Tensions between India and Pakistan have escalated following terrorist attacks in Indian-controlled Kashmir that killed 28 civilians. India accuses Pakistan of sponsoring these attacks, threatening several countermeasures. India has suspended the Indus Water Treaty, and in response, Pakistan has closed its airspace to Indian international flights. It is feared that India might strike Pakistan with conventional forces, just like it retaliated in 2019, as a response to an attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir that killed at least 40 paramilitary soldiers.

Unfortunately, India and Pakistan support militant groups in each other’s territory. The premier intelligence agencies, like the CIA and M16, are aware of what India does in Pakistan and vice versa, and they report accordingly to their heads of government, making it difficult for nations to take sides except to condemn terrorist attacks. In reaction to the Pahalgam “bad” attack, US President Donald Trump expressed confidence in saying that India and Pakistan “would figure it out” — hopefully, without using nuclear weapons.

If there is a nuclear war between Pakistan and India, Pakistan will most likely start it because India has declared a No First Use (NFU) policy, which means they have vowed to never use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. Pakistan has made no such commitment. This commentary explains why Pakistan refuses to make an NFU commitment.

Note, however, that an NFU policy is not a legal obligation but merely a unilateral moral stance India can abandon at any time. Since India has border disputes with two nuclear-powered neighbors, Pakistan and China, its NFU policy is much more protective of its interests as it reduces pressure on China to strike India preemptively out of fear. India’s NFU policy also enhances India’s reputation as a restrained nuclear power.

As explained below, Pakistan is unlikely to abandon its stance on the use of nuclear weapons because it fears it cannot win a conventional war with India. Unless India and Pakistan sign a mutual defense pact, reversing the historical mindset and opening a bold new future, the threat of nuclear war will hover over the region.

Conventional Warfare Resources

There is a vast disparity between India and Pakistan regarding military assets and funding resources, as India has risen to be a top-10 economic power. India’s annual defense budget is USD $75 billion, whereas Pakistan’s is $7 billion. Per Global Firepower records, India has far more active personnel, total and fighter aircraft, helicopters, armored vehicles, fleet strength, and submarines. India has $627 billion in foreign reserves, and Pakistan has $13 billion. If a conventional war breaks out, India has significant resources to sustain a long war compared to Pakistan.

In nuclear weaponry, however, according to the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Pakistan commands a slight edge. Pakistan has over 200 nuclear warheads in 2025, which exceeds India’s nuclear warheads. Both nations have land-based, sea-based, and air-launched atomic payload capabilities. The production of Ababeel and Shaheen-III will empower Islamabad to have full-range coverage of India and its outlying territories. To fight India’s conventional might, Pakistan has developed “tactical” nuclear weapons to use on battlefields.

The use of tactical nuclear warheads in a battle does not fall under the Non-Attack Nuclear Agreement that obligates India and Pakistan not to destroy or cause damage to any nuclear installation or facility in the other country. Both countries dutifully exchange information on 1st January of each calendar year on the latitude and longitude of their nuclear installations and facilities, and “whenever there is any change.”

Indus Waters Treaty

Pakistan will likely use a tactical nuclear weapon if India closes the rivers that supply water to Pakistan. In 1960, India and Pakistan signed the Indus Waters Treaty to “attain the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus system of six rivers.” The Treaty generally allocates all the waters of the Eastern Rivers (Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi) for the unrestricted use of India. Article III of the Treaty states: “Pakistan shall receive for unrestricted use all those waters of the Western Rivers which India is under obligation to let flow.” India can use the waters of the Western Rivers for agricultural use and to generate hydroelectric power. However, with minor exceptions, “India shall not store any water of, or construct any storage works on, the Western Rivers.”

No exceptions in the Treaty can undermine the division of waters between the two countries, Eastern Rivers for India and Western Rivers for Pakistan, without breaching international law.

If disputes arise, the Treaty provides a tiered method of dispute resolution through direct negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. The parties must resolve any interpretive or functional breaches arising under the Treaty through a bilateral Commission. If the Commission fails to do so, the World Bank appoints a Neutral Expert to resolve the conflict. If the dispute remains, the Treaty obligates the Parties to settle the dispute through binding arbitration.

There is no specific provision in the Indus Treaty allowing a Party to suspend or revoke any provision unilaterally, much less denounce the entire Treaty. The provisions of the Treaty can be modified or terminated only by another agreement. India may suspend the bilateral Commission without violating international law, but suspending any substantive provision would be legally actionable, as Pakistan is preparing to do so.

Pakistan’s First-Use Nuclear Policy

Since India has adopted an NFU policy, Pakistan’s first-use nuclear policy attains more significance because, as noted earlier, if a nuclear war breaks out, Pakistan will likely use the first atomic weapon. So, the question arises, under what circumstances will Pakistan use a nuclear weapon with the full realization that there will be a nuclear retaliation. Adopting an NFU policy does not mean India would not respond to nuclear with nuclear.

As a broad principle, Pakistan will likely use a nuclear weapon to survive as a nation-state. Pakistan will use the nuclear option, for example, if India, using its conventional forces, occupies a portion of Pakistan’s territory or threatens its economic survival by blocking its seaports, choking international trade. Pakistan will also likely use atomic weapons to deter India from jeopardizing Pakistan’s existential survival by withholding the waters of the Western Rivers.

In 1971, the Indian armed forces assisted Bangladesh, which was then East Pakistan, with airstrikes and other military assets in gaining independence from Pakistan. Nearly 93,000 soldiers of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan formally surrendered to the Indian Army and the Bangladesh Liberation Militia. Under the first-use nuclear policy, Pakistan would have detonated atomic weapons on the Indian Army to safeguard its territorial integrity. However, neither India nor Pakistan had nuclear weapons in 1971.

The historical princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), larger than the United Kingdom in territorial size, is divided roughly half and half between India and Pakistan. The 1972 Simla Agreement formalizes the division of J&K, recognizing the border as the Line of Control (LoC), though the dispute remains. The LoC is a contractual border, though not an international one, since the final status of J&K is still unsettled. The Simla Agreement obligates India and Pakistan to resolve their disputes through bilateral negotiations. This obligation requires not altering the LoC by force from either side.

So, the question arises whether Pakistan will invoke its first-use nuclear policy if India occupies the Pakistan-controlled J&K by force. The Pakistani portion of J&K, including Gilgit-Baltistan, has acquired a new strategic significance for Pakistan because of its role in water security, military defense, natural resources, tourism, and economic connectivity with China, as it connects China’s Xinjiang region to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port through highways and pipelines.

Pakistan will not allow India to alter the LoC, and the proposal that India can occupy the entire disputed state of J&K will invite stiff opposition from both Pakistan and China. Recognizing the high stakes, it seems unlikely that India will embark on such a course of action.

Conclusion

India and Pakistan have different policies regarding the first use of nuclear weapons. With its NFU policy, India earns international respect as a non-aggressive state, and the policy reduces pressure on China to watch India with suspicion. By contrast, Pakistan does not adopt an NFU policy because losing half the country, Bangladesh, to the Indian armed forces is etched in its bitter memories. Pakistan has decided not to lose any more territory to India. If India uses its military might to dismember Pakistan, occupy Gilgit-Baltistan, or choke Pakistan’s survival by denying Indus waters, Pakistan, in the words of a seasoned political analyst, “will use the weapon and go to heaven.”

However, the likelihood of a nuclear war is low. Since acquiring nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan, despite intense rhetoric and reciprocal support for terrorism, have avoided catastrophic actions that could trigger a nuclear war. They have also engaged in multiple international forums to address their bilateral disputes.

Ali Khan is the founder of Legal Scholar Academy and an Emeritus Professor of Law at the Washburn University School of Law in Topeka, Kansas. He has written numerous scholarly articles and commentaries on international law. In addition, he has regularly contributed to JURIST since 2001. He welcomes comments at legal.scholar.academy@gmail.com