 |
|

Legal news from Wednesday, February 20, 2013 |
 |
|


Supreme Court rules double jeopardy applies even after judicial mistake
Michael Haggerson on February 20, 2013 3:12 PM ET

[JURIST] The US Supreme Court [official website] ruled 8-1 [opinion, PDF] on Wednesday in Evans v. Michigan [SCOTUblog backgrounder; JURIST report] that double jeopardy [Cornell LII backgrounder] applies even if the trial judge acquitted the defendant based upon an erroneous ruling on the required elements of the offense. The defendant was charged with arson for burning down a vacant house in violation of a Michigan statute [MCL 750.73 text]. The trial court added an additional element to the state law requiring the prosecution to prove that the burned house was a dwelling. Failing to prove the nonexistent element, the trial court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict and entered an order of acquittal, dismissing the case. The Michigan Supreme Court [official website] reversed the lower court's decision, reasoning that this case does not involve giving the prosecution a second opportunity to present evidence that it could have in the first proceeding. The US Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Michigan. The US Supreme Court had previously ruled [SCOTUSblog report] that double jeopardy applies when the trial judge makes an erroneous evidentiary finding regarding a required element of a crime. The state of Michigan tried to distinguish the precedent, where the trial court erroneously required the prosecution to prove more with regard to an element, with the current situation, where the trial court added an additional erroneous element. However, the US Supreme Court stated that both cases involved "an antecedent legal error that led to an acquittal because the State failed to prove a fact it was not actually required to prove" and that there was no distinguishable difference between the precedent and the current case.
Justice Samuel Alito, the lone dissenting opinion, argued that the court's decision does not serve the original purpose of the double jeopardy clause. Alito stated that the original purpose of the double jeopardy clause was to prevent the state, with its superior resources and power, from getting multiple attempts to convict an individual for the same crime. Alito argued that in this situation the state never received a fair opportunity to prosecute the defendant in the first place. Alito further argued that there was no actual acquittal because acquittals are decisions based on resolution of elements of the charged offense, whereas in this case the decision was based on element that was not part of the charged offense.


Link |
|
subscribe |
|
latest newscast |
archive |
Facebook page

|

Supreme Court declines to extend 2010 immigration ruling retroactively
Matthew Pomy on February 20, 2013 2:25 PM ET

[JURIST] The US Supreme Court [official website] ruled [opinion, PDF] Wednesday in Chaidez v. United States [SCOTUSblog backgrounder] that its holding in Padilla v. Kentucky [JURIST report] does not apply retroactively. In Padilla, the court held [opinion, PDF] that immigration attorneys are required to inform their clients about some of the deportation consequences of guilty pleas under the Sixth Amendment [text] of the Constitution. In Justice Elena Kagan's opinion in Chaidez, the court found that this did not apply to cases that were already final on appeal. This means immigrants who wish to appeal their cases to retract guilty pleas may not argue ineffective counsel if their case became final before Padilla was decided in 2010. This is because the question was previously unaddressed or even entirely different in many jurisdictions. Kagan wrote, "When we decided Padilla, we answered a question about the Sixth Amendment's reach that we had left open, in a way that altered the law of most jurisdictions." Supporters of the decision argue this avoids an overflow of appeals of immigration rulings.
The petitioner in Chaidez was indicted in 2003 on three counts of mail fraud and pleaded guilty on the advice of counsel. The government initiated removal proceedings in 2009, and Chaidez appealed, claiming she would not have pleaded guilty if she had been aware that such a plea could result in deportation. The court granted certiorari [JURIST report] in the case last April. The case was then heard [JURIST report] in November. Padilla was decided in March 2010 while Chaidez's motion was pending with the district court.


Link |
|
subscribe |
|
latest newscast |
archive |
Facebook page

|

Supreme Court: state courts may hear malpractice claims arising out of patent disputes
Brandon Gatto on February 20, 2013 2:23 PM ET

[JURIST] The US Supreme Court [official website] on Wednesday ruled unanimously [opinion, PDF] in Gunn v. Minton [SCOTUSblog backgrounder] that federal law does not deprive state courts of subject matter jurisdiction over a state law claim alleging legal malpractice in a patent case. Delivering the opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that while federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all cases arising under patent law pursuant to 28 USC § 1338(a) [text], the court recognized more than a century ago in New Marshall Engineering Co. v. Marshall Engineering Co. [opinion] that not every question involving a patent-related subject must be heard in a federal forum. Roberts reasoned that although the state court would be forced to answer a question of patent law to resolve Minton's legal malpractice claim, the "answer will have no broader effects" because "[i]t will not stand as binding precedent for any future patent claim" nor "even affect the validity of Minton's patent." Finding that there was "no serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum," the court concluded that federal law does not deprive the state courts of subject matter jurisdiction in hearing the claim.
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments [transcript; audio] in the case last month. The suit arose out of computer programmer Vernon Minton's claim of patent infringement against the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc. [corporate websites] in 2000, where he was represented by attorney Jerry Gunn. There, Minton's case was dismissed on summary judgment by the US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas [official website] on grounds that Minton's patent was invalid under the "on sale bar" of 35 USC § 102 [text]. On appeal for reconsideration, Minton unsuccessfully argued for the first time that his patent fell within the "experimental use" exception of the federal law. On further appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit [official website] affirmed [opinion], ruling that the "experimental use" argument was waived because it was not raised initially in the district court. Minton subsequently sued Gunn for legal malpractice in Texas state court, but was similarly defeated on summary judgment. On appeal, Minton argued for the first time that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear his claim against Gunn, and he should therefore be allowed to begin anew in federal court. Although the Supreme Court of Texas [official website] agreed with Gunn [opinion], the US Supreme Court's ruling on Wednesday effectively reverses that judgment and remands for further proceedings.


Link |
|
subscribe |
|
latest newscast |
archive |
Facebook page

|

HRW pushes UN for independent investigation of Sri Lanka rights abuses
Keith Herting on February 20, 2013 12:07 PM ET

[JURIST] Lawyers for Human Rights Watch (HRW) [advocacy website] said Tuesday that they have sent a letter [text] to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) [official website] calling for an independent investigation of Sri Lanka's compliance with its own Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) [JURIST news archive]. In a press release [official statement] announcing the letter, HRW claims that despite assurances by Sri Lanka that they are diligently investigating claims of rights abuses during the 26-year civil war it fought with the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) [CFR backgrounder], there has been little evidence to confirm that claim. HRW would like the UNHRC to consider launching its own investigation into rights abuses and efforts made by the nation to address them when the rights organization meets next month. According to the the author of the letter, Asia Director at HRW, Brad Adams:Over the past year the Sri Lankan government has alternated between threatening activists who seek justice and making small, cynical gestures to keep the international community at bay. The Human Rights Council should dismiss these tactics, end the delays and authorize an independent, international investigation into the estimated 40,000 civilian deaths at the conflict's end. HRW claims that the state of human rights in Sri Lanka have deteriorated since the last time the UNHRC met in March 2012 and that democracy itself is in danger without international intervention.
The Sri Lankan government has faced various allegations of human rights violations and war crimes by civil rights organizations and the UN since the end of its civil war. Earlier this month UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay [official website] criticized [JURIST report] Sri Lanka's failure to investigate abuses adequately. Last July HRW urged Sri Lanka to stop arresting journalists who criticized the government [JURIST report]. In November 2011 the Sri Lankan government was subjected to criticism for its failure to investigate [JURIST report] issues of torture for past human rights violations and to enforce laws against continued torture and ill-treatment by government officials against civilians. In April 2011 a UN panel of experts on Sri Lanka found credible allegations of war crimes [JURIST report] committed during the country's war with the LTTE, warranting further investigation. In June 2010 Pillay called for an international inquiry [JURIST report] into the conduct of the Sri Lankan government during its civil war.


Link |
|
subscribe |
|
latest newscast |
archive |
Facebook page

|

Europe rights court rules Austrian woman can adopt child of same-sex partner
Maureen Cosgrove on February 20, 2013 9:47 AM ET

[JURIST] The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) [official website] ruled [judgment] Tuesday that a woman in a same-sex relationship could adopt her partner's biological child [press release, PDF]. The court held that Austria's existing ban on the practice, also called successive adoption, violated Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights [text, PDF]. The treatment of same-sex couples was discriminatory, the court said, when compared with unmarried, heterosexual couples in which one partner wished to adopt the child of the other partner. The court also concluded that the Austrian government failed to show that excluding successive adoptions by same-sex couples, while allowing unmarried, heterosexual couples to engage in the practice, was necessary for the protection of the "traditional family" or for the protection of the interests of the child. Following the ruling, Amnesty International (AI) [advocacy website] urged the Austrian government to reform its laws [press release] to reflect the court's decision.
Controversy surrounds efforts to expand the adoption rights of same-sex couples. Earlier this week the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany [official website, in German] ruled [judgment, in German] that same-sex couples in a civil union can legally adopt [JURIST report] the non-biological children of their partners. In October the Northern Ireland High Court [official website] held [JURIST report] that a law permitting adoption only by heterosexual married couples or single individuals, regardless of their sexual orientation, is unlawful. That same month the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals [official website] ruled that an Alabama law defining marriage as between one man and one woman bars a woman from adopting her female partner's child [JURIST report]. Just last March the ECHR ruled [JURIST report] that the right of a person in a same-sex partnership to adopt his or her partner's child is not protected by the European Convention on Human Rights.


Link |
|
subscribe |
|
latest newscast |
archive |
Facebook page

|

Supreme Court rules arrest 1 mile from search premises unreasonable
Julia Zebley on February 20, 2013 9:40 AM ET

[JURIST] The US Supreme Court [official website] on Tuesday ruled [opinion, PDF] 6-3 in Bailey v. United States [SCOTUSblog backgrounder; JURIST report] that police cannot a detain a suspect a mile away from the premises in the search warrant. The court found that Michigan v. Summers [opinion] does not apply to this situation, where Chunon Bailey was detained a mile away from his residence. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion, stating that three law enforcement interests considered in Summers—officer safety, facilitating the completion of the search, and preventing flight—are not as important in situations such as Bailey's.[N]one applies with the same or similar force to the detention of recent occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched. Any of the individual interests is also insufficient, on its own, to justify an expansion of the rule in Summers to permit the detention of a former occupant, wherever he may be found away from the scene of the search. This would give officers too much discretion. The categorical authority to detain incident to the execution of a search warrant must be limited to the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched. The court did not address if the arrest would have been constitutional under a Terry stop, and left the issue for remand.
Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan, concurred in the decision but disagreed with the majority's use of interest balancing. Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito. Breyer's dissent argued that the incident was almost indistinguishable from Summers and the court had invited confusion by not explaining what "in the vicinity of the premises" means. "A bright line will sometimes help police more easily administer Fourth Amendment rules, while also helping to ensure that the police do not go beyond the bounds of the reasonable. The majority, however, offers no easily administered bright line. It describes its line as one drawn at 'the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched,' to be determined by 'a number of factors ... including [but not limited to] the lawful limits of the premises, whether the occupant was within the line of sight of his dwelling, the ease of reentry from the occupant's location, and other relevant factors.' The majority's line invites case-by-case litigation although, divorced as it is from interests that directly motivate the Fourth Amendment, it offers no clear case-by-case guidance."


Link |
|
subscribe |
|
latest newscast |
archive |
Facebook page

|

UN urges US Congress to renew Violence Against Women Act
Maureen Cosgrove on February 20, 2013 9:06 AM ET

[JURIST] UN experts on Tuesday urged [press release] the US House of Representatives [official website] to renew the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) [S 47, PDF] which expired in 2011. The bill is intended to increase protections for Native American and Alaskan Native women, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender victims, and immigrant victims and their children. The legislation also give tribal courts on reservations more power to pursue cases against non-indigenous individuals who attack indigenous women on tribal land. Last year the Republican-led House and the Democratic-controlled Senate both passed renewal bills, but they were unable to reach a compromise [AP report] over the prosecutorial power of tribal courts. UN Special Rapporteur Rashida Manjoo [official profile, DOC] emphasized the importance of the legislation:Since its enactment in 1994, the Violence Against Women Act has played a crucial role in providing guidance to state and local level governments, and in facilitating their adequate responses to violence against women. It has steadily expanded funding to address domestic violence and, with each reauthorization, it has included historically underserved groups. The US Senate [official website] voted 78-22 [JURIST report] last week to renew the Act.
In 2011 a UN report [text, PDF] by Manjoo said that there is a continued prevalence of violence [JURIST report] and discriminatory treatment of women in the US, with a heightened impact on poor, minority and immigrant women. The report said the US has taken some positive steps with the passage of the VAWA and the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA) [text, PDF], but concluded that a lack of substantive protective legislation at both the federal and state levels combined with the poor implementation of current laws was resulting in the continued prevalence of violence against women and a discrimination against victims, particularly affecting women in the military, women in detention, Native American women and other women in poor and/or immigrant communities. The report further said that rates of abuse against women are higher among the African American, Native American and immigrant communities. Last year JURIST Senior Editor Brandon Gatto argued that the VAWA should be reauthorized to better protect immigrant partners and spouses from abuse [JURIST report].


Link |
|
subscribe |
|
latest newscast |
archive |
Facebook page

|

Supreme Court hears arguments in Monsanto seed patent dispute
Julia Zebley on February 20, 2013 7:59 AM ET

[JURIST] The US Supreme Court [official website] heard arguments Tuesday in Bowman v. Monsanto [transcript, PDF; JURIST report] on the scope of a Monsanto [corporate website; JURIST news archive] patent [text] on genetically-modified seeds that utilizes Roundup Ready [product website] technology. The seeds are altered to "self replicate," which means that the more one plants the seeds, additional seeds will be produced. Monsanto sued a number of farmers who were using the self-replicating technology in harvests after the season they purchased the seeds, arguing the farmers should have to purchase new seeds every year. Attorneys for the farmers argued that the farmers were using the patent as intended.Patent exhaustion provides that once a patented article is sold, it passes outside the protection of the Patent Act. It is available to be used by the purchaser to practice the invention. Now, what's the invention here? The invention is a bit of DNA that, when asserted into a soy bean seed, makes that seed and all the plants that grow from that seed resistant to the active ingredient in Roundup. Now, the only way to practice that invention is to plant the seed and to grow more seeds. Monsanto argued that its patent specifically alters the soybeans in ways that using other soybeans, which the farmer can buy at a cheaper price, is protected by the patent. For example: "[T]he glyphosate resistance doesn't change the yield of a particular plant, it changes the way you have to control weeds. And he would not be able to use Monsanto's technology that would allow aerial application of an herbicide. He would have to—if he wanted to buy plain old, you know, conventional soybeans, he has to control for weeds in the conventional way."
The court also heard arguments in Millbrook v. US [transcript, PDF; JURIST report] on if 28 USC § 1346 [text] waives the immunity of prison guards who commit intentional torts, within the scope of their authority but not while committing a search, seizure or arrest. Millbrook's attorney argued that the alleged sexual assault on Millbrook occurred within the scope of the prison guards' employment, and suggested that the legislature did not mean to exclude extreme acts of misconduct. And even in Pennsylvania, you see cases where people do outrageous things, like a private detective shooting a picketing protester, where the Pennsylvania courts have held that that's within the scope of employment. It's a complicated issue. It's an issue of State law and it will be different in every State, which is why I would suggest it's more appropriate for this to be handled on remand rather than have a ruling by this Court on a narrow issue of Pennsylvania State law. But I think it is hardly implausible that Pennsylvania courts would find this within the scope of employment. The attorney for the United States argued that a plain reading of the law suggests the waiver is for anything within the scope of the employment, which is defined by State law, regardless of the improper acts committed through that scope: "[T]hose torts [listed] serve as a rough approximation of what Congress anticipated would be the areas where it thought the United States should be liable, when we are talking about Federal law enforcement officers."


Link |
|
subscribe |
|
latest newscast |
archive |
Facebook page

|

Supreme Court to rule on campaign finance case
Julia Zebley on February 20, 2013 7:15 AM ET

[JURIST] The US Supreme Court [official website] granted the first two cases [order list, PDF] of the 2013 term on Tuesday, including one on campaign finance [JURIST backgrounder]. In McCutcheon v. FEC [notice of appeal, PDF; case materials] the court will consider whether the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) [text] limit on individual contributions should be found unconstitutional as unsupported by a sufficient government interest. The court previously held in Buckley v. Valeo [opinion] that limits on contributions implicate First Amendment interests, but that limits may be imposed as long as they are closely drawn to match a sufficiently important governmental interest. Shaun McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee (RNC) [advocacy website] argue that the limit—up to $2,500 per election to federal candidates, up to $30,800 per calendar year to a national party committee, up to $5,000 per calendar year to any non-party political committee, with an aggregate limit of $117,000—is too low and not supported by a sufficient governmental interest because the Federal Election Commission (FEC) [official website] failed to show a specific, rather than generalized, risk of constitutional interference. The US District Court for the District of Columbia ruled [opinion, PDF] for the FEC suggesting the limits on spending were a purely legislative issue. In this case, the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari but accepted appeal under probable jurisdiction.
The court granted certiorari in Sandifer v. United States Steel Corporation [cert. petition, PDF] on the limited question: What constitutes "changing clothes" within the meaning of Section 203(o) [text] of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) [materials]? The law, under the definition for "hours worked," states that employers should "exclude any time spent in changing clothes." A class action of 800 employees from US Steel argue that they should be compensated for the time they spend changing in and out of safety equipment, because that is not what was intended by "clothes" under the act. The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled [opinion] that changing into work clothes is not excluded by the act: "From a worker's standpoint any time spent on the factory grounds is time 'at work' in the sense of time away from home or some other place where he might prefer to be if he weren't at work. But it is not time during which he is making steel, and so it is not time for which the company will willingly pay."
Also Tuesday, the Supreme Court denied stays in two cases. The full court denied a temporary stay in Hedges v. Obama [JURIST news archive], which sought to temporarily block enforcement of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (NDAA) [text, PDF]. Justice Clarence Thomas denied a stay of execution [order, PDF] for Warren Lee Hill [JURIST news archive] and rejected his petition for certiorari. Hill has an IQ of 70 and his execution has been stayed several times due to courts disagreeing on the nature of his mental disability. Despite Thomas' denial, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stayed the execution to consider the issue minutes [Huffington Post report] before Hill was to be executed.


Link |
|
subscribe |
|
latest newscast |
archive |
Facebook page

|

Supreme Court rules parent can appeal in international child custody dispute
Jerry Votava on February 20, 2013 6:22 AM ET

[JURIST] The US Supreme Court [official website] ruled unanimously [opinion, PDF] in Chafin v. Chafin [SCOTUSblog backgrounder; JURIST report] that a parent can appeal a custody ruling when a district court has determined the child's habitual residence is another country and the child has already been removed from the US. The issue in this case stems from a custody dispute between US Army Sergeant Jeffrey Lee Chafin and his Scottish wife, Lynn Chafin. A district court ruled that, under the Hague Convention of the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction [text], their child's habitual place of residence was Scotland, so Mrs. Chafin moved there and took the child with her. The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit [official website] ruled [opinion] earlier this year to dismiss the case on the grounds that it was moot. Chief Justice John Roberts held that an order from an appeals court to a district court would not be moot despite the unlikeliness of compliance of a foreign jurisdiction with a district court's return order. Roberts wrote:Enforcement of the order may be uncertain if Ms. Chafin chooses to defy it, but such uncertainty does not typically render cases moot. Courts often adjudicate disputes where the practical impact of any decision is not assured. ... Courts also decide cases against foreign nations, whose choices to respect final rulings are not guaranteed. ... The Hague Convention mandates the prompt return of
children to their countries of habitual residence. But such return does not render this case moot; there is a live dispute between the parties over where their child will be raised, and there is a possibility of effectual relief for the prevailing parent. The courts below therefore continue to have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the parties’ respective claims. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer in a concurring opinion. Ginsburg wrote, "the advent of rival custody proceedings in Scotland and Alabama is just what the Convention aimed to stave off. This case highlights the need for both speed and certainty in Convention decisionmaking. Most Contracting States permit challenges to first instance return orders." The opinion advocated quick judicial action in these cases.


Link |
|
subscribe |
|
latest newscast |
archive |
Facebook page

|
| For more legal news check the Paper Chase Archive...
|
|
|