G. Eugene Martin [former Executive Director, Philippine Facilitation Project, United States Institute of Peace]: "I am encouraged by recent news of an agreement between the government of the Philippines and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) negotiators but am somewhat skeptical that the underlying causes of the conflict have been fully addressed. The gap between the Philippine government and the Moro minority is extensive as each approaches the issue of sovereignty and self-determination from opposite perspectives. The Moros believe their historically independent and sovereign sultanates have been forceably and illegally incorporated into the Philippine nation (during the US colonial period) without their consent. The government takes the position that inclusion of Moro lands in the territories Spain sold to the US in the Treaty of Paris in 1898, despite a lack of Spanish control, and the US disregard of Moro appeals to be excluded from the Philippine Commonwealth and independent nation gives the government sovereignty over the entire archipelago. Ergo, the Moros believe their right to self-determination if not independence predates Philippine national sovereignty and cannot be limited by the national constitution. The government holds that any grant of self-determination or autonomy has to be determined according to the constitution and national legislation. The legislature is dominated by the 95% non-Moro population of the country and is not sympathetic to Moro demands.

The MILF has agreed to compromise earlier Moro demands for independence (a la Timor Leste) and settle for self-determination under which they can govern themselves through their traditional and culturally formulated institutions and processes. Previous agreements to grant Moros greater local autonomy have failed during implementation as the central government – executive, legislative and judicial – have enervated the political substance of the agreements. The small Moro minority has little political clout nationally and the elites maintain political and economic dominance over affairs in the majority Moro areas of Mindanao. A century of internal migration from northern islands into Mindanao has demographically minoritized and politically and economically marginalized the Moros in their ancestral lands. Government insistence that any grant of regional self-determination has to be approved by a majority of the local population consistently results in the Moro minority losing to the non-Moro majority.

My optimism regarding news of a new agreement is constrained by the lack of public information on the details of the agreement. Interested parties, both Moro and non-Moro, have little if any knowledge of how the so-called break through was reached and what compromises were made. Opponents of any Moro autonomy or self-rule have already broadcast exaggerated reports of land confiscations, political upheavals, and cultural and religious discrimination against non-Moro residents in Mindanao. Lacking reliable public information on the agreement, Moros and supporters of a peace process have little to use to counter rumors and unsubstantiated charges. If the agreement is signed in August it will be publicized and can be studied, discussed and debated nationally. Regrettably, experience suggests the majority population little understands or cares about the Moro situation and is easily swayed by biased, Manila-based media which represents elite interests and and promotes sensational rather than informative and educational stories.

President Macapagal Arroyo's term of office ends in June 2010, leaving little time to change public perceptions and begin implementing an agreement in the face of political opposition which is likely to be fierce. Numerous interest groups — non-Moro land owners of traditional Moro lands, commercial and transport interests, non-Moro and co-opted Moro politicians in fear of losing their offices and privileges, and military groups used to policy influence based upon security considerations — will seek to preserve their perquisites by subverting implementation. Any hope of implementation will require a detailed roadmap with milestones, awards for compliance, penalties for obstructions, and strong, long term central government and Moro commitment to its successful conclusion. The immediate legal challenge to the prospective agreement and the Supreme Court's hold on its August 5th signing is indicative of the likely strong reaction by opponents of a settlement with the Moros. Such a reaction is not unexpected given the unwillingness of the government and the MILF to include all stakeholders in the peace process. Since details of the announced agreement are unknown, people's worst fears prompt legal recourse. The parties should initiate prompt and extensive consultations throughout the nation. International engagement – to monitor and supervise the process, provide economic, political, legal and developmental assistance, and use diplomatic and political leverage – will be needed to help both parties keep on track.

One further issue. While the term "Moro" is used to denote the Islamic minority in the southern Philippines, it covers 12 ethno-linguistic groups which do not necessarily have the same agendas or perspectives. Intra-Moro factions, disagreements, conflicts and rivalries have had nearly as much to do with continued conflict as government or majority population policies. Unless the disparate Moro groupings can be united or agree upon a common agenda and policy, political stability and economic progress is unlikely. The majority population's continuing ability to divide and co-opt Moro communities and leaders has enhanced its ability to weaken Moro resistance and successes.

It is difficult to succinctly summarize an extremely complex historical situation. One can hope the recent news of an agreement will begin the process of resolving the conflict, but it is too soon to say if this is but another in a long list of false rumors and starts."