Governance) in six Eastern European countries and Russia. This program concentrated on rural development and resource dependency; and ecosystem management and governance, using the context of ecosystem destruction. Dr. Aishton focuses on quantifying the relationship between rural communities and their natural resource base. His skills include the application of technical science; remote sensing and use of satellite and aerial images; rural energy development and use; evaluation of ecosystem services from the perspective of what is actually used; and conflict management in a multi-lingual, multi-cultural setting. A strong academic background and over 40 years of experience in foreign and domestic ecosystem management form the foundation that enables Dr. Aishton to conduct and manage international and domestic projects that work with culturally diverse groups; manage large budgets; and develop new project opportunities. Dr. Aishton holds a Master of Science in Environmental Policy, a PhD in Environmental Dynamics, and has completed coursework at the Maine School of Law.