After the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia faced a response from the international community in the form of sanctions. Since then, almost 22,000 sanctions have been imposed on the country to target various spheres of the Russian economy and complicate waging the war. Over the last three years, the EU has imposed 14 comprehensive sanctions packages. The US is constantly updating its sanction list, including recently tightened measures related to the most profitable sector of the Russian economy—oil and gas. The UK imposed sanctions on another crucial sector of the Russian economy, banning metal, diamond, and energy exports. Thousands of people violating international law ended up under personal sanctions, and tens of the manufacturers of the goods used for the war of aggression were punished by these measures.
There are different opinions regarding the pros and cons of the sanctions. Still, one thing is obvious—targeting the Russian economy, Ukraine’s allies are also targeting the military sector that is fueled by the money earned through international trade. Along with economic sanctions that target funding for military construction, measures restricting the import of military technologies to Russia from abroad are pivotal.
However, despite Western governments imposing restrictions on military exports to Russia, sanction circumvention remains widespread. In January 2025, investigative journalists found that the missiles targeting Ukrainian cities are built with microchips made with components imported from Western countries. The most widespread Russian drones — Lancet, used on the frontlines by the Russian military, are also made with Western electronic equipment that is delivered to Russia despite the US embargo through Central Asia. In 2023, the Ukrainian military claimed that for the creation of these drones, Russia was using Czech motors. Recently, Czech investigators found out that from 2014 to 2022, Czech engineering companies sold equipment used for military purposes to Russia despite the restrictions.
Not just preventing sanction circumvention is needed to target Putin’s regime that wages this war. One of the alternative measures is to support the brain drain of talented specialists from the country. However, sometimes, instead of targeting Russia’s economy, propagandists, or sanction circumvention mechanisms, European legislation targets people who try to flee Putin’s Russia. Among such measures is the decision to ban visas for Russian students in some European countries. Higher education in Russia has become deeply politicized. Hence, those who disagree with the regime and do not want to be brainwashed in the university look for a better education abroad. The visa ban for students trying to flee Russia masked as “a fight against espionage” seems hypocritical and populist in the countries that do not prevent sanction circumvention of military equipment to Russia and do not efficiently target those responsible for the war.
A bright example of populist sanctioning is the Czech Republic. In 2024, the country banned visas for Russians and Belarusians, with a few exceptions for those who already have visas or residence permits. Belarusian students can obtain student visas if offered a scholarship from the Czech Republic or the EU. Russian students do not have such an option. Despite the declared intention of the Czech Prime Minister to create conditions for students to keep studying and working, the implementation is so far questionable.
The country issues almost no student visas and has a broad list of degrees inaccessible to Russian students. After graduation, there are very few options for those who managed to finish university there to stay in a country. The Czech Republic is one of the most affordable countries for studying among the EU members, and its ban on student visas will primarily target young people from lower or middle-class social groups disagreeing with the government who do not have other, “more expensive” European options.
Recently, the Czech Senate approved the Lex Ukrajina bill, which sparked major controversy. On the one hand, the law extends temporary protection for Ukrainian refugees, but on the other hand, it contains discriminatory provisions towards Russians, including those who oppose the regime. According to the new law, all current citizenship applications by Russians over the age of 15 will be frozen indefinitely and considered only after the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The only exceptions will be refugees, children under 15, and those who have contributed significantly to the Czech economy or culture. The law also requires Russian citizens to give up their Russian passports before obtaining a Czech one, which may be a problem due to the reluctance of Russian officials to accept these applications from those willing to do it for political reasons.
Therefore, following its visa ban for students, the Czech Republic approved the bill that forbids those living in the country for a while from obtaining citizenship just by means of their citizenship without any regard for their political position. Many Russians living abroad who actively supported Ukraine after the outbreak of the invasion, politically and financially, may face persecution if they return to Russia. The bill completely ignores people’s political positions, making the exception only for those who largely contribute to the economy. The politicians argue that this bill is aimed at eliminating Russian espionage. However, the search for spies turns into a witch hunt of young people trying to leave the authoritarian country, and not those who have enough money to contribute to the Czech economy. The Kremlin has this money. Hence, the practical benefit of the bill is questionable.
An investigation by The Insider showed that Vladimir Strzhalkovsky, the ex-KGB officer close to Vladimir Putin in the 1990s, after working for many years as a top manager of the governmental enterprises connected to natural resources, built an alcohol empire in Europe with businesses in many countries, including the Czech Republic. Strzhalkovsky and his son, who graduated from the Foreign Intelligence Service academy in Moscow, have created a holding company that includes alcohol producers in Italy, France, and the Czech Republic, five luxury spa hotels in Italy and Greece, a pub in Austria, and half a dozen restaurants in Moscow. Despite the huge turnovers, many of these assets are either not profitable or loss-making, raising suspicions of money laundering. At the same time, Strzhalkovsky did not face any European sanctions. His brewery, Svabin, in the Czech Republic, is now officially owned by a citizen of Romania, Ivan Marchiuc, who suspiciously until recently was surnamed Marchuk and had Russian citizenship and a residence in Moscow, raising questions about the efficiency of the bans introduced by the Czech Republic.
Another recent investigation by The Insider showed that top managers of Russian companies connected to developing the war machine in the country are enjoying the possibility of buying luxurious property in Italy.
At the same time, the owner of M-production — Russia’s largest private contractor for the production of political talk shows, is freely traveling around Europe without being sanctioned. Her agency creates the shows of Vladimir Soloviov, the most famous Russian propagandist advocating for the war in Ukraine, and at least 10 other popular warmongering shows in Russia and Belarus, where the speakers openly call for attacking the Western countries. At the same time, the company’s owner buys private property in Bulgaria, the EU, and other NATO member countries.
Looking at the recent investigations, it becomes apparent that a lot of work needs to be done in order to prevent Russian propagandists who fuel pro-war sentiment in the country and managers who develop its war machine from traveling around Europe and owning businesses there. Another important measure is a more thorough control of sanction circumvention and money laundering by the enterprises closely connected to the Kremlin. While the Czech and some other governments are targeting Russian students from less affluent families who disagree with the regime and are willing to emigrate, seeing them as potential spies, the real spies close to the Kremlin own businesses in these countries. The current concept shall be revisited if the governments want to punish the real culprits behind the war.
Mykyta Vorobiov, Senior Editor for Long Form Content at JURIST, is a Ukrainian-born political analyst, journalist, and political science student at Bard College, Berlin.
