On November 19, President Vladimir Putin announced a revised nuclear strike doctrine that escalated the consequences of the Ukraine-Russia conflict. The Russian nuclear strike has become much more probable than before. The NATO countries, particularly the United States, should not dismiss what Putin says as mere threatening rhetoric but should accept it at its face value and act accordingly.
President Putin has warned that Russia may authorize a nuclear strike if a conventional attack on Russia or its ally Belarus “created a critical threat to their sovereignty and (or) their territorial integrity.” Russia would not only strike Ukraine but also any nation that allows its weapons to be used in the Ukrainian attacks, which means that Russia could attack the U.S. with a nuclear weapon.
While a direct nuclear strike on the U.S. remains unlikely, the possibility of a nuclear exchange between Russia and Ukraine has become a more pressing concern. The use of NATO-supplied weapons causing significant damage within Russia could potentially trigger a nuclear response from Russia, mounting the conflict to a global level.
Due to Russia’s veto power, the Russia-Ukraine conflict appears beyond resolution through the United Nations Security Council. The prospect that Russia would concede defeat and withdraw its troops, as it did in Afghanistan, rehabilitating Ukraine’s territorial integrity is exceedingly low.
This commentary suggests that Ukraine consider settling the conflict by refraining from joining NATO and potentially conceding certain territories. Although rewarding the Russian invasion seems unjust, the Ukraine concessions may represent the only viable path to end the ongoing slaughter and the potential for an expanding conflict.
Revised Nuclear Doctrine
In reaction to the Ukrainian attacks inside the Russian territory with missiles supplied by the United States, Putin announced that Russia would counteract with a nuclear strike if Ukraine attacked with conventional weapons provided by a nuclear state, meaning the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Thus, under the revised nuclear doctrine, any attack on Russia by a non-nuclear state with weapons obtained from a nuclear state will be taken as a joint attack. Note that the doctrine authorizes the Russian armed forces but does not require them to use a nuclear strike in response to a joint attack.
The recent authorization by President Biden for Ukraine to use U.S. long-range missiles, specifically the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), to hit targets within Russian territory marks a significant intensification in the ongoing conflict. This decision allows Ukraine to target military stockpiles and supply hubs deep inside Russia, particularly around the Kursk region, where tensions have been heightened by the deployment of North Korean troops to support Russian forces.
The supply of long-range weapons to Ukraine, capable of striking deep inside Russian territory, significantly alters the dynamics of the battlefield. Losing troops in the trenches is one matter; enduring casualties in the heart of cities is quite another. Weak nations tolerate such attacks, but nuclear-armed states do not endure deep incursions without a significant response. Countries like Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon have suffered from the devastation of their cities primarily because they lack nuclear deterrence. Russia, however, possesses nuclear weapons, and it is unlikely to respond in the same manner as a beleaguered nation. Russia’s nuclear threat is real.
UN Security Council Failure
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Unfortunately, the outdated and dysfunctional UN Security Council has failed to prevent wars and safeguard the territorial integrity of relatively weak nations.
Nations with veto power on the Security Council have recurrently undermined the UN Charter as the guardian of peace and security. In the past three years (February 2022 – November 2024), Russia has used its veto (negative vote) nine times, the U.S. five times, and China three times, a combined use of 17 times. Of these, eight negative votes were related to peace in the Middle East, and two were related to peace and security in Ukraine.
In September 2022, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that called on Russia, consistent with Article 2(4), to immediately cease its invasion and withdraw its forces to its “internationally recognized borders.” The resolution failed because of the Russian negative vote. Since then, admitting the futility, the international community has made no new efforts in the Security Council to end the Ukraine-Russia conflict.
When security institutions fail to establish peace, narratives can fuel the war. The prevailing narrative suggests that if Ukraine concedes territory and submits to Russian hegemony, the concession will embolden Russia to replay its invasion script and attack other nations to submit. This narrative frightens militarily weak nations in Europe, which, without NATO protection, could be easily defeated and humiliated, their leaders ousted, and their political systems forced to capitulate to Russia. Ironically, this narrative also draws strength from the U.S. invasion of Iraq, where regime change and subsequent instability had extensive domestic and geopolitical complications.
Unfortunately, powerful nations like Russia and the U.S. do not pay attention to negative narratives and do what serves their geoeconomic and hegemonic interests. When the rule of law collapses, as demonstrated by the UN Security Council’s failure to stop wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, raw might become the dispute resolution logic, requiring the weak to submit to the powerful. We overlook the fundamental lesson that history repeatedly teaches: law is superior to the use of force as a method of dispute resolution.
Taking Russian Threat Seriously
By announcing its revised nuclear doctrine that dramatically lowers the threshold to use a nuclear strike, Russia has forced the Western nations to reconsider supplying weapons to Ukraine. The NATO nations have supplied weapons and equipment to Ukraine to the tune of over $100 billion. The U.S. alone has donated more than $61 billion. For all practical purposes, the Ukraine conflict is turning into a war between Russia and NATO.
The transfer of weapons escalates an ongoing conflict and enables slaughter. In 2014, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) entered into force, a treaty prohibiting the transfer of arms incompatible with the goals of international humanitarian law. Russia has not signed the ATT. The United States and Ukraine have signed the treaty but have not yet ratified it. They are still obligated not to violate the treaty’s core substance blatantly. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have all ratified the treaty and are bound by the treaty’s letter and spirit.
There is no likelihood that the West would equip Ukraine with nuclear weapons to deter Russia, even though Putin has reacted forcefully to any such move. Sadly, the European ruling elites have made some catastrophic mistakes in the past, which led to two world wars.
Western nations label the revised nuclear doctrine as rhetoric, not a viable option. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer denounced the “irresponsible rhetoric coming from Russia, and that is not going to deter our support for Ukraine.” Ukrainian parliamentarian Oleksandra Ustinova, who lobbied the Biden administration for the ATACMS, argues that Putin would not carry out a nuclear strike.
It is a mistake to treat Putin’s nuclear threat as a bluff. Note a Russian proverb: Don’t say “hop” until you’ve jumped.
NATO countries, particularly the U.S., must note that Russia is unlikely to accept defeat at the hands of Ukraine, vacate the occupied territories, accept Ukraine as a NATO country, and retreat in humiliation. Unlike the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, which left behind billions of dollars in weaponry, Russia’s authoritarian regime under Putin is driven more by national pride and a do-or-die mentality. The Pentagon should consider consulting with psychologists to understand Putinism better. I have already argued in 2022 that Putin is no superfluous man.
Conclusion
The Russia-Ukraine war is a devastating conflict with no clear path to resolution through the UN Security Council due to Russia’s veto power. Despite Russia’s precedent-setting withdrawal from Afghanistan, a complete restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity appears unlikely. Humiliation in the neighborhood is different from disgrace in distant lands. Equating Ukraine with Afghanistan is like comparing Afghanistan with Cuba. The U.S. could tolerate defeat in Afghanistan, but it could not accept Soviet missiles installed in Cuba. Continued missile supplies to Ukraine from NATO allies will prolong the bloodshed, even if Russia’s nuclear threat does not materialize, betting against which is a monumental mistake.
A compromise such as Ukraine renouncing NATO membership and potentially ceding territory may seem unfair. Still, it offers a pathway to ending the conflict and mitigating the further suffering of Ukrainian families. History is replete with examples where weak nations concede territory. The 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the Mexican War. Mexico conceded the territory now included in the U.S. states of New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, Arizona, California, Texas, and western Colorado. This commentary underscores the urgent need for diplomatic solutions.
L. Ali Khan is the founder of Legal Scholar Academy and an Emeritus Professor of Law at the Washburn University School of Law in Topeka, Kansas. He has written numerous scholarly articles and commentaries on international law. In addition, he has regularly contributed to JURIST since 2001. He welcomes comments at legal.scholar.academy@gmail.com